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ORGANIZED LABOR, THE ENVIRONMENT,
AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
James C. Oldham*
I.

INTRODUCTION

ALTER REUTHER typified much of what is best in organized
labor. He was a man of high intensity, with persistent vision
and lofty goals. Sometimes his flights into idealistic prose must have
seemed flatulent to the rank and file,1 but he strove to keep union
ideals visible and to keep the labor movement on the cutting edge of
social change.
In 1970, not long before his death, Walter Reuther reached this
judgment:

W

I think the environmental crisis has reached such catastrophic proportions that I think the labor movement is now obligated to raise
this question at the bargaining table in any industry that is in a
measurable way contributing to man's deteriorating living environment. And I believe the UAW is obligated to raise this matter at
the bargaining table in 1970.2
Mr. Reuther's exhortation was heeded in Atlantic City, New Jersey,
at the 1970 United Auto Workers (UAW) Annual Convention.
There it was resolved:
Unchecked pollution by the automobile and related industries is of
• Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Georgetown University Law
Center. B.S. 1962, Duke University; LL.B. 1965, Stanford University; M.S.B.A. 1967,
University of Denver.-Ed.
I am indebted to many in the development of this Article, but I should like
especially to acknowledge two groups whose contributions have been invaluable: the
members of my seminar, Public Responsibilities in Private Collective Bargaining, conducted during the spring of 1972, and the many officers and employees of the United
Auto Workers who were consistently generous with their time, thoughts, and information. Particularly helpful was John Yelton, Administrative Assistant to Olga Madarthe Vice President of the United Auto Workers whose responsibilities encompass conservation and the environment. It was through Mr. Yelton that I became the
temporary custodian of the United Auto Workers questionnaires, which are discussed
in some detail herein.
I. A 1952 speech to the CIO Convention, at which Reuther succeeded Philip
Murray to the presidency, is illustrative. As free labor, he said,
We have a job ••• of doing much more than just bargaining for our membership.
We have to assume ever-increasing social responsibilities •••• We must find a way
to realize the tremendous spiritual reservoir that resides within a free people, and
translate that power into constructive approaches to the world's problems-if we
do that, we can win the battle for peace and freedom.
Quoted in J. FITCH, SOCIAL REsPONSIBILITY OF ORGANIZED LABOR 208 (1957).
2. Press Conference, Jan. 8, 1970. Excerpts are printed in The UAW's Fight Against
Pollution IO (undated), a booklet collecting articles concerning environmental problems that have appeared in the UAW Washington Report.
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direct concern to auto workers not only because they are citizens
concerned for their environment but because there is a direct threat
to their jobs and their job security. The worker's stake in resolving
this problem for society and the nation is compounded by the stake
in his own job. We shall raise this issue sharply in 1970 negotiations
in discussions with the companies ...•8

Mr. Reuther's declaration and the subsequent UAW resolution
raise a host of practical and legal questions. Among them:
-Will the companies listen?
-Must the companies listen?
-Can contract provisions with meaningful environmental language be reached that are not trade-offs for bread-and-butter
demands?
-Is ratification by membership a realistic expectation?
-Will the environmental provisions be implemented at the local
level?
Legally, the overriding issue is the extent to which the duty to
bargain under the Taft-Hartley Act4 can be said to encompass matters
of environmental concern to the employee in his role as a member of
the community. A related inquiry is whether employees can, without
fear of reprisal, take a stand against adverse ecological effects of their
employer's operations, particularly if the employees' jobs contribute
to the problem. To phrase the latter question under the Taft-Hartley
Act: Is a concerted refusal by employees to perform work which is
ecologically destructive an exercise of section 7 rights which is
thereby protected by section S(a)(l) of the Act? This question is
complicated by the potential conflict between the union, as a collective representative, and the consciences of individual employees.
Relevant also to those inquiries is the recently enacted Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).5 This statute, even
though almost diluted in its coverage by limitations imposed at the
appropriations stage, 6 has enormous potential. Whether the potential
3. Quoted in I BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 19 (1970).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970). The Taft-Hartley Act, officially known as the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947, amended several provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), ch. 732, 49 Stat. 449, and added several new provisions to the law. Through the remainder of this Article, the current law will be
called the Taft-Hartley Act.
5. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970)).
6. House and Senate conferees on the Labor Department appropriation bill for
fiscal 1973 agreed to "exempt" employers with 15 or fewer employees from OSHA. The
"exemption" took the form of a ban on expenditures for inspection of any such small
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will be realized remains uncertain,7 but federal intervention was
clearly needed to invigorate both industry and organized labor on
in-plant health and safety conditions. 8 The impact that OSHA will
have on out-plant environmental problems is uncertain. Some improvements precipitated by OSHA will benefit the outside environestablishment. Thus, with no supportive legislative hearings, the conferees eliminated
OSHA protections for some 15 million employees, or one fourth of those previously
covered by the Act. See 80 LAB. REL. REP. 308 (1972). These limitations did not, how•
ever, take effect because President Nixon vetoed the entire appropriations bill, which
covered the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare. A new appro•
priations bill (H.R. 16654), which reduced the exemption to three employees or less,
was then subjected to a pocket veto by the President. Therefore, the Act is being ad•
ministered as it was written-with no exemptions. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration is at present operating under a continuing appropriations
resolution.
7. That the OSHA administrators, as presently constituted at least, may not be
taking the bold, sweeping actions necessary to apply the statute as fully as possible
may be indicated by the recently decided "walk-around time" problem. At issue was
whether, under OSHA, employees who exercise their statutory right to accompany
OSHA inspectors during plant tours of safety conditions have the concomitant right to
receive wages for the time spent during the inspection. The matter was raised by the
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW), and the agency determined that
walk-around time is not paid time. This decision was reached by the Solicitor·s
Office of the Department of Labor despite the language of section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 657
(e) (1970), that employee representatives "shall" be given an opportunity to accompany
the inspector and the provision of section ll(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970), prohibiting
discrimination against employees for exercising "any right afforded by this [Act]." The
Labor Department was not bothered by the fact that Mobil had originally left the
salaries of the "walkers" intact, but changed this policy after the company was cited
for three "serious violations" and ninety "other violations." See Office of the Solicitor,
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Memorandum for Assistant Secretary George C. Guenther (March
1, 1972).
The union is resisting this narrow interpretation. On February 14, 1973, a suit,
Leone v. Mobil Oil Co., Civil Action No. 285-73, was filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia requesting damages and a declaratory judgment on
the "walk-around time" issue. Furthermore, OCAW negotiations concerning 415 agreements with oil companies that expired on December 31, 1972, have included demands
that independent consultants survey plants periodically for hazards and that a labormanagement committee police health and safety conditions. According to OCAW
International President Grospiron, success over this issue would give workers a say in
determining whether working conditions are safe. He was careful to add that the
public as well as workers might be affected by plant conditions since "if dangerous
gases are loose in the plants, they're bound to blow downward to the community."
OCAW Press Release, Jan. 4, 1973.
8. See generally J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITIER WAGES: RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP
REPORT ON DISEASE AND INJURY ON THE JOB (1973). Also of siguificance in this regard are
the results of the 1970 UAW strike against General Motors (Gl\f), which reflect the
importance of in-plant health and safety problems at the bargaining table. According
to Irving Bluestone, director of the General Motors Department of the UAW, in 40
out of the 155 plants engaged in local negotiations, management granted 1915 demands
related to working conditions which were "onerous, dangerous, uncomfortable." Of
these, the largest group by far, 673, dealt with "improvement of the plant environment."
This category included such diverse demands as insect and rodent control; ventilation
installation and improvement; noise pollution; cleanliness of cafeterias and locker
rooms; and removal of all oil, water, and other debris from the floors. News from
UAW, Nov. 10, 1971.
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ment as well, 9 but the business expenditures that will be required
to comply and to stay in compliance with OSHA may delay constructive attention to community-oriented environmental problems
at the bargaining table.
The legal issues inherent in treating out-plant pollution under
the Taft-Hartley Act cannot be fully evaluated without a realistic
appreciation of practical considerations and industrial experience.
For this reason, considerable empirical information has been collected
from a variety of sources.10 The examination and evaluation of this
data will precede the legal analysis. The data, it is hoped, will resolve
two questions: What is the effect of out-plant pollution on the
workers, and what has been the response of labor unions to date?
II.

THE

IMPACT OF OUT-PLANT POLLUTION AND THE
ATTITUDE OF EMPLOYEES

Early in this century, Louis Brandeis reflected on the concept of
collective bargaining. He stated:
Two lines of development consistent with industrial democracy seem
to me possible. Both preclude the present arrangement of the socalled individual contract between the employer and employee.
The one possibility is a great advance in collective bargaining
and trade unionism.
The other possibility is the development of cooperation.
Cooperation to be effective means something very different from
mere profit sharing. It means giving to the workman not only a share
of the profits, but a share of the responsibilities and management,
and a utilization of the latent powers in him. There now exists in
9. A striking example was recently provided by the OCAW concerning asbestos
workers and asbestos-contaminated burlap bags. At the plant in question, it was
alleged that not only was the workers' health in danger, but also that members of
the public were placed in jeopardy because they might inhale asbestos contained in
bags that had been used to store asbestos and then sold to nurseries. Washington Post,
Feb. 15, 1972, at A3, col. 4.
IO. In general, the information was collected from national and international unions
headquartered in the United States through correspondence, questionnaires, and
personal visits by the author. In addition, the environmental protection agencies of
every state were- contacted. In the fall of 1971, a series of questions was sent to the
approximately 135 unions headquartered in the United States with membership
exceeding 5000 workers, and at the same time letters were sent to the state environmental protection agencies. Follow-up letters were sent to the unions and agencies
during the summer of 1972. These efforts generated responses from approximately 60
unions (44% of those contacted) and 38 state agencies (76%)Additional information and data were secured through personal visits in "Washington and elsewhere. Of special significance in this connection were two valuable sets of
documents entrusted to the author by the UAW: (I) the questionnaires referred to in
the acknowledgements at the outset of this Article, which the UAW sent during 1970
to 430 local unions and which requested information on occupational health and
safety matters, including environmental concerns that extend beyond the confines of
the work place, and (2) reports of actual health and safety settlements achieved by
about 75 local unions after the termination of the 1970 General Motors strike.
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this country among businessmen an undeveloped and-to a considerable extent-unconscious feeling that something in the line of
this true cooperation is essential; and there is reason to believe that
within a comparatively short time we shall have a marked develop•
ment of such cooperation.11
Brandeis' prophecy proved wrong; instead of employer-employee
"cooperation," collective bargaining was the vehicle which gained
widespread acceptance.12 Fundamental to any concept of collective
bargaining is the question of what is to be bargained about. Although considerable law has developed regarding the subjects that
must be bargained over,18 the first step for the employees and their
union representatives is to sort out priorities and to determine what
to press for at the bargaining table.
Do the individual workers or their unions care about subjects,
such as community environmental problems, that have not traditionally surfaced at the bargaining table? The answer depends on many
factors, some of which are immediately apparent. The views of the
rank-and-file workers will be different from those of their international representative. The interest of the local union in bargaining over "social" issues will generally be less than that of a progressive international.14 The views of the individual workers will
11. Letter to Winthrop Talbot, in 2 l.ErrERS OF Loms D. BRANDEIS, 1907-1912, at
587 (M. Uroksky &: D. Levy ed. 1971).
12. Brandeis' prophecy may yet be fulfilled. A recent article by a student of
workers' management and community control outlines the growing willingness of
Europeans to experiment with worker self-management and the increased discussion
such strategies are receiving in the United States, particularly in the UAW. Case, P'ision
of a New Social Order, THE NATION, Feb. 14, 1972, at 200. See also Senator Wagner's
concept of a labor-management "partnership," discussed in text accompanying notes
254-57 infra.
13. In both the Wagner Act and its successor, the Taft-Hartley Act, the duty of
employers to bargain pertained to "wages, hours and other conditions of employment."
Taft-Hartley Act § S(d), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). See also Taft-Hartley Act § 9, 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1970). What constitutes "wages, hours and other conditions of employment," is not spelled out in the statute, and it is this skeletal phrase which has been
fleshed out by Board and court decisions. See text accompanying notes 173-228 infra.
14. Recall the remarks of Walter Reuther in note 1 supra. Consider also the
remarks of Irving Bluestone of the UAW: "But we have never lost sight of the fact
that we are just one little piece of the total society. And that our effort must be to
move the totality of the society along. We have tried to fashion our collective bargaining
proposals so that what helps our people also is in tune with the needs of society."
Johnson&: Kotz, The Unions-III, For Young Workers, Old Leaders, Washington Post,
April 11, 1972, at AS, col. 6, col. 7.
At the local level, the idealistic union goals often espoused by international spokesmen may lose some of their allegiance. As authors of one study concluded: "Almost all
workers were convinced of [the union's] value as a form of job security; only a
minority showed 'emotional identification' with its organized goals." L. SAYLES 8: G.
STRAUSS, THE LoCAL UNION 132 (1967).
A graphic illustration of the tension between international goals and local interests
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depend on their skills, their age, their dependents, and like determinants. Job security always looms large at the local level, and this
remains true notwithstanding increasing alienation of younger workers from both their jobs and the unions to which they belong.111
To evaluate how these generalizations apply to environmental
matters, three inquiries are pertinent. First, to what extent are jobs
being jeopardized by pollution cleanup requirements? Second, are
individual workers affected to any great extent by the polluting
effects of an employer's operations? Third, are there individual
workers who are prepared to disregard job security to resist the performance of certain types of work that have injurious environmental
consequences? Answers to these questions should facilitate a judgment on the importance of out-plant environmental issues to the
laboring public.

A. Job Security

As workers in the paper industry, we are aware of the pollutants
which result from our productive operations. We are aware of the
fact that workers and management must continually search for new
means to reduce and eliminate such pollutants.
However, we are also becoming increasingly aware of the real
danger of losing many of our jobs because of incessant and strenuous
demands that our industry immediately eliminate all forms of pollution, regardless of cost and irrespective of the present state of abatement technology in the industry. 16
occurred in the UAW's 1970 GM strike. During that struggle, the GM division of the
international union asked if its Local No. 160 would permit 306 of its 5000 hourly
workers to cross picket lines in order to work on auto emission and safety developments. According to Irving Bluestone, the UAW did not "want to give GM the opportunity to place the blame on UAW for holding back progress on pollution control." 1
BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 664 (1970). Local No. 160, however, refused to
cooperate and voted against letting the 306 workers continue their pollution control
efforts. Id. See also note 114 infra.
15. As Leonard Woodcock, President of the UAW, has written:
Those who sit below the salt, and that still includes most wage-earners and their
families, are not in a position to take a bold, intransigent stand against pollution
and the employers who are its major perpetrators. Even though they have
traditionally been and remain the chief victims of pollution, working people are
obliged by the insecurity of their jobs and lives, by their families' needs and by
their loyalties to wives and children, to give "the smell of the paycheck" priority
over a wholesome working and living environment-when they are offered no
other choice.
Woodcock, Labor and Politics of Environment, SIERRA Cura BUI.I,,, Dec. 1971, at 11, 14.
16. United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, CLC, A Position Paper on
Air and Water Pollution Control Measures in the Paper and Allied Products Industry
1 (undated) (emphasis original) [hereinafter UPP Position Paper]. This position paper
better operating efficiency and lower water costs, yielding a ten per cent return on the
Soon after the issuance of this paper, the United Papermakers and Paperworkers
merged into the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers to form the United Paperworkers International Union.
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The foregoing statement by the United Papermak.ers and Paperworkers Union has represented and may still represent a relatively
common position throughout organized labor.17 Such a stance is
based on the often unarticulated but major premise that "[m]ost
pollution abatement expenditures do not increase productivity and
do not produce a :financial retum." 18 Since job security occupies such
a prominent position in the hierarchy of employee concerns, the
impact of environmental activities on job opportunities must be
carefully considered.

I.

Calculation of Pollution Abatement Costs

The assumption that expenditures for pollution abatement offer
no corresponding :financial benefits has been used by industry in
resisting environmental controls. This argument may be used in
union negotiations-without union restraint on wages and benefits
the increased costs of pollution control may lead to closing a plant.10
Alternatively, the argument may be offered to mobilize union opposition to environmentally beneficial legislation or regulation. 20
Yet, beneath the surface of such appeals lies a difficult problem: How
can cost estimates placed by industry on the pollution abatement
requirements applied to any given plant be objectively evaluated?
Some researchers have alleged that cleanup estimates prepared by
consultants for industry have led in several instances to a dilution
of otherwise applicable environmental standards, even though it
could be demonstrated that the estimates were based on significant
misapprehensions. As a result, the suggestion has been made that
environmental agencies must develop the staff capability to make
their own cost studies or to analyze the cost studies submitted to
them.21
One of the difficulties with industry's cost estimates is that the
:figures tend to be gross projections of capital expenditures required
for pollution abatement, which do not take into account offsets that
would accrue to the company in the form of federal tax credits,
depreciation allowances, savings because of better operating efficiency, and revenues from the sale of products recovered in the
abatement process. As noted in a study on pollution costs prepared
17. See, e.g., the reference by Leonard Woodcock to the sentiments of the workers
in note 15 supra. See also text accompanying notes 98-102 infra.
18. UPP Position Paper, supra note 16, at 4.
19. See pt. III. A. infra.
20. See text accompanying note 162 infra.
21. 2 BNA ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 1293 (1972).
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for the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), these offsets are not insignificant.22
In fact, Carl Gerstacker, Chairman of the Board of the Dow Chemical Company, maintains that, by care and ingenuity, pollution control can be profitable. In a speech to the Economic Club of Detroit
in early 1972, Gerstacker flatly stated that Dow had made good
profits on the capital it had spent for pollution control.23 He and his
22. The report states:
Although these studies focused on adverse economic impacts, it should be
noted that there will be positive economic impacts as well. An example of positive
economic impacts, which were not addressed by the microeconomic studies, is
increased profits and employment (a) in the industries that produce pollution
abatement equipment and services, (b) the industries that produce relatively lowpolluting products, and (c) some of the firms in the industries that are impacted
by environmental regulations (i.e., firms that absorb the market shares previously
held by firms that are not efficient when measured by their use of total resources,
including the environment, and thus close when they must incur pollution abatement costs).
Examples of positive economic impacts, which were not addressed by either
the microeconomic or macroeconomic studies, are (a) possible productivity increases where environmental regulations stimulate technological developments
(e.g., changes in production processes which both increase productivity and reduce
pollution), and (b) increases in the average level of productivity in some industries
as environmental regulations result in the closing of plants that are inefficient in
their use of total resources. Further, no attempt was made to quantify the economic benefits of a cleaner environment (e.g., higher crop yield, increased manhours of productive work) or to compare these benefits with the costs of pollution
abatement. Finally, since the macroeconomic analysis employs the conventional
national income accounts framework, it overstates the net costs (or understates the
net benefits) to society because such accounting fails to include the benefits of a
cleaner environment.
U.S. COUNCIL ON EN\'IRONMENTAL QUALITY, DEPT. OF Co~n.IERCE & ENVIRONMENTAL PRO•
UCTION AGENCY, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION CONTROL: A SUMMARY OF RECENT
STUDIES 4-5 (1972) [hereinafter CEQ STUDY].
23. Address by Carl A. Gerstacker, Feb. 22, 1972. Some of the examples given by
Gerstacker were: a 7.2 million dollar cooling tower investment which would produce
better operating efficiency and lower water costs, yielding a ten per cent return on the
investment; a 2.7 million dollar investment to recover chlorine and hydrogen previously lost to the atmosphere, yielding 900,000 dollars per year in savings in operating
costs; a 750,000 dollar investment to reduce solids discharged into the Mississippi, resulting in 250,000 dollars annual savings in material and water costs; and pollution
control projects installed in 14 latex plants at a cost of 2 million dollars, expected to
cut operating costs by approximately 2 million dollars a year.
These are dramatic examples; Gerstacker acknowledged that they were selected for
that reason and not all experiments by Dow had been so successful. But the point is
significant: Pollution abatement processes are capital expenditures with concomitant
revenues and savings, arguably to the point of no net cost.
There is further support for this proposition. In a speech before the Town Hall of
California on March 14, 1972, Richard Cheney, President of the Glass Container Manufacturers' Institute, stated that reclamation and recycling of bottles alone was approaching one billion bottles per year. Secondary uses of the reclaimed material, including
glasphalt paving, bricks, blocks, and terrazo floors, were being developed.
Perhaps the most advanced system for mining the "urban ore" of discarded materials was designed by the Black Clawson Company for the Franklin, Ohio, refuse-processing plant. Using magnets, the plant is capable of processing 150 tons of trash per
day, from which 27 tons of paper fiber, 9 tons of ferrous metals, 9 tons of crushed
glass, and 1,500 pounds of aluminum are normally recovered. Aside from establishing
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fellow officers are convinced that the company can average its entire
pollution abatement program at zero net cost.
Given this testimony of actual and potential offsetting revenues
attending pollution control, environmental agencies should require,
at a minimum, that corporations bear a burden of proof that includes not merely a gross analysis but a net cost analysis as well.
Unions can often assist in this regard since capital expenditures for
pollution abatement will undoubtedly be discussed at the bargaining
table in conjunction with the company's ability to accommodate
wage and fringe benefit demands. 24

2. Pollution Abatement Costs and Plant Closings
Even if the premise that pollution abatement expenditures do
not produce a financial return is accepted, it does not resolve
whether such expenditures actually eliminate jobs, or whether they
constitute a make-weight rationale for shutting down plants which
were marginal to begin with. Unquestionably, a number of industrial facilities have been and will continue to be closed down,
ostensibly because of financial inability to surmount required pollution abatement costs,!l 5
This problem has led the EPA to attempt an "early-warning
system" which will permit early identification of industrial plants
that may be in jeopardy because of environmental requirements. 26
The plan has been structured so that the EPA will alert the Department of Labor to EPA enforcement actions in time for the Department to take "prompt and appropriate action to avoid or minimize
unemployment problems."27 Initial attention will be focused on
a pollution-free waste disposal system, the plant can apparently operate profitably. Public Relations Dept,, American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Facts, Fall 1971, at 12.
Finally, governmental incentives should not be overlooked. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has indicated that as a consequence of President Nixon's 1972
environmental message to Congress, it will be "clarifying the availability of tax exempt
treatment industrial revenue bond financing for the construction of recycling facilities
built by private concerns to recycle their own wastes." 2 BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 1486 (1972). There have also been proposals in Congress that would enable
the Small Business Administration to make loans to facilitate alterations or changes
in plant, equipment, or production methods caused by federal or state pollution regulations. 3 id. at 344, 431 (1973).
24. Cf. NLRJ3 v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
25. Media reports have documented a number of these situations. See, e.g., Calame,
Fearing Loss of Jobs, Union Battle Efforts To Clean Environment, Wall St. J., Nov. 19,
1971, at 1, col. 6; Scates, A Choice: Pollution or Poverty, Washington Post, Jan. 23,
1972, at A3, col. l; Udall &: Stansbury, Selling Ecology to the Hard Rats, Washington
Post, April 25, 1971, at Bl, col. I.
26. 2 BNA ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 856 (1971).
27. Id. at 884 (1971).
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economically depressed areas; and, if the cooperative program is
successful, plans will be formulated to extend it to the Department
of Commerce, the Small Business Administration, and the Economic
Development Administration.28
The EP A's early-warning system presupposes that plant closures
caused by environmental requirements constitute a serious problem
for American industry and for organized labor. However, there are
reasons to think that the problem is not as severe as labor or media
reports would indicate. For instance, there is evidence that most of
the plant closings simply hasten the inevitable. According to the
CEQ study previously mentioned:
Most of the firms or plants that will be forced to close are
currently marginal operations (e.g., smaller, older, less efficient producers) that were already in economic jeopardy due to other competitive factors. In such cases, the impact of environmental standards is
only to accelerate closings that would have occurred anyway. The
pollution abatement costs either eliminate already slender profit margins or reduce them to a level at which they fail to justify the
required capital expenditures in pollution abatement equipment (in
terms of an adequate return on investment).29

The over-all conclusion of the report was that, although not
inconsequential, "the impact of those pollution control costs that
were estimated and examined would not be severe in that they
would not seriously threaten the long-run economic viability of the
industrial activities examined."30 And from a macroeconomic stand28. Id.
29. CEQ STUDY, supra note 22, at IO. In terms of numbers, the report states:
There are approximately 12,000 plants currently operating in the industrial activities studied. Of these it is expected that approximately 800 would close in the
normal course of business between 1972 and 1976. It would appear from the contractors' evaluations that an additional 200-300 will be forced to close because of

pollution abatement requirements. Many of these additional closings would appear
to involve plants that were vulnerable for other reasons and, hence, that were
likely to have closed anyway a few years later.
Id. See also Udall &: Stansbury, supra note 25, at B4, col. I, quoting former environmental official Ben Linsky to the effect that "[a]ny plant so marginal that a small addition to its cost threatens a shutdown is probably being carried on faith credit and has
been sick for a long time."
30. CEQ STUDY, supra note 22, at 3. That pollution control costs are not inconsequential is highlighted by continuing announcements of plant closings or shutdowns
caused by pollution cleanup requirements. Recent examples include a Maryland sulphuric acid plant of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, an Arizona mining and milling facility
operated by Duval Corporation, the Weyerhauser Company Sulphite Pulp Mill in
Everett, Washington, and a California plant that manufactures particle board. 2 BNA
ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 920, 1059-60, ll48, 1238, 1293 (1972). Over all, the
EPA reports that during the second quarter of 1972, environmental regulations were a
factor in the closing of three plants and the curtailing of production in three others. It
is projected that nine additional plants might close and one more might curtail pro•
duction in the near future. There were a total of 21 closings and 13 curtailments be-
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point, the study indicated that "the national economy will not be
severely impacted by the imposition of pollution abatement standards."31
Clearly, there have been and will continue to be valid instances
of plant closings precipitated by environmental control requirements
imposed on industry. However, insistence upon careful net cost
data should keep these instances to a low number, affecting a minimal percentage of the work force. For those employees whose jobs
are displaced, new approaches are feasible such as the protective
legislation being advanced by the UAW.32 In view of these considerations, it is fair to conclude that the job scare attending pollution
abatement efforts has been overdrawn. It should not be the basis for
a retraction of environmental requirements except in cases that
have received extremely close attention and documentation.
B.

The Effect of Out-Plant Pollution on Workers as
Members of the Community

The extent to which industrial workers are affected by out-plant
pollution caused by the industrial facilities in which they work depends on a number of factors, chief among which are the type of
industry and its geographic and demographic setting. As to the
latter, there are three principal situations in which out-plant pollution is likely to affect workers significantly: the company town,
the "captive community," and the urban industrial setting.
I. The Company Town
The company town, although rare today, was historically a relatively familiar feature of American business.33 Because of a plant's
tween January 1971 and June 1972. In the same time period, 44 closings and 13 curtailments were threatened. 3 id. at 572 (1973).
31. CEQ STUDY, supra note 22, at 11. The approach used to prepare the CEQ Study
was to conduct one macroeconomic analysis and eleven microeconomic analyses, each of
which was performed by an independent consulting firm under the guidance of the
Council of Economic Advisors. Id. at 3, 5. The eleven microeconomic studies addressed
the following industries: automobiles, baking, cement, electric power generators, fruit
and vegetable canning and freezing, iron foundries, leather tanning, nonferrous metals
smelting and refining, petroleum refineries, pulp and paper mills, and steel-making. Id.
at 6.
32. See text accompanying notes 79-85 infra.
33. See, e.g., s. BUDER, PULLMAN-AN ExPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL ORDER AND COMMUNITY PLANNING, 1880-1930 (1967); J. ARMSfR0NG, FACTORY UNDER THE ELMS: A HIS·
TORY OF HARRISVILLE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1774-1969 (1969). Usually the company town
was created because of geographic necessity, but sometimes the efforts were altruistically
motivated, such as the case of Pullman, Illinois.
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remote location, the workers in such a setting generally have no
choice about where they live; their lot is company-owned housing.
Obviously, the influence of the employer permeates the lives of the
employees beyond the eight hours per day when the employees may
physically be at the plant. It is for this reason that the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts have upheld the position of
the workers that such things as rent of the company housing constitute "conditions of employment" that are mandatory subjects for
bargaining.34

2. The Captive Community
Another situation, which closely parallels that of the company
town, might be termed the "captive community." Here, even though
independent businesses, housing, and other commercial amenities
exist, the community is nevertheless extraordinari~y dependent upon
a single corporate entity that operates a major industrial plant in the
area. Dependence will occur primarily because the corporation is
the chief employer in the town, but there will also be indirect connections between the corporation and other community interests and
services such as real estate and banking.35 This pattern is not uncommon in rural communities throughout the United States. A good
example is the town of St. Mary's, Georgia. In this community of
about 1,800 residents, nearly all of the wage earners are employed
by the Gilman Paper Company.36 The mill also indirectly supports
many of the remaining 3,400 residents of Camden County. Until
34. See, e.g., American Smelting &: Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 522 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969); NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th
Cir. 1953); Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
35. A community can be "captive" to industry in other ways as well. Even though
an industrial complex may not employ the bulk of the workers in a community, the
industrial activity which does exist may create pollution that captivates the entire area.
A case in point is Helena, Montana, as revealed in a 1972 study by the EPA. There,
the EPA bluntly concluded:
Atmospheric concentrations of sulphur dioxide in the Helena Valley exceed
Montana air quality standards and levels reported in federal criteria to be associated with deleterious effects on human health, vegetation, and materials. Industrial
operations of American Smelting and Refining Company and Anaconda Company
in East Helena are the responsible sources.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECfION AGENCY, HELENA, MONTANA, AREA ENVIRONMETAL
POLLUTION STUDY 1 (1972) [hereinafter HELENA, MONTANA STUDY].
The American Smelting and Anaconda Plants referred to employed a combined
total of 260 workers out of a population of roughly 29,000. Id. at 6-7. Since these
workers cannot escape the reach of their employer's emissions, their conditions of employment extend beyond the work place in much the same fashion as in the company
town.
36. Shuck & Wellford, Democracy and the Good Life in a Company Town, HARPERS,
May 1972, at 56, 57.
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recently, all workers at the mill were required to live in St. Mary's;87
they reportedly encounter the influence of the mill in virtually all
of the commercial enterprises that the community harbors.38
If St. Mary's, Georgia, is typical, these captive communities may
have been saved by their industrial captors from economic desuetude.39 Small communities frequently solicit the introduction of
industry in order to secure new jobs and other advantages for their
residents.40 Nevertheless, it is clear that in these communities the
lives of the workers are intricately interwoven with the fate of the
resident corporation. And, occasionally, the chamber-of-commerce
advantages of attracting industry tum sour. The community may
become subject to political manipulation,41 or there may be environ37. Id. at 58-59.
38. Shuck and Wellford described the situation at St. Mary's in the following manner:
The workers [sic] who does move to St. Mary's is drawn into an intricate web
of economic and financial relationships, the strands of which all lead back to the
mill. He has probably bought his house from the major real estate company in St.
Mary's, controlled by the Brumley Family. [Brumley is the mill's manager.] He has
probably mortgaged his house and car to St. Mary's State Bank, also controlled by
Brumley, and purchased life and home owner insurance from Flem Hall, cashier
at this bank. The mortgage funds probably come from First Federal Savings and
Loan Association in Brunswick, of which Brumley is a Director ••••
Id. at 59.
39. Id. at 63.
40. For a study of labor market behavior in selected small communities, see R. WIL·
COCK & I. SOBEL, SMALL CITY JOB MARKETS: THE LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS AND
WORKERS (1958). As the authors note:
Within recent years, significant labor market changes have been created by the substantial amount of geographic decentralization of American industry. Factories, in
many cases branch plants of large firms, have been moving not only into the suburbs of large urban centers but also into small communities beyond the orbit of
large metropolitan labor market areas. For many of these small communities, the
new plant represents, if not the only industrial employment, at least a major proportion of such job opportunities. Among the results of small town industrialization are better-balanced populations, with fewer young persons "lost" to the cities,
higher living standards for many residents and a higher utilization of labor force
potential.
Id. at 5. Occasionally, this desire to attract industry subordinates other goals such as
environmental protection. As put by H. S. Houthakker, a member of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors, "It is conceivable that a depressed area may want to at•
tract industry at the expense of a less stringent ambient air standard; the citizens of
that area should be able to have some influence on the choice involved ••••" Quoted
in Woodcock, supra note 15, at 13. Leonard Woodcock has characterized Mr. Houthakker's statement as the "old and ever-new government-industry partnership against the
unorganized, the unemployed, the poor and their communities." Id. at 14. Nevertheless,
the residents of small communities do frequently agitate for industry at any cost. In
Midland, Michigan, citizens staged a mass rally to protest the delays which construction plans on an atomic power plant had suffered because of environmental requirements. Detroit News, Oct. 13, 1971, at 2A, col. 1. Another example, ironic in retrospect,
is Everett, Washington, currently suffering because of the shutdown of mills due to
environmental requirements. That city was once billed by the Chamber of Commerce
as "The City of Smokestacks." Scates, supra note 25, at A3, col. I.
41. This was alleged to have occurred in St. Mary's, Georgia. See Shuck & Wellford,
supra note 36.
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mental abuses to which the residents become subject and over which
they have very little control. An infamous example of the latter
occurred years ago in Donora, Pennsylvania, where several residents
were killed and a great many hospitalized because a stagnant cloud
of coal dust had lodged in the valley in which the community sits.42
More recent examples have occurred in Buffalo Creek Valley, West
Virginia, and Providence Valley, Elkton, Maryland. In February
1972, at least ll5 persons died in Buffalo Creek Valley and more
than 80 per cent of the homes of the Valley's 5,000 residents were
destroyed as a result of the collapse of a huge bank of slag and industrial waste built up over the years by the Buffalo Mining Companyf8
In Providence Valley, residents who were made ill by fumes exuding
from the chemical plant located there were awarded damages by a
county court for their "very real, substantial and unreasonable injuries, both physical and in the enjoyment of their properties."44
The chemical plant was the only industrial operation in the valley,
which has about 200 residents.
For the chemical workers and miners living in Providence Valley
and Buffalo Creek Valley, and for workers similarly situated in other
captive communities, it is obvious that their lives were and are
affected around the clock by the operations of their employers. Their
"conditions of employment" encompass much more than the circumstances attending their eight-hour working shifts each day.
3. The Urban Industrial Community

The third and most pervasive geographic setting in which workers' lives are affected by the adverse environmental impact of their
employers' operations is the familiar urban industrial area within
42. See Roueche, The Fog, in B. RouECHE, ELEvEN BLUE MEN 194 (1953) and in
EcoLOGICAL CRISIS-READINGS FOR SURVIVAL 125 (G. Love & R. Love ed. 1970).
43, Caudill, Buffalo Creek Aftermath, SAT. REv., THE SOCIETY, Aug. 26, 1972, at 16.
44. Capurro v. Galaxy Chem. Co., Nos. 33lll & 3357, Slip Op. at 5 (Cir. Ct., Caroline
County, Md., June 3, 1972). Judge Wise found it particularly significant that the president of the corporation testified under oath when speaking of corrective measures that
might be taken "that he considered corporate survival his first priority, above any
consideration of the interests of the Plaintiffs and the plant neighborhood.'' Slip Op.
at 4. The damage suit in question proceeded under a nuisance theory, and was the
aftermath of an earlier injunction suit that had been successfully maintained by the
residents. Slip Op. at 2-3.
Pertinent also is a recent award by a jury to a Sumter, South Carolina, farmer of
lll5,000 dollars for damage to his land caused by the pollution of a local stream by
four Sumter industries. According to the farmer, raw waste dumped into the stream
damaged his timber, produced an offensive odor, intensified the mosquito problem, and
generally depreciated enjoyment of his property. The jury awarded 10,000 dollars in
actual damages and punitive damages of 125,000 dollars. 3 BNA ENV. REP. (Current
Developments) 95 (1973).
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which manufacturing or processing facilities are located. Because of
the proximity of the homes of many workers to their place of work,
these employees are affected to a significant extent by pollution
emanating from their employers' industrial facilities. 45 According to
a 1965 Census Bureau Study, 34 per cent of all blue-collar workers
(craftsmen, operatives, and laborers) lived within three miles or less
of their place of work, and an additional 15 per cent lived four or
five miles away.46 While generalized data may not be available or
feasible regarding patterns of dispersion of stationary source industrial pollutants, studies indicate that instances of dispersion in excess
of several miles are common.47
45. As noted by Udall and Stansbury:
Increasingly, younger labor leaders realize that most workers live near their plants
in some of the worst urban neighborhoods, and that the very poisons environmentalists hope to remove from the outside community do their greatest damage
inside the blue-collar work place. For these reasons, the industrial worker stands
to gain more than anyone else from the ecology movement.
Udall&: Stansbury, supra note 25, at B5, col. I. See also Woodcock, supra note 15, at 15.
46. U.S. BUREAU OF nm CENsus, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1963 CENSUS OF TRANSPORTATION, PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION SURVEY, HOME-TO-WORK TRAVEL, ADVANCE REPORT
12 (1965). Similar geographic distributions in percentage terms were found to exist for
clerical or sales workers, and for professional and managerial employees. For "service
and private workers," 51 % were found to live three miles or less away from their work.
Id. Two observations on these data should be made, however. First, while the geo•
graphic distribution from home to work of white- and blue-collar workers may be
similar, the place of work of the blue-collar worker will more often be at a source of
industrial pollution than the place of work of the white-collar worker, Second, there
are numerically more blue-collar workers than employees in the other categories,
and, in that sense, blue-collar workers are the class most affected by pollution from
stationary sources. For example, according to the 1965 study, 35% of workers living
one mile or less from their place of employment were blue collar (craftsmen, opera•
tives, and laborers) compared with 23% of professional and managerial employees. For
workers living two or three miles from work, the comparison was 38% to 23%, respectively. Id.
In some heavy industrial areas, the disparity between the number of blue-collar
and professional or managerial employees is considerably greater. For example, according to 1970 census data for the Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, Indiana, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), approximately 45% of the workers who reside in
the area are craftsmen, operatives (except transport), and nonfarm laborers, compared
with the 17% who are professional and managerial employees. U.S • .BUREAU OF THE
CENsus, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS TO POPULATION AND HOUSING, CENSUS TRACTS:
GARY-HAMMoND-EAsT CHICAGO, !ND., STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA 17
(1972). The heavily industrial cliaracter of the SMSA is reflected in the fact that 44%
of all employees living in the area are engaged in manufacturing, and over 82% reported their place of work as being within the SMSA. Id. at 9, 17.
47. For example, in the Environmental Protection Agency's study of Helena Valley,
Montana, see note 35 supra, dispersion of sulphur oxides at levels exceeding acceptable
air quality criteria carried from the East Helena Industrial Complex for distances well
in excess of five miles. HELENA, MONTANA STUDY, supra note 35, at 1, 10, 25-44. For
additional studies containing similar data, see U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPT. OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, IRONTON, 0Hio-AsHLAND, KENTUCKY-HUNTINGTON,
WEST VIRGINIA, AIR POLLUTION .ABATEMENT ACTIVITY, PRE-CONFERENCE INVESTIGATIONS
62-63 (1968); U.S. PUBLIC HEALm SERVICE, DEPT, OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
PARKERSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA-MARIETIA, Omo, AIR POLLUTION .ABATEMENT ACTIVITY 4855 (1967).
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The extent to which the lives of industrial workers are affected
by the polluting activities of their employers may be evaluated
further by considering the results of an empirical study undertaken
by the UAW during 1970. In February of that year, the UAW
International Headquarters sent an "Environmental, Occupational
Health and Safety Questionnaire" to over 400 local unions.48 Although many of the questions dealt with in-plant safety conditions,49
48. The questionnaire, which is reproduced in Appendix A infra, was completed by
430 local UAW unions, the bulk of which (152) are located in Michigan. Geographically,
the next largest grouping (69 locals) is Canadian. The remainder is distributed throughout the United States, although the number of locals located in New England, the
Rocky Mountains, and the Deep South is small.
The questionnaire utilized by the UAW was a successor to a questionnaire fashioned
by the OCAW and circulated in 1969 pertaining to occupational health and safety matters. The OCAW circulated its questionnaire to 508 locals, of which 130 provided
usable responses. In conjunction with this questionnaire, the OCAW held a series of
regional conferences throughout the United States and Canada to discuss hazards in
the industrial environment. A representative transcript of one of these conferences,
together with the tabulated results of the questionnaires and elaborative testimony,
was presented to the House Education and Labor Committee in hearings on OSHA.
Hearings on H.R. 81J, H.R. J809, H.R. 1291, and H.R. 1JJ7:J Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, at 1179-217, 1233-307, 1484-86 (1969) [hereinafter H.R. 81J Hearings]. The questionnaire in blank was also printed. Id. at 1217-18. Comparable testimony on behalf of the
OCAW was presented to the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Hearings on
S. 219J and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st 8: 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1007-72 (1970) [hereinafter S. 219J
Hearings].
Subsequent to the distribution of the UAW questionnaire, OSHA was passed, and
for this and other reasons the questionnaire was never analyzed by the UAW except
in a general way. In 1971, the returned questionnaires were released to the author's
custody, facilitating a computer analysis of the results. The original data were refined
in two ways: according to (1) the size of the local and (2) the type of production taking
place at the plant. With regard to size, the largest two groupings were locals with less
than 100 members (81 locals or 19% of those surveyed) and those with more than 1000
members (67 locals or 16%), Surmising that relatively different patterns of answers to
the questionnaire might attend these two groups, they were isolated for cross-tabulation purposes. A similar isolation was fashioned around the type of production. Two
categories were created: "service and assembly" and "heavy industry," which together
encompassed 274 of the 430 locals. These two categories were also selected for crosstabulation on the assumption that significant differences in questionnaire responses
would be revealed. For some purposes, the size of the locals proved irrelevant; for example, the number of bargaining units was not significantly greater with larger locals
than with smaller locals. However, as demonstrated in the succeeding text and notes,
the assumption that the size of the local was a significant determinant generally proved
to be correct, in contrast to the type of production, which did not reveal as many differences as had been expected.
49. See Appendix A infra. The in-plant data is relevant to this Article in two ways:
first, in-plant problems are often related to out-plant pollution, as when ventilation
causes fumes to be discharged into the outside environment; second, the attitude of
management to in-plant safety and health issues may be helpful in assessing the responsiveness of companies to the well being of workers as members of the community
affected by company operations.
Only about one fifth of the locals reported that the employer measured industrial
air contaminants and physical agents, and even fewer employers released data to employees. Only 17% of the locals had asked the companies to monitor standards on a
regular basis, with the requests coming predominantly from larger locals.
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a number of questions related directly to the out-plant pollution
effects of the industrial facilities for which the local unions are
certified bargaining representatives.
When asked whether their members knew if their plant was
contributing to pollution of the surrounding air, water, and land,
59 per cent of the 430 unions answered that the plants were contributing to pollution. In locals with membership exceeding 1,000,
this figure rose to 78 per cent. 5° Fifty-seven per cent of the locals
indicated that their plants did not have devices to purify wastes
before discharge into the air or water; however, this condition
was more prevalent in the plants associated with small unions than
those associated with large ones.51
Seventy-eight locals, or 18 per cent of those responding, indicated
that their plants had been cited for air or water pollution violations
by a governmental agency. This figure rose to 26 per cent for local
unions affiliated with heavily industrial plants, and to 37 per cent
for local unions with membership exceeding 1,000.
These results, while not surprising, represent a disquieting confirmation of the pervasiveness of polluting activities by a broad cross
section of industry as recently as 1970. Even more disturbing are the
figures that describe the polluting activities which individual employees are required to engage in as part of their employment obliThe availability of medical care on the work premises and the presence of company•
sponsored medical testing correlated with the size of the local unions. Significantly,
36% of all local unions reported that their companies had no safety or health programs,
although more of the large locals, 79%, reported such programs.
Responding to a call for suggestions, the most frequent recommendation was the
establishment of a safety committee. To remedy the effects of harmful substances in
the work place, 31 % of the locals called for better ventilation; there was no indication, however, that the employees were concerned with the effect of harmful fumes once
they were aired outside the work place.
More than 40% of the locals reported that the poor safety attitude of the companies
was their chief difficulty, Undoubtedly, these figures do not represent a fully objective
point of view; only 9 of the 430 unions indicated that indifference of the membership
to health and safety issues caused any problems. Other figures substantiate this point:
40% of the unions indicated that they did not spot check the safety or health engineering equipment used by their members.
Presumably the foregoing plant conditions will undergo radical changes as the impact of OSHA is felt. The data revealed by the UAW questionnaire can certainly be
viewed as a belated corroboration of the need for the Act.
Exact responses for both in-plant and out-plant data may be obtained from the author.
50. The corresponding figure for small unions is 44%,
51. In locals with less than 100 members, 73% reported that there were no wastepurifying devices, whereas the negative responses in large unions amounted to 37%,
Among those locals associated with plants that have been labeled "heavy industry" or
"service and assembly," a lack of purifying devices was reported in 55% of the cases
in both categories-a figure corresponding closely to the over-all percentage given in
the text (57%),
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gations. When asked if their members are assigned job tasks by plant
management that result in air or water pollution, 37 per cent of the
locals answered affirmatively. In heavy industrial unions, the figure
rose to 43 per cent, and, in unions with membership exceeding
1,000, the figure climbed to 46 per cent. These statistics are highly
germane to any discussion of possible protection available under the
Taft-Hartly Act for employees who refuse to perform environmentally injurious work. 52
A final series of questions and answers of significance to the outplant pollution issue relates to how employees' lives are affected outside the plant. Seventy-six locals, more than 17 per cent, knew of
instances when their members' lives had been directly affected by
pollution caused by the plants at which they worked. Such examples
were cited by almost one fourth of the large unions responding to
the questionnaire, as well as by one fourth of those plants which are
heavily industrial. Moreover, other questions and answers reveal that
additional members may have been affected by out-plant pollution.
When asked if emissions from company smokestacks caused damage
to employees' cars parked in the company lot during working hours,
33 per cent of all unions reporting indicated "yes," and in the large
unions ill effects were reported in 55 per cent of the cases. 53
Thus, particularly in the larger unions, the instances in which the
environmental effects of employer operations have an adverse impact
on employees' lives are numerous. The problems of out-plant pollution and their relationship to the unions and the individual workers
are not merely theoretical. It is not surprising to find that workers
are increasingly resistant to participation in the polluting activities
of their employers.
C. Individual Resistance
Years ago, it might have been thought rare for an employee to
exercise social conscience in any fashion that might jeopardize his
employment. However, with the coming of an era in American
society in which individual and minority protests are frequent such
52. See pt. IV. B. infra.
53. The corresponding figures for damage to cars in service and assembly and heavy
industry were 38% and 39%, respectively. More unions (40% over-all) reported the
presence of emissions in the parking lots than reported damage to cars.
It can be argued that the parking lot situation should be analyzed as an in-plant
condition because the effects occur on company property. However, employees frequently park not in company lots but in nearby commercial lots. In both cases, the
nature of the damaging factor-emissions from company equipment-is the same.
Therefore, the parking lot problem is one with clear out-plant implications.
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actions by employees are no longer unusual. More often than not, at
issue in these instances has been alleged racial discrimination,54 but
recently there have been examples directly involving the environment.
Illustrative of the environmental protests is the case of Gilbert
Pugliese, a millwright. After having been a steelworker for twentyeight years, Pugliese one day refused to push a button that would
have sent several hundred gallons of oil into the Cuyahoga River at
the Cleveland plant of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation.55
Although the spillage of oil was a minor feature of the company's
polluting activities, Pugliese recognized that the discharge could
be avoided if the oil were pumped into drums, and he simply took
a stand.56 When this first happened in 1969, Pugliese was immediately suspended for five days. He was threatened with permanent
suspension, but the company decided not to risk a revolt of the
workers and humored him for two years. However, in the summer
of 1971, a foreman insisted that Pugliese again punch the oil discharge button. Risking eighteen years of seniority and his entire
livelihood, Pugliese refused. 57 Eventually, due to support from fellow
workers and embarrassment caused by adverse publicity, the union
had to support Pugliese-reportedly in order to avert a wildcat
strike. 58 Pugliese kept his job, and Jones and Laughlin initiated a
procedure to use drums and pumps to dispose of the waste oil; 59 but
it was an involved and tawdry process which would not have ended
happily without the power of the press.60
There have been other examples of resistance by employees to
action by, or job requirements of, their employers that would have
54. See NLRB v. Tanner Motor, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), discussed in note
353 infra, in which two employees who campaigned for nondiscriminatory hiring of
blacks by their employer were disciplined. Consider, too, the experience of Polaroid
Corporation in 1970-1971 when a small group of its black employees formed the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement to force Polaroid to cease doing business in
South Africa. This experience, which received considerable coverage in the press, is
summarized in Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and The Employee's Duty of
Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 279, 282 (1971).
55. This case is described in Ehrenreich 8: Ehrenreich, Conscience of a Steelworker,
THE NATION, Sept. 27, 1971, at 268.
56. Id. at 269. Even though a relatively minor act of pollution, the oil discharges
were in violation of the Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33
u.s.c. § 407 (1970)).
57. Ehrenreich &: Ehrenreich, supra note 55, at 269.
58. Id. at 270.
59. Id. at 271.
60. For a discussion of the possibilities Pugliese might have explored under the
Taft-Hartley Act, see pt. IV. B. infra.
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had injurious environmental consequences. In 1970, Captain William Guthrie, a pilot for Eastern Air Lines, was fired because of
his refusal to continue to empty the pressurization and drain cans
of his aircraft after take-off. 61 Guthrie was reinstated after his conduct generated publicity adverse to Eastern and had been the subject
of a resolution by the Air Line Pilots Association calling for an
industry-wide practice of drainage prior to take-off. 62 Refusal to
participate in environmentally damaging activities also led a group
of employees of the Corps of Engineers to file suit in February 1972
against the General Services Administration (GSA) in opposition to
the GSA's plan to build a federal office building in downtown
Mobile, Alabama.63 The employees charged that the GSA had not
filed an environmental impact statement as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act,64 and that the planned structure would
add to the congestion problems of the downtown area. More recently,
three General Motors employees reported to work wearing gas masks
to protest the pollution in the plant caused by gasoline-powered
fork-lift trucks. 615 After refusing their foreman's request to remove
the masks, the three employees were permitted to file a grievance but
were then suspended from work.
Incidents such as these testify to the growing impatience of
today's worker with authoritarian behavior by employers who may
not have fully explored whether social interests can be accommodated without sacrificing profits.66 This growing impatience should
be recognized not only by employers, but also by unions. Unions are
in an ideal position to back up employees such as Pugliese and
Guthrie; it should not take the threat of a wildcat walkout to jar
a union into action. 67
61. Letter from J.J. O'Donnell, President, Air Line Pilots Assn., to James C. Oldham, Nov. 4, 1971 [hereinafter O'Donnell Letter].
62. See note 107 infra.
63. 2 BNA ENv. REP. (Current Developments) 1356 (1972).
64. 42 u.s.c. § 4332 (1970).
65, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 21, 1973, § A, at 6, col. I. The Vice President of the
UAW local said that in mid-1971, GM had agreed to replace gas-powered trucks, as
they became obsolete, with electric ones. Id. See also text accompanying note 124 infra.
66. For examples of such accommodation, see note 23 supra and accompanying text.
67. At the opposite extreme from the Pugliese case are those instances, generally
involving public employees, when union strike activity has harmful environmental effects. The strike of New York City sanitation workers in 1971 is a case in point. In
litigation commenced by public officials seeking a preliminary injunction, the New
York supreme court held that a common-law action would lie against union leaders
who allegedly conspired to engage in an unlawful strike that resulted in the discharge
of raw sewage into Long Island Sound, disrupted ecological balances, and endangered
beach areas. Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1971), Tevd.
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THE UNION RESPONSE TO OUT-PLANT POLLUTION

The environmental involvement of national and international
unions headquartered in the United States has been erratic and
relatively inconclusive. Nevertheless, there have been union responses to environmental problems in general and to the operations
of their own companies in particular-responses that merit examination. Preliminary consideration will be given to the one issue on
which several unions have focused, "environmental blackmail."

Environmental Blackmail
In the view of some observers, the plant closure cry raised by
industry when faced with environmental controls is often disingenuous and constitutes what has been termed "environmental
blackmail." 68 A number of unions, particularly the Oil, Chemical,
and Atomic Workers (OCAW) and the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), are beginning to recognize these smoke screens and call the employers' bluff primarily
through contract negotiations and union policy statements. Other
unions, notably the UAW, are concentrating their efforts on legislative protection to cushion the impact of curtailed operations resulting from pollution regulation.
Of union responses to the blackmail issue, perhaps the most
widely cited instance of refusal to capitulate was taken by the OCAW
when Union Carbide announced that federal environmental requirements would force the closing of its plant at Marietta, Ohio. Faced
with steadfastness by the OCAW, Union Carbide backed down and
A.

on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1972). The basis for the
court's ruling was "a new rule that persons maliciously polluting or contaminating the
environment may be enjoined by the chief executive officer of a county or town whose
residents are adversely affected by the offensive conduct, or by private citizens reasonably
affected." 67 Misc. 2d at 212, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 750. The court reasoned:
The conscience of our community is saturated with environmental awareness, and
those deliberately contaminating the environment as an illegal tactic are conspicuously wrongdoers. For the law to ignore this would be to forfeit all credibility. Just
as new torts have emerged with new technology, new torts must emerge with
changing population pressures and acknowledged social responsibilities.
67 Misc. 2d at 213, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
68. Calame, supra note 25, at 21, col. 4. After referring to an effort by environmentalists for new laws that would help call the bluff of business, the author stated:
"This reflects a view that many company threats about layoffs and plant closings
amount to 'environmental blackmail.'" Udall &: Stansbury, supra note 25, at Bl, col.
2, quote Norman Cole, head of the Virginia State Water Pollution Control Board, as
stating: "'An industry's first response to environmental orders is often to create a job
scare. It tries to bluff its union and its congressmen into calling off the dogs. If companies spent as much time and ingenuity cleaning up as they do stalling, the whole
country would be better off.'" See also Reid, Ecological Blackmail: "Jobs vs. Clean
Air," ENv!RONMENTAL AcnoN, Aug. 21, 1971, at 13.
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indicated that it would seek ways to avoid any significant layoffs
while complying with the environmental order.69 Similar experiences
have been reported by other unions.70
In addition, the OCAW introduced a strong resolution at the
1971 AFL-CIO Constitutional Convention, proposing that "whenever environmental protection measures force the partial or full
closure of a facility with resultant job losses, displaced workers shall
be protected in their economic well-being."71 Suggested protection
included early retirement with pension, extended severance pay, and
transfer to other facilities. Costs of the protection were to be borne by
the employer where feasible, but by the government if necessary.72
The resolution also included a provision urging legislation to inhibit
employers from using the threat of unemployment as a method of
avoiding compliance with pollution control regulations; under this
scheme, an employer could be enjoined from "lay[ing] off ... any
worker until the necessity of such layoff or layoffs has been proven,
with the burden of proof on the employer and with public hearings
and opportunity for cross-examination of employer witnesses provided. "73 These provisions constituted two points of a sixteen point
resolution urging a strong stand on many aspects of environmental
abuse.74 However, the OCAW resolution was referred to the AFLCIO Committee on Resolutions, where it was badly emasculated.75
69. Calame, supra note 25, at 21, col. 4; Udall & Stansbury, supra note 25, at B4,
col. 1.
70. In Ticonderoga, New York, an International Paper Company mill threatened to
move if it was forced to comply with a state air pollution order. The union initially
supported the company's resistance, but then began to realize that the highly skilled
pulp and paper workers it represented could not easily be replaced-that, in fact, International Paper could not move without them. Union support of the company ceased
and International Paper stayed in Ticonderoga and complied with the order, Udall
& Stansbury, supra note 25, at B4, col. 2.
The American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO) in Tacoma, Washington, was initially supported in its resistance to a pollution order by workers who feared
that the company might close the Tacoma plant, as it had the ASARCO plant in
Selby, California, rather than comply with cleanup orders. But ASARCO gets its copper
ore from the Philippines and obviously must remain near the Pacific Coast. With
Oregon and California already on the record as being against dirty smelters, many of
the men began to question their role as "pollution pawns." Id. at Bl, col. 2; B4, col. 4.
71. AFL-CIO, Resolution No. 72, Environmental Protection, Ninth Constitutional
Convention, Bal Harbour, Fla. (Nov. 18-24, 1971), reprinted in Appendix B infra.
72. Id.
73. Id,
74. Id. Fourteen of the 16 points of the OCAW resolution, which dealt with matters other than environmental blackmail, were supported by a separate resolution introduced by the Colorado Labor Council. (The OCAW is headquartered in Denver.)
AFL-CIO, Resolution No. 13, Ecological and Environmental Problems, Ninth Constitutional Convention, Bal Harbour, Fla. (Nov. 18-24, 1971).
75. See AFL-CIO, Resolution No. 124, The Environment, Ninth Constitutional Con-
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Other unions have concentrated on contract negotiations in their
efforts to blunt any adverse impact of environmental regulation. In
at least three contracts, the IAM has secured the following provision
in collective bargaining agreements:
Pollution Control-The contracting parties agree that pollution control is a company responsibility-if the shop is closed by a government agency, because of an alleged violation of an established
pollution control standard, all employees covered by this Agreement,
shall receive full compensation and their regular rate of pay, for all
time lost.76

The provision is a broad one, and its open-ended nature could
generate a number of arbitration cases in the event of a plant shutdown. For example, the phrase "for all time lost" must have some
implied limitation, such as the use of due diligence by employees
to seek comparable employment elsewhere. It is significant, too, that
the bargaining units covered by the foregoing provision are all quite
small.77
Most unions have not sought to deal with the problem at the
bargaining table. The typical pattern of behavior has been either
to capitulate when an employer insists that a marginal plant be shut
down rather than cleaned up~ or to aid the employer in seeking
exceptions to the pollution abatement orders that affect the plants
in question.78
The UAW's campaign against environmental blackmail has been
more visible and different in emphasis. In June 1971, Leonard
Woodcock, President of the UAW, presented to the Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Committee,
which at the time was holding hearings on the economic impact of
environmental control requirements, a statement about the plight
of the working person in environmental blackmail situations and
proposed legislation to deal with the problem.79 The basic thrust of
vention, Bal Harbour, Fla. (Nov. 18-24, 1971) [hereinafter Resolution No. 124], reprinted
in Appendix B infra.
76. IAM Contract with Harig Mfg. Corp. at 19 (effective June I, 1970); IAM Contract with Powers Label Co. Division, Duncan Parking Meter Maintenance Co. at 12
(effective June I, 1970); IAM Contract with R. Krasberg & Sons Mfg. Co. at 10 (effective June 1, 1970).
77. The units are 106 employees at Harig Mfg. Corp., 5 employees at Duncan Parking Meter Maintenance Co., and 30 employees at R. Krasberg & Sons Mfg. Co. Letters
from Albert Epstein, Director of Research, IAM, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 30, 1971;
Dec. 13, 1971.
78. See, e.g., text accompanying note 164 infra.
79. Hearings on Economic Dislocation Resulting from Environmental Control Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1971) [hereinafter Dislocation Hearings].
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the proposed legislation was to give workers who are displaced or
otherwise affected by an employer's pollution abuses the right to
bring a class action in a state or federal court against the corporation
and its officers and directors for damages.80 These damages would
include, among other things, all lost wages and fringe benefits, compensation for loss of seniority rights, costs of retraining necessary to
obtain other employment, and moving expenses; damages would be
offset by any unemployment compensation or other benefits collected
by the employees.81 Affected employees would, however, be required
to have sought suitable employment elsewhere before they could
recover damages.82 The proposed legislation further would provide
that there would be a conclusive presumption in favor of workers
when layoffs, shutdowns of plants, or down-grading of jobs resulted
from a governmental order precipitated by environmental pollution,
and the Secretary of Labor would be empowered to bring suit if
requested by individuals.88 Woodcock pointed out that the basic
concept of his proposed legislation was not new-it had recently
been implemented by the Congress as part of the AMTRAK legislation.84 He further suggested that a cost-sharing program might be
set up so that the government would assist employers in meeting the
expenses necessitated by the Iegislation.85
Subsequently, under the direction of its Education and Conservation Department, the UAW has actively sought support for
the legislation proposed by Woodcock. In addition to disseminating
widely the statement Woodcock had made to the Air and Water
Pollution Subcommittee,86 the UAW succeeded in interesting the Urban Environmental Conference (UEC) in the environmental blackmail issue. The UEC is a group organized by Michigan Senator
Philip Hart during late 1971, and the group is actively working with
the union on ways to stop environmental blackmail as one of its
three national priority projects.87
As a result of UAW and UEC activity, a draft of a bill, entitled
"Environmental Controls Adjustment Act of 1972," has been pre80. Id. at 286.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 288.
83. Id. at 288-89.
84. Id. at 287-88. The rail passenger legislation is contained in 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644
(1970).
85. Dislocation Hearings, supra note 79, at 290.
86. See, e.g., UAW's Woodcock Blasts Industry's Environmental "Game Plan," EN•
VIRONMENTAL J., Sept. 1971, at 31. See also Woodcock, supra note 15, at 15-16.
87. The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 9, 1971, at Al6, col. 1.
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pared by the staff of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee.
In its present draft status, the bill would provide sweeping economic
protection for workers who lose their jobs as a result of plant shutdowns or reorganizations necessitated by pollution regulations.88
The approach of the bill is to administer grants through the states
by coordinating disbursements with unemployment compensation
programs already in operation at the state level. Even though the bill
is only in the formative stages, it is worth observing that operating
through state unemployment compensation structures could be quite
cumbersome, and could be inequitable to employees of the same
corporation who happened to reside in different geographic locations.
Union interest in protective legislation is reportedly having an
effect on legislative enactments directed primarily to other issues
but which collaterally affect worker dislocation. For example, sections of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
197289 also speak to the problem of environmental blackmail. One
section requires the Administrator to consider potential economic
and social dislocations when deciding whether to establish effluent
limitations.90 Furthermore, under section 507(e),91 the Administrator
is ordered to evaluate potential loss or shifts of employment resulting
from pollution enforcement. Specifically mentioned for investigation
are threatened plant closures or job reductions. Employees who lose
or are threatened with the loss of their jobs as a result of effluent
limitations imposed by the Act can request an investigation in which
the employer will explain the actual or potential effect of such a
limitation on employment and the justification for any discharges or
layoffs. The Administrator is then directed to report on these relationships and include any recommendations he thinks appropriate,
all of which are to be available to the public.
This same question was dealt with on a broader scale in title
VIII of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1972.92
The bill, which was eventually vetoed by President Nixon, required
the Administration to investigate employment losses actually or allegedly resulting from enforcement of any federal environmental
quality law. This investigation was to consider the extent to which
the community would be dislocated and any possible alternatives to
88. The bill is presently in discussion draft form only.
89. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
90. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 302(b)(l), added by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 846.
91. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 507(e), added by Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 890.
92. H.R. 16071, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., tit. VIII (1972), in 118 CoNG. REc. 18357-58
(daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972).
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the employment loss. After the employer filed a report showing the
employment consequences of compliance with the law, the Secretary
of Labor would certify the workers unemployed as a result of pollution standards. Certified employees could then receive unemployment compensation equal to sixty per cent of their former weekly
wage for seventy-eight weeks, mortgage and rental payments for up
to a year, and re-employment assistance, all to be funded under a
100 million dollar authorization. The employer was forbidden to
discharge or discriminate against any employee who aided in the
enforcement of this or other pollution laws. When the Secretary
found such discrimination, he could order reinstatement of the
employee and fine the employer 1,000 dollars for each day the violation continued. The Secretary was also empowered to make low
interest loans to aid private industry in developing pollution control
facilities when necessary financing was unavailable from private
sources. These expenditures were to be covered by a separate 100
million dollar authorization. As explained in debate by its leading
sponsor, Senator Williams, the rationale for the bill was that "in
protecting future life for our children and grandchildren, we owe
an immediate obligation to our current work force. We have no
right to force upon them the exclusive costs of redeeming our environment for future generations." 93
Foreshadowing the eventual veto, various administration officials
made known their objections to the legislation. Secretary of Labor
Hodgson was opposed, not only because he viewed the program as
"inadequate" and financially uncertain, but also because the "Department of Labor . . . has always favored having only one unemployment program, rather than a series of programs tailored to
specific workers 'adversely affected' through a particular circumstance."94 Caspar Weinberger, Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, objected on budgetary grounds and on the theory that
revenue-sharing met the same objectives "in a more effective and
responsive manner." 95
To Senator Muskie's mind, the bill was necessary to assure that
the "jobs and livelihoods of workers, their families, and their communities are not used as pawns in industry efforts to undercut pollution control regulations." 96 However, because of the veto, the
93. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 17718 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
94. Letter from James D. Hodgson to Senator Randolph, Sept. 14, 1972, in 118 CONG.
R.Ec. 17719 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972).
95. Letter from Caspar Weinberger to Senator Randolph, Sept. 9, 1972, in 118 CoNG.
R.Ec. 17720 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972).
96. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. 17728 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
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threat and reality of environmental blackmail are still essentially
unregulated.
Nevertheless, the water pollution provisions and the draft legislation previously discussed represent a start toward the UAW goal
of shielding the workers from environmental blackmail. Undoubtedly, the full protection goal of the UAW has little political
feasibility, but if further compromise legislation should be enacted,
it could advance the willingness of organized labor to combat environmental pollution at the bargaining table and elsewhere.

B. General Environmental Involvement
Unions can be categorized into three groups according to the
degree of attention devoted to environmental problems.97 Some have
expended virtually no energy in considering the problem. Others
have passed resolutions at international conventions pertaining to
various environmental subjects. Finally, a few unions have engaged
in some sort of affirmative action on environmental problems, such
as negotiating contract provisions or sponsoring legislative or educational campaigns.
I. Inactive Unions

Not surprisingly, the first category is the largest in terms of the
number of international unions-although not in terms of the number of members represented. Of the sixty unions responding to a
series of questions sent by the author to 135 national and international unions headquartered in the United States, thirty-five fell
within the first category.98 A number of these unions represent
nonindustrial, white-collar workers who do not suffer the primary
effect of stationary source industrial pollution.99 But some of the
97. This categorization excludes attention to in-plant occupational safety and
health problems.
98. See note 10 supra.
99. E.g., Actors Equity Assn., American Postal Workers Union, National Assn. of
.Broadcast Employees & Technicians. However, even among these unions, pollution takes
its toll. For example, the Musicians' Guild indicates, "Our members have a great deal
of problems with [a]ir pollution as they cannot sing properly and are subject to
inflammation of throat and nose due to foul air in densely populated urban centers."
Letter from Joan Greenspan, Asst. Executive Secretary, Musicians' Guild, to James C.
Oldham, Oct. 28, 1971. Furthermore, noise caused by airplanes, traffic, horns, and sirens
disrupts concerts in which Guild members are performing. The Guild has been active
in supporting local bills for control of noise and for securing better enforcement of
local ordinances in existence.
Other unions associated with nonindustrial employers are also taking affirmative
environmental action. See, e.g., the example of the Communication Workers Union in
note 160 infra.
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unions in this category, such as the Teamsters, are quite large and
are very much involved with polluting industries.100 This is not to
say that these unions, or the seventy-five unions that did not respond
at all, have no concern for the safety and health of their workers.
Although the record of organized labor on occupational health may
be less than outstanding,101 there are nevertheless many unions that
allocate all of their resources available for safety and health to problems occurring in the workplace, thereby excluding problems extending into the community at Iarge.102

2.

Unions Adopting Environmental Resolutions

Unions in the second category-those that have confined their
interest in the environment to adopting resolutions-have often
been content with resolutions that are merely affirmations or retreads
of resolutions adopted at the annual AFL-CIO Convention.108 The
100. The Teamsters have sponsored a three-year study on the adverse environmental
conditions facing the professional truck driver, but the study is of an occupational
health and safety variety, and the Teamsters are keeping the results of this study
confidential. Letter from Abraham Weiss, Research Director, Teamsters, to James C.
Oldham, July 27, 1972.
101. See generally J. PAGE 8: M. O'BRIEN, supra note 8.
102. For example, Mr. M.B. Wigderson, Staff Vice President of the Air Line
Employees Assn,, in a letter to the author dated November 2, 1971, stated:
We have not had any ground swell from our membership demanding that we
negotiate into the agreements contractual language which would tend to deal with
environmental or ecological features concerning the operation of an air line. We
do have contractual language which deals directly with safety and health, but in
all honesty, anti-pollution theories were not involved.
From the foregoing, I think you would be safe in assuming that the white
collar workers who make up the membership of this Union do not feel that the
Union in and of itself should be the vehicle to carry on anti-pollution campaigns.
A statement from the Bakery Workers' Union puts it more directly: "I know the
unions could do more than they have about the ecology of the country, but we feel
there are more pressing matters of immediate concern." Letter from Vaughn Ball,
Director of Research and Education, Bakery 8: Confectionary Workers' Union, to James
C. Oldham, Oct. 28, 1971.
These statements are admittedly realistic and perhaps representative of a widely
held view within organized labor. But the times are changing, and so, too, may that
point of view. As put by Joseph T. Power, General President of the Plasterers' Union,
in a letter to the author dated Dec. 2, 1971:
In my opinion, organized labor has every justification to interject themselves
[sic] into the involvement of anti-pollution and concern over the establishment
and functioning of environmental programs.
Organized labor has the same moral responsibility that was evident in spear
heading other social legislation and the implementation there of, such as social
security, health, education, safety in the work place, etc.
103. E.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Resolution No. 20, The Environment,
28th Biennial Convention (May 29-June 2, 1972), which reads:
RESOLVED, that the 28th Biennial Convention of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC:
I. Joins with the AFL-CIO in the struggle to conserve our environment and stem
the tide of pollution;
2, Recommends that because of air pollution and the tremendous drain on energy
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AFL-CIO resolutions, in tum, have tended to be quite bland, particularly when compared with those resolutions referred to the Resolutions Committee from which the final product originated.104
Other unions have independently formulated environmental
resolutions. Some of these are so general as to be of limited usefulness.105 Others make specific suggestions about legislative enactments
and appropriations,106 which could prove useful if the unions enfuels by internal combustion engines for automotive vehicles, we urge that the
National Air Pollution Control Administration give top priority to developing
alternative sources of power for such vehicles;
4. As a means to protect workers from losing their jobs and to discourage companies from relocating to areas having more lenient pollution laws, we urge
that the federal air and water pollution acts should be amended to provide
national emission standards on all sources of air and water pollution.
5. Urges strengthening the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency and
centralization of the administration of federal anti-pollution activity; and
6. The Amalgamated, through its publication, legislative activities and educational
activities, will continue to fight for a cleaner environment.
104. Reference was made earlier to the OCAW and Colorado Labor Council resolutions introduced at the Ninth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO. See notes
71 & 74 supra and accompanying text. The OCAW resolution (which was identical to
the Colorado Labor Council Resolution except for the addition by the OCAW of points
one and two) is set out in Appendix B infra. The resolution reported out of the Resolutions Committee of the AFL-CIO and adopted by the Convention, however, is
considerably watered down compared to that offered by the OCAW, even though the
end product is alleged by the AFL-CIO to cover the substance of the OCAW resolution.
See Resolution No. 124, supra note 75, reprinted in Appendix B infra. Most of the
features of the adopted resolution were presented to the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions as the AFL-CIO 1972 platform proposals. See AFL-CIO, Platform
Proposals (1972).
The Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO has independently adopted a
resolution on the environment. After calling generally for mobilization of resources
and organizations to combat environmental pollution and for a national plan to deal
with the problems, the statement in conclusion resolved:
7. The Industrial Union Department make every effort to see that the burden of
technological change is borne not only by the worker but-in the transition to
new means of production-by the whole community on whose behalf the change
takes place.
8. The Industrial Union Department condemns and rejects the environmental
blackmail of those who would intimidate the worker with economic threats.
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO, A Resolution on the Environment (1971).
105. See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Resolutions, 34th
Annual Convention (May 1971); Office & Professional Employees' Intl. Union, Resolution No. 38, Convention, Miami :Beach, Fla. ijune 1971), the operative paragraph of
which reads as follows:
RESOLVED that the Office & Professional Employees International Union and
its membership support those organizations whose objectives are to have all governments in our countries (Canada and the U.S.) introduce and enforce strong and
stringent anti-pollution controls and laws so that our children and their children
should inherit a world which is not only fit to live in, but a world which retains
those natural beauties and other attributes essential not only to the physical but
also to the intellectual and spiritual well being of mankind.
106. See, e.g., American Fedn. of State, County & Municipal Employees, Resolution
No. 70, Contamination of the Natural Environment, Convention (1970). Consider also
the following resolution of the Office & Professional Employees International Union:
WHEREAS, under authority of the National Environmental Policy Act, President Nixon created a Council on Environmental Quality, and
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deavor to see that these suggestions are implemented. Still others
have fashioned resolutions relating specifically to the type of business
in which most of their members work, or around a particular event
with which the union was involved.107
Resolutions may be useful in focusing the attention of union
members on particular matters of concern to the international. But
WHEREAS, this three member group was to ride herd on other federal agencies
reviewing the environmental impact of their projects before construction began,
and
WHEREAS, the Council, which is getting more than one hundred such reports
monthly and the volume is threatening to break down the system, was only granted
a first year budget of one million dollars which allowed only twenty-one professionals on the staff, and
WHEREAS, the Council needs additional funds to beef up its staff with
qualified persons so that what started out as an effort to exercise responsible
environmental concern over public works can be continued for another year, now,
be it
RFSOLVED: that all citizens concerned about the effect of dams, highways and
other public work projects on the environment should be speaking up for the fact
that the Council on Environmental Quality needs more money, let it be
RFSOLVED FURTHER: that this, the 12th Convention of the OPEIU, urge
all members to contact their Congressmen to insure that this Council is properly
funded so that it can continue its vital work.
Office & Professional Employees Intl. Union, Resolution E.B. No. 10, Council on
Environmental Quality, Convention, Miami Beach, Fla. Uune 1971).
107. A representative example of resolutions relating to the type of business of the
employers with which a union negotiates is the following resolution, adopted by the
Newspaper Guild National Convention, June 26-30, 1972:
CLEAN ENVIRONMENT
The Newspaper Guild, as a strong International voice, should provide a good
example in newspaper recycling by printing Guild international and local publications on recycled paper. The Guild should, after starting printing on recycled
materials, urge the printing industry to adopt a policy of using recycled paper in
its operation in order to prevent depletion of our ever-diminishing forest reserves.
The Guild further urges that the printing industry limit its emissions and use
every effort to persuade paper processing plants to take measures to reduce the
chemical efiluents despoiling rivers and polluting the air to the detriment of the
health and well-being of the population at large.
An example of a resolution surrounding a particular event is the experience previously referred to of the Air Line Pilots Association in support of Captain William Guthrie's efforts to ensure drainage of pressurization and drain cans of aircraft prior to
take-off. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra. The Board of Directors of the Air
Line Pilots Association adopted the following resolution in 1970:
WHEREAS the dumping of Kerosene from the Pressurization and Drain cans
of jet aircraft has become a major concern of the Air Line Pilots Association and
the National Air Pollution Control Administration, and
WHEREAS the NAPCA has asked airlines to voluntarily halt dumping millions
of pounds of jet fuel each year into the skies near airports,
THEREFORE BE IT RFSOLVED that it shall be Association Policy to strongly
urge all airlines whenever possible to drain all Pressurization and Drain cans on
jet aircraft prior to take-off.
O'Donnell Letter, supra note 61.
Perhaps the Association was co-opted; President O'Donnell advises that Captain
Guthrie "is now actively working with the company on ecological matters." Id. President O'Donnell also indicated that the Association has supported the redesign of jet
engine burner cans and studies of the effect of fuel spillage on runways. In Mr.
O'Donnell's judgment, "It has not been necessary for our Association to force to the
bargaining table these problems. The airline companies have instituted programs with
great vigor when technological research has produced a better, cleaner product." Id.
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in terms of real-world accomplishments, they are significant only
to the extent they are ultimately translated into action. This does
not often happen.
3. Affirmative-Action Unions
There are a few unions that have taken some sort of action on
community environmental problems. Occasionally this action is so
oriented toward compromise that the union becomes the hostage of
the industry. A prime example is the record of the United Mine
Workers (UMW), with its long history of environmental involvement-involvement that has been deferential to industry and generally ineffective.108 This has been particularly unfortunate in the
mining industry since its operations are often conducted in the
captive-community geographic setting, where the lives of employees
108. An example of the priorities of the UMW is seen by the statement of Joseph
P. Brennan, Director of UMW Research and Marketing before the Illinois Pollution
Control Board, March 12, 1971. Regarding the dangerous sulfur dioxide (SO~ emissions
resulting from the use of high sulphur coal, he stated:
While we acknowledge the need for air polution control and the need for regulations to help bring such control about, we want to present to you today the other
side of the coin. We are asking that in the rush to enact the strongest possible air
pollution abatement regulations you do not destroy the lliinois coal industry and
the jobs, wages and other benefits which that industry brings to your State.
While continuing to stress the advantages that coal brought to Illinois, he recognized
"the legitimate demands of the citizen of lliinois for air pollution abatement." His
problem, however, was that "inevitably these demands will be translated into regulations, regulations which will impose financial and technological burdens on industry."
His solution to this dilemma was to call for more advanced technology, and for
greater "pressure" to be applied to the electric utilities who would then voluntarily
refrain from polluting. He concluded:
[IJhere are those who suggest we can no longer wait, that we must have the
maximum reduction of pollution now. I recognize that this is a popular course,
I also recognize that those who espouse it can do so without fully recognizing the
consequences upon the people who mine and transport Illinois coal. Unfortunately,
I do not believe that this is in the interest of the State. Certainly it is not in the
interest of its miners, and on their behalf I would ask that you do not impose
S0 2 emissions regulations which are pending ••••
Any discussion of the UMW should take into account the new leadership of the
union which was voted in as a result of the court-ordered rerun of the 1969 election.
To demonstrate the new direction of the leadership, upon taking office on December
22, 1972, President Arnold Miller promptly discharged 20 of the 24 members of the
International Board. Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1973, at A9, col. 2. Miller announced
that henceforth the union would seek stricter enforcement of coal mine safety standards,
and that he had warned one of the coal companies against firing a UMW safety committeeman who pulled men out of a mine containing too much methane gas. Id., Jan.
5, 1973, at A2, col. 4.
In terms of a change from the types of policies represented by Mr. Brennan's statement, one of the more dramatic examples came when the UMW asked the Senate
Interior Committee to prohibit strip mining of coal unless the land could be properly
restored. Miller's position was that "we cannot allow the corporate interests in their
zeal for profits to destroy our ecological balance, destroy our land and create panic
among those who labor to produce the wealth of our country." Id., March 15, 1973, at
A28, col. 8.
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are inextricably tied around the clock to the operation of the
mines.100
But there are unions in this third category that are struggling to
·wrestle community environmental problems into the open and to
marshal! resources to deal with them. The most active have been the
UAW and the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers.110
a. The United Auto Workers. Much has been said already about
the UAW. In addition to that union's environmental blackmail campaign, it has made significant efforts to educate the membership
about environmental concerns. During the 1970 GM strike, the
international union required rank-and-file employees to attend strike
education classes for two hours per week; some of these sessions were
devoted to environmental matters, utilizing both films and materials
specially prepared for the sessions by the UAW Conservation and
Resource Development Department.111 Additional environmental
109. Consider, for example, the disasters in the mining communities at Donora,
Pennsylvania, and Buffalo Creek Valley, West Virginia, described in the text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
110. These unions generally adopt internal environmental resolutions in conjunction with their other activities. The 1972 UAW resolutions on ecology and natural
resources covered much ground, including air and water pollution, population, recycling, urban planning, transportation, environmental education, land use, pesticides,
and nuclear power. Most pertinent to the present Article was the resolution on environmental blackmail which provided:
Industry has a long and continuing record of resistance and delaying tactics to
avoid the costs of eliminating their pollution. One strategy in this attempt is that
of playing on the economic fears of workers and communities to create opposition
to clean-up efforts. To put an end to such "environmental blackmail," legislation
must be enacted to safeguard workers from job-loss fear caused by plants threaten•
ing to either close or move to other countries rather than abate their pollution.
Plants should be forbidden by law to engage in economic intimidation. Plants
claiming "impossible" pollution control costs should first be required to provide
their company's financial records to a public show cause hearing and completely
substantiate such financial claims before any government permission for plant
closure is considered.
Employees should not have to bear the burdens and sacrifices involved in correcting environmental pollution caused by their employers.
UAW supports passage of legislation which guarantees workers restitution
whenever they lose wages, fringe benefits, protections or security rights because of
plant shutdowns or layoffs resulting from environmental pollution or its correction by their employers. Moreover, such legislation should provide the right for
workers to sue for damages for harm done to them under such circumstances. We
must continue to urge Congress for legislation allowing the Highway Trust Fund
to be properly allocated to all forms of transportation.
UAW, Resolution on Ecology and Natural Resources, 23d Constitutional Convention,
Atlantic City, N.J. (April 23, 1972) (emphasis original).
111. Interview with John Yelton, Administrative Assistant to UAW Vice President
Olga Madar, Detroit, Oct. 29, 1971. The UAW has typically required two hours of
picket line duty per week during a strike as a prerequisite to the collection of strike
benefits of forty dollars per week. However, in the 1970 strike there was no need for
extensive picket lines, thus facilitating the alternative of education sessions. Previously
there had been annual education sessions for local union leaders, but the GM strike
education sessions marked the first significant educational series involving the rank and
file, Representative of the prepared materials were a four-page pamphlet entitled
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education programs have been sponsored by the UAW as a part of
ongoing programs held at the union's Family Education Center at
Onaway, Michigan.112
The UAW's environmental efforts have not been uniformly successful. For example, an attempt by UAW Vice-President Olga
Madar to secure environmental information from GM during the
1971 Campaign GM experience produced only the most sketchy and
superficial results.113 Also, the UAW's resolve to treat community
What Kind of World Will They Have? (Oct. 1970) and a booklet, complemented by a
suggested outline, entitled Conserving Our Resources-What We Can Do (1970).
112. For example, the UAW sponsored a 1970 symposium entitled "The Impact of
Urbanization on Man's Environment," held at United Nations Headquarters in New
York and at the UAW's Family Education Center, Onaway, Michigan, June 13-20,
1970. Portions of this symposium were subsequently published by the UAW for its own
education programs and for distribution elsewhere. United Nations &: UAW, Symposium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment, Statement and Conclusions (1970); L. Woodcock, The Crisis of Our Environment, UAW's Views Presented
to a United Nations Conference (1970).
113. At the annual meeting of shareholders held on May 21, 1971, Olga Madar
stated:
People are now aware of the extent, the danger and the causes of pollution.
They are committed to the American dream that citizens of this nation can have
an impact on organizations, industry and government in bringing about change.
Reporting your actions on pollution control and prevention makes General Motors
a patriotic ally with the citizens of this nation. And it would increase the salability
of the product. Affirmative action also to prevent pollution beyond that required
by government regulation is also essential and needed. We now know, after the fact,
as we attempt to repair the damages, that prevention is less costly in taxes not only
to citizens, but also to stockholders, and in fact what we have learned is that the
dividend factor is substantially reduced because of the increase in taxes in terms
of cleaning up the damage which has been done in the past.
. . • I would think that, in terms of affirmative action, that General Motors
would make public in its annual reports whether or not any toxic materials used
in the manufacturing process are coming in contact with our public waterways
or are in any way causing air pollution.
General Motors Corp., Annual Meeting of Shareholders, May 21, 1971, Transcript at
190-91.
James Roche, Chairman of the :Board of General Motors, did not respond at the
meeting to the above points. Later, raising the matter again, Ms. Madar wrote to Mr.
Roche. Along with a series of questions concerning employment and training of
women, the following questions were put:
Is General Motors involved in affirmative action to prevent pollution beyond
that required by government regulation?
Is General Motors making public or registering with government agencies the
toxic materials used in the manufacturing process which come in contact with our
public waterways or are causing air pollution?
Letter from Olga Madar, Vice President, UAW, to James M. Roche, Chairman, :Board
of Directors, General Motors Corp., Sept. 18, 1971.
Chairman Roche's answers, conveyed to Olga Madar by Irving :Bluestone, who had
received them from George Morris, Vice President of the General Motors Industrial
Relations Staff, were quite general. They indicated that General Motors had been
applying more restrictive pollution control codes than required by law, and, with
regard to planned expenditures, the corporation was spending 64 million dollars in
1971 on industrial air and water pollution. Concerning automobile emission controls,
the corporation indicated it was not exceeding government standards, but was spending
150 million dollars on its 1971 program. Letter from James M. Roche, Chairman, :Board
of Directors, General Motors Corp., to Olga Madar, Vice-President, UAW, Nov. 16,
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environmental problems at the bargaining table in 1970, admittedly
complicated by the prolonged GM strike, does not appear to have
been implemented at the local level to any significant degree. This
conclusion stems both from the refusal of local union members to
cooperate in continuing auto emission control work during the
strike114 and from an analysis of the health and safety results achieved
by seventy-five GM locals.
Environmental bargaining by the UAW locals during 1970 was
not successful, but neither was it inconsequential. Although environmental issues were raised in almost all cases, rarely did they clearly
address the environment outside the plant. Of the approximately 750
environmental protection demands put forward by the 75 local
unions reporting back to the Intemational,115 76 per cent dealt with
ventilation-basically with requests for new or refashioned air
freshening or climate control systems.116 It is dubious whether these
issues can properly be categorized as out-plant environmental concerns. Obviously, the reason for any ventilation or exhaust system in
an industrial setting is to remove noxious elements from the in-plant
atmosphere. The reports to the international did not indicate concern by the locals over any potentially adverse effects outside of the
plant caused by the release of these elements. The only references
1971; Memorandum from Irving Bluestone, Director, General Motors Dept., UAW, to
Olga Madar, Vice-President, UAW, Nov. 24, 1971.
114. See Kerwin, Pollution Small Issue to Strikers, Detroit News, Oct. 19, 1970, at
7A, col. 1, cols. 1-4:
The [UAW]'s image as a pacesetter [in pollution control] was tarnished last
week by rebellious rank-and-file members who apparently consider a strike more
important than protecting the environment. The UAW's hierarchy was unable to
get Local 160 to relax its strike enough to permit 300 of its members to work on a
crash program at the General Motors Technical Center in Warren to control auto
emissions.•••
But even more embarrassing is the failure of UAW leadership to persuade its
pickets to permit workers from other unions-building tradesmen-to install
pollution control equipment at GM factory sites during the strike ••••
At its national union convention last April, delegates-prompted by the late
UAW President Walter P. Reuther-vowed to make pollution control a "bargainable issue" at the negotiating table in 1970.
Industry spokesmen scoffed at the idea that such a technical item could be
bargained over. They also predicted that the item would get lost since workers
were more interested in "bread and butter" issues as [sic] higher wages, early
retirement and restoration of the cost of living scale.
Their suspicions apparently were confirmed last week by adamant pickets who
apparently place pollution control low on their priority list.
115. As mentioned in the acknowledgments at the outset of this Article, the UAW
made available to the author both the questionnaires and reports filed by the GM
locals that listed the health and safety demands made during the 1970 negotiations and
the eventual settlement reached on each issue. All references are to the demands
categorized as involving environmental controls. No further citations will be given for
figures that summarize these reports.
116. This figure increased to 86% when items related to ventilation, such as exhaust
equipment and maintenance, are included.
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made to this subject were two requests for larger, more efficient exhaust stacks inside the plants; 117 it is possible that these exhausts
would be filtered or in some way detoxified before release, but if so
it is not apparent from the demands. The conclusion is inescapable
that, although clearly affecting the outside environment, ventilation
is generally regarded by the locals as only an in-plant concern.118
There were several instances in which local unions demanded
that emission controls be placed on all air-polluting equipment.119
Three locals even pressed the demand that existing machinery not be
operated until the controls were installed.120 In all cases the company
pronounced itself dedicated to the eventual elimination of pollution
-and thus, studies were proposed and commended. Only twice were
promises of specific remedies made.121
Several other union demands showed a tendency to treat the outside as the refuse area for in-plant emissions. One request was made
to vent the exhaust from a hose cutting area directly outside,122 while
another was that tar be poured away from the workers, preferably
outside.123 It apparently did not occur to or interest these locals to
press for the elimination or reduction of the offensive wastes-it was
easier to request that they be disposed of elsewhere. The Chevrolet
plant in Buffalo reversed these positions, however, demanding ab117. These were made at the Chevrolet Plant in Tonawanda and the Hydromatic
Plant.
118. Whether ventilation issues present a new concern or a long-standing problem
to the locals is unclear because of the terminology used. Since the demands and settlements are essentially internal documents, they employ descriptive terms and labels that
have little meaning to outsiders. Accordingly, a demand that an additional air make-up
unit be placed on the left side of aisle J-15 in Department B-18 does not reveal whether
the request originates from a new awareness of the pollution hazards caused by industrial processes employed in the department or merely a more traditional desire to have
a cool, comfortable worksite.
119. See notes 120-21 &: 127 infra. In two instances, the company agreed to repair
the damage to employees' cars resulting from briquette plant emissions. (Chevrolet Metal
Castings Plant, Saginaw; Chevrolet Plant, Grey Iron.)
120. At one plant, the demand was bluntly put: "The Briquette Plant shall not be
permitted to operate at any time until an Emission System is installed and operating."
Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw. Similar positions were taken at Chevrolet
Plant, Grey Iron, and at Delco Morraine.
121. In both instances, the response came in regard to a demand concerning a
briquette plant, see note 119 supra. Both provisions involved the same local. Following
completion of the strike, management promised to operate the plant "in compliance
with applicable local, state and federal emission control regulations which require that
such facilities include an emission control system. Management also states that when
the emission control system on the briquette plant is shut down for major repairs,
productive operations on the facility will be suspended until such repairs are com•
pleted." Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw; Chevrolet Plant, Grey Iron.
122. Rochester Products Plant.
123. Chevrolet Plant, Norwood.
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solute use of outside areas during nonworking time because the
ventilation inside was so poor.
Six UAW locals demanded that gasoline-powered trucks used
within the plant be replaced with electric battery-operated vehicles.124 Coming from GM employees, this demand has particular
irony. In most instances, management agreed that as the present
equipment wore out, it would be replaced with electric models if
they could be purchased at comparable cost. Also of interest were
five complaints about gas fumes. One settlement specified a switch
to butane fuel,125 and another indicated that in the future only unleaded gas would be used. 126
There were ten demands that specific machines or production
processes be enclosed to retard the spread of fumes, vapors, and
particles. The usual target was paint spraying, welding, or grinding
operations, although asbestos dust and methylene dichloride were
also singled out.127 The specificity of these requests reflects an increased sophistication regarding the dangers of particular elements
and processes and the increasing evidence linking gases and particulates to respiratory diseases.
b. The International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper
Mill Workers. A second union that has taken steps to come to
grips with community environmental problems is the International
Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers.128 This
union's environmental involvement spans a period of several years.
In early 1970, the union successfully negotiated contract language
with the Kamloops Pulp and Paper Company, Ltd., in British
Columbia, establishing a joint union-management environmental
protection committee to educate employees on pollution matters
both on and off the job, to receive information, and to make suggestions on environmental problems.129 Previously, the International
Executive Board of the union had outlined a six-point action plan
for a pollution abatement program, which, in part, directed the
124. Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw; Chevrolet Plant, Buffalo; Chevrolet
Plant, Grey Iron; Chevrolet Plant, Livonia; Chevrolet Plant, St. Louis. Notably, the
same demand at the Delco Morraine Plant was met with a flat company agreement
to replace two of the gas trucks with electric vehicles.
125. General Motors Assembly Division, Fremont.
126. Rochester Products Plant.
127. A.C., Flint; Central Foundry, Bedford; Central Foundry, Saginaw; Chevrolet
Metal Castings, Saginaw; Chevrolet Mfg. Plant, Warren; Chevrolet Parts, Saginaw;
Chevrolet Truck; Delco-Morraine; Fisher Body, Mansfield; Fisher Body, Pittsburgh.
128. This union no longer exists independently. See note 16 supra.
129. Intl. Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite 8: Paper Mill Workers, News Release, July 1971.
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union's Research and Education Department to collect information
on the extent of pollution in the mills with which the union bargained and to carry out an intensive public-information program.180
Later in 1970, the union sponsored a workshop on "Man and His
Environment" for more than 250 local union leaders, at which an
official position paper approved by the Executive Board was explained to local representatives. The position paper recommended,
among other things, the establishment of pollution control committees in all local unions, collection of factual material, and affiliation
with specific antipollution groups.131
In 1971, the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers refined its
position paper into a detailed environmental program for local
unions. This program, which was later adopted by the international
union,132 contains specific proposals for implementing an environmental plan of action at the local level.183 Suggestions in three areas
are of particular interest, relating to (1) in-plant activities of the
workers, (2) the joint environmental control committee, and (3)
collective bargaining issues. In the plant, the formation of an environmental-concerns committee is recommended, accompanied by
the appointment of individuals to provide media assistance and to
attract guest speakers. Furthermore, it is suggested that two members
of this committee act as an in-plant study group to discover ways by
which plant operations could become more ecologically sound.184
The joint environmental control committee recommended by
the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers Union is designed to
have an equal number of management and union representatives,
whose responsibilities shall be "to consider, investigate and make
proposals to the company with respect to the environmental problems arising from the operation of the plant."135 The committee's
130. Id.
131. 1 BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 616 (1970).
132. Letter from Richard A. Estep, Director, Department of Research and Education, Pulp, Sulphite&: Paper Mill Workers Union, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 4, 1971.
133. Intl. Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite &: Paper Mill Workers, Project III-An Environmental Program for Local Unions Gune 8, 1971) [hereinafter Project III].
134. Id. at I. These members are instructed at some point to "ask other members
of the union ••. to describe or write down job actions they perform which might
be harmful. A list should be compiled and submitted through the pollution committee
or grievance committee for action." Id. This suggestion is directly pertinent to the
discussion regarding protected, concerted activities of individual employees who resist
the performance of environmentally harmful jobs. See pt. IV. B. infra.
135. Project III, supra note 133, at I. The committee would also be consulted for
its approval concerning the possible ecological consequences of new building plans.
These consultations would likely be resisted by management since considerations of
design and operation of new buildings may constitute a "management prerogative,"
See text accompanying note 201 infra.
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powers, however, include only investigation, record-keeping, and
recommendation for action.136
In the area of collective bargaining issues, the program suggests
that local unions attempt to make the term "unfair environmental
practice" as much of a byword as "unfair labor practice" and that
they seek a stipulation in all contracts that "no company take economic reprisal against an employee because he reports his company's
pollution violations to public authorities."137 Also, it is recommended that the unions push for full public disclosure of financial
records to support any claim of high pollution abatement costs,138
and "bargain to require companies which reduce their work forces as
a result of environmental cost pressures to continue to pay the wages
of those employees who lose jobs for a specified period of time afterward."139 Finally, it is recommended that stipulations be achieved in
contracts that "a given percentage of investments and profits be
utilized for environmental research."140 The program acknowledges
that "[£Jew collective bargaining sessions to date in any industry have
been able to induce management to accept concepts of this nature,"
but suggests ways to marshal community support, such as taking out
newspaper ads, meeting with ecology groups within the community
and with the workers themselves, approaching local politicians, and
writing letters to the editors of newspapers.141
c. Other unions. Negotiated contract provisions which encompass community environmental problems are rare. Occasionally,
general provisions have been secured, such as the following language
136. Project III, supra note 133, at 1-2.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. at 2. This recommendation states further that after dismissal, employees
should be paid before stockholders, and laid-off workers should be given relocation assistance. Giving employees preference over shareholders would require that management
carefully consider corporation law. For instance, officers and directors may be placed in
a position of risking a breach of their fiduciary duties to shareholders.
140. Id. at 2. The suggestion that a percentage of investments and profits be specified in the contract and devoted to environmental research, albeit courageous, faces
formidable obstacles under the Taft-Hartley Act and interpretive case authority. For
instance, one of the principles most frequently encountered for delineating those areas
that are reserved to management for decision is that management retains the prerogative of making decisions on capital expenditures. It should be recognized that if the
tactic is attempted by a union, and if the union's insistence threatens to go to impasse
or assumes strike proportions, an unfair labor practice charge alleging refusal to bargain
can be anticipated. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964). The fiduciary duties of officers and directors under corporation law could also be
a problem. Thus, this provision raises more serious, and to some extent different, considerations than the other contract recommendations contained in the union's program
for local unions.
141. Project III, supra note 133, at 2.
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which appears in contracts negotiated by the Glass Bottle Blowers
Association: "Environmental Control Program: The Company will
continue to cooperate with the Union in all legitimate labor-management activities in this area."142 A more substantive provision is the
health and safety section of the contract recommended by the United
Farm Workers Organizing Committee. That provision, among other
things, deals specifically with pesticides and establishes a health and
safety committee comprised of workers' representatives, the members
of which are to be given "free access to all records concerning the
use of economic poisons" and are to participate with the company
in the formulation of rules and practices relating to the health and
safety of the workers.148 No worker under the agreement would be
required to work when in good faith he believes that to do so would
immediately endanger his health or safety.144 These provisions are
preceded by a preamble which recites the danger to the earth's
ecology inherent in improper use of "economic poisons," and which
concludes that "in hope of taking progressive steps to protect the
health of the farm workers and consumers, Company and Union
agree that the subject of economic poison is a necessary and desirable
subject for this collective bargaining agreement." 145
Many of the activities of the OCAW have previously been mentioned;146 but even though the OCAW has a progressive attitude on
environmental matters, no local union agreements have been negotiated dealing exclusively with the environment beyond the actual
confines of the work place. As one union spokesman said, "This
should not be interpreted as a lack of concern. Rather, it is an inability to effect controls over an area where we lack jurisdiction."147
142. Letter from Harry L. Moore, Director of Legislation, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn.,
to James C. Oldham, Aug. 16, 1972.
143. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm. Contract§ 18.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See text accompanying notes 69-75 supra.
147. Letter from Frederick A. Linde, Presidential Assistant, Health, OCAW, to James
C. Oldham, Nov. 22, 1971. This concern over jurisdiction would appear to conflict with
a previous report that the OCAW planned to make pollution problems a subject for
contract negotiations. See 1 BNA ENV. REP. (Current Developments) 20 (1970). Perhaps
the previous report contemplated pollution problems that have a significant bearing on
the in-plant environment. By contrast, Olga Madar of the UAW has stated:
[W]e have said that, for the first time, we will make the problem of general environmental pollution a bargaining issue in our next negotiations. Pollution at the
work place has been a subject for discussion for a great number of years but much
more needs to be done to protect the health and safety of our membership in the
plants.
This year, hopefully, we are going to tackle these two together. That's not going
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The jurisdictional question under the Taft-Hartley Act is a
serious one. 148 In Canada, where the Taft-Hartley impediments do
not apply, contractual bargaining on out-plant environmental problems has occurred with more frequency. In a study performed by the
Canadian Labour Congress, it was reported that all five of the unions
which were considered149 had at one time tried unsuccessfully to
negotiate clauses relating to the control and elimination of pollution.1110 All of the unions planned "to press this issue in their future
negotiations,"1111 and in at least one instance, the Steelworkers upheld
their promise. Article 22 of the 1970-1972 agreement between the
Steelworkers and Cominco, Ltd., provided as follows:
The Company and the Union affirm their joint objective of achieving a work environment in the Company's operations and a general
environment in the communities which these operations affect, which
is pollution free to the extent practical, recognizing the nature of
the Company's industrial operations.1 52

This provision, although basically a statement of good intentions,
to be easy because it's going to be difficult to get the kind of contractual language
which will comply with the legal structures in collective bargaining.
Madar, Ecotactics, in 11th Farmer Labour Teacher Conference, Report, Solution to
Pollution, Matter of Life and Death, at 39, 41 Gune 20-21, 1970).
148. See pt. IV. A. infra.
149. The five unions were the Pulp, Sulphite&: Paper Mill Workers, the UAW, the
OCAW", the Glass Workers, and the Steelworkers. Canadian Labour Congress, Draft
Report of Survey Results Concerning Environmental Activities of Five Unions 2 (undated).
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id. The questionnaire was circulated by the Canadian Labour Congress in response to a request from the Swedish Embassy preliminary to Sweden's hosting of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in June 1972. Letter from Jim
MacDonald, Director, Social &: Community Programs Dept., Canadian Labour Congress,
to James C. Oldham, July 6, 1972. Mr. MacDonald attended the United Nations Conference, and subsequently observed that the minimal attention given "the working
environment" in the "Action Plan" recommendations was "a cause of dissatisfaction to
those of us who were 'worker' delegates in our respective national delegations." Id.
Noting that the United States delegation to Stockholm did not include a trade unionist,
Mr. MacDonald observed: "By and large [the United States delegates] brought little
credit to your nation." Id.
The Canadian Labour Congress has been attentive to pollution problems for several
years. In addition to the 1971 questionnaire and resultant report, the Congress has
prepared an educational film on pollution problems and devoted the citizenship month
campaign of February 1971 to the theme of the environment. Letter from George Home,
Director, Political Education Dept., Canadian Labour Congress, to James C. Oldham,
Nov. 26, 1971.
152. Agreement, Trail, Kimberly, H.B., Benson Lake, and Bluebell Operations, Between Cominco, Ltd., and Locals 480, 651, 901, 949 &: 7293 of the United Steelworkers
of America, July I, 1970-June 30, 1972, at 59. This provision was renewed and now
expires on May 30, 1973.
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has nevertheless facilitated the creation of a labor-management committee on pollution.153 Shortly after the signing of the agreement, a
Steelworker official with jurisdiction over Western Canada instructed
his locals "that a pollution clause be made one of the major priorities
in your next negotiations," and that "it is an issue that should be
pressed to a strike issue unless we get verifiable evidence from the
Companies that they have done something and are willing to put a
clause on pollution in our collective agreements ...." 154 While it is
unlikely that local unions would treat an environmental provision
as a strike issue, management consent to that type of provision is
feasible without a strike threat, given the provision's generality. The
widespread adoption of such a provision would be a useful first step
in treating community environmental problems at the bargaining
table and would facilitate the treatment of environmental questions
through the grievance and arbitration procedure set forth elsewhere
in the contract.155
The preceding examples of union involvement in community
environmental problems have been some of the more visible to date.
There have been other sporadic instances of union involvement, such
as occasional union "discoveries" of pollution with which management is then confronted156 or which are lodged with the appropriate
environmental protection agency.157 A few unions have been
153. Schreiner, Steelworkers in Forefront in Anti-Pollution Battle, The Western
Steelworker, April-May 1972, at 7, col. 1, col. 3.
154. Id. at 7, col. 3.
155. Grievance and arbitration clauses come in various sizes and shapes. The scope
of the grievance provision may be broader than that of the arbitration provision. Typically, however, the two provisions will be coextensive and will provide for the treatment of issues involving "the meaning, interpretation or application" of the provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement.
156. Compare the experience of a Rochester, New York, UAW local shop chairman
who wrote to the International describing chemical discharges from his plant which were
polluting nearby streams. After ascertaining that the water was in fact polluted, UAW
headquarters took the matter up with GM's Director of Labor Relations. The reply
from GM stated that the water sample had been taken from a sewer line, and that, in
any event, local industrial waste engineers from the city had tested the plant's effiuent
and found it "acceptable to their system and within existing codes." Letter from Bill
Reece, Shop Chairman, Local 1097, UAW, to Walter P. Reuther, President, UAW,
April 27, 1970; Letter from Irving Bluestone, Director, GM Department, UAW, to
George Morris, Director, Labor Relations, General Motors Corp., July 5, 1971; Letter
from George Morris to Irving Bluestone, July 16, 1971.
157. For example, in 1971, the Safety Committee of Local No. 1974 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers discovered pollution in a creek flowing
east of the Western Electric plant where union members were employed. Test samples
were sent to the Omaha Testing Laboratories, and later the EPA was contacted. Reportedly, the union's evidence was convincing, notwithstanding the fine reputation of
Western Electric on environmental matters. As a result, the company took steps to
rectify the problem. Berger, Western Electric Found Polluting Nearby Stream, The
Short Circuit, Dec. 1971, at 3.
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vigorous participants in the formulation of environmental trade
associations comprised of labor, management, and professional representatives.158 Others work with their companies or with civic
organizations in cooperative efforts to promote conservation and environmental programs.159 A few imaginative attempts to combat
pollution have also been made by nonindustrial unions.160
C. Union Activity Through State
Environmental Protection Agencies
In correspondence with the environmental protection agencies
of the 50 states, responses were received from 38 agencies, 76 per cent
of those contacted. Generally, most agencies responded that, while
they were hopeful that significant union activity in support of en158. The Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, together with several
other unions, was instrumental in the organization of the Western Environmental Trade
Association (WETA). Letter from Hugh D. Bannister, President, Western Pulp&: Paper
Workers, to James C. Oldham, July 24, 1972. The Trade Association has a broadly
representative board of directors and has been active in major environmental projects
on the West Coast. See WETA, A Prospectus, 1 ·wETA Newsletter, July 1972.
159. For example, the Glass Bottle Blowers Association indicates that it has worked
extensively with companies to mount recycling campaigns as well as on research projects, Letter from Harry L. Moore, Director of Legislation, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn.
to James C. Oldham, Aug. 16, 1972. Similar cooperative efforts have been reported between the Air Line Pilots Association and the air line companies. See note 107 supra.
160. For instance, Mr. Joseph Beirne, President of the Communication Workers of
America, l\-Tote to the Chairman of the Board of the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company in June 1971 to emphasize the union's belief that the Bell System owed more
to the community than providing the best telephone service at the lowest possible
prices. In addition to recommending that the Bell System evaluate the mining methods
of its copper suppliers and the reforestation programs of companies from which it buys
timber for telephone poles, President Bierne stated:
Along these lines, the Bell System could help to speed the development of a low
emission motor vehicle. As one of the nation's largest purchasers of motor vehicles
with a fleet of some 128,000, it would seem reasonable that AT&T should exert
some of its vast market power on the automobile manufacturers. The Bell System
could provide a real economic incentive for producing low emission motor vehicles
if it would adopt a firm policy of making all of its purchases in a given period of
time, say five years for example, from the automobile company which is the first to
offer a motor vehicle which meets the 1975 standards as provided for by the Act.
If such a policy were adopted it would have its most beneficial effect if it were
announced as soon as possible and well before the date on which compliance with
the Act would be required. This would give the same opportunity and incentive
to all of the auto makers and it would firmly place AT&T on the side of cleaner
air before other major U.S. corporations, Such a policy would entail little or no
cost to the operating companies and i[t] would be wholly consistent with the announced objectives of the Corporation,
Letter from Joseph A. Beirne, President, Communications Workers of America, to H. L.
Romnes, Chairman of the Board and President, AT&T, June 30, 1971.
Another example of an effort by a nonindustrial union to combat pollution is provided by the American Federation of Teachers. That union commissioned a classroom
teacher from Kansas City, Missouri, to prepare a detailed lesson plan on environmental
problems for use in the school systems. Letter from Robert D. Bhaerman, Director,
Department of Educational Research, American Fedn. of Teachers, to James C. Oldham,
Nov. 18, 1971. See American Teacher, April 1970, at 11, for more of the specifics of this
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vironmental abatement would be forthcoming, very little activity of
this type had yet come to their attention. The agencies were asked
if they had encountered any specific instances of union members
refusing to perform acts in the course of their employment which
would have violated federal or state environmental laws. They were
also asked whether unions had taken any affirmative action in an attempt to bring employers into compliance with pollution control
legislation or ordinances. Finally, general information and comments regarding labor union activity in the area of environmental
protection were solicited.
A few agencies were simply unresponsive.161 However, most responded to the questions even though they could provide very little
information. Half of the responding states had nothing tangible or
significant to report.
In a number of instances, however, participation by labor in environmental protection agency hearings was reported. In three states,
labor union testimony against the imposition of environmental controls was described.162 Nevertheless, there were five states in which
testimony had been given or active support othenvise demonstrated
to the environmental protection agencies in favor of the imposition
of controls.163 In three states, controls were favored by organized
project. Unfortunately, the lesson plan concepts did not materialize to the extent originally intended. Letter from Robert D. Bhaerman to James C. Oldham, June 27, 1972.
What was accomplished is summarized in American Teacher, April 1972, at 11.
161. For example, Mr. Tommy Gingles, Assistant Executive Director, Air &: Water
Pollution Control Commn., State of Mississippi, indicated that the author's letter had
been referred to the Commission's legal staff, which replied: "We have no comment on
this matter and to our knowledge, Mississippi statutory law is silent on this subject."
Letter from Tommy Gingles, to James C. Oldham, Jan. 5, 1971.
162. Letter from William A. Munroe, Chief, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, State
of New Jersey, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 23, 1971; Letter from Aaron L. Bond, Chief,
Health&: Air Quality Control Section, New Mexico Environmental Improvement Agency,
to James C. Oldham, July 19, 1972; Letter from Gerald R. Severson, Attorney, Texas
Air Pollution Control Services, to James C. Oldham, July 3, 1972. Mr. Bond referred
to invitations extended to labor unions to participate in a hearing on copper smelter
emissions, stating that "the interest of the labor union is in supporting the position of
the industry that no further control of emissions is desirable."
163. Letter from John E. Daniel, Attorney, Bureau of Environmental Health, Alabama Dept. of Public Health, to James C. Oldham, Dec. 2, 1971 [hereinafter Daniel
Letter]; Letter from Norman E. Schell, Director, Div. of Air Pollution Control, Arizona
State Dept. of Health, to James C. Oldham, Feb. 23, 1972 [hereinafter Schell Letter]:
Letter from Frank P. Partee, Director, Kentucky Air Pollution Control Comm., to James
C. Oldham, Dec. 2, 1971; Letter from Martin A. Ferris, III, Special Assistant Attorney
General, Bureau of Air Quality Control, Maryland Environmental Health Administration, to James C. Oldham, Dec. 3, 1971; Letter from Ed Gatzemeier, Industrial Hygiene
Engineer, Montana State Dept. of Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 15, 1971. Also of
interest in this regard are the views of James W. Murry, Executive Secretary of the
Montana State AFL-CIO, who urged the EPA "to hold firm on the emission standards it
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labor, but additional time was requested before the controls would
become applicable, or controls were supported only on the condition
that no loss of jobs would result.164
In at least one instance, a labor union had sought an environmental protection agency's assistance in bringing an action against an
employer. 165 Three states indicated that employees or union members had individually reported employers to environmental protection agencies. 166 And in one state, criminal sanctions had been sought
by an environmental protection agency against individual employees
for polluting activities. 167
One state agency was familiar with a local public information
program which had been supported by a labor union,1 68 but in
several additional states, the role played by labor unions was to impede pollution abatement. In two of these instances, labor pickets
precluded or interrupted the installation of pollution abatement
equipment or waste disposal efforts,169 and in three states, it was
set" for various smelters in the state. EPA Hearings on the Montana Air Implementation
Plan, held in Helena, Mont., Aug. 30, 1972.
164. Schell Letter, supra note 163; Letter from John C. Soet, Chairman, Air Pollution
Control Commn., Michigan Dept. of Public Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 11, 1971;
Letter from Daniel M. Barolo, Sanitary Engineer, Div. of Air Resources, New York State
Dept. of Environmental Conservation, to James C. Oldham, July 20, 1972.
165. In New York, an incident was reported in which union representatives approached the Department of Environmental Conservation concerning the etching of
automobile windshields of aluminum plant employees caused by fluorides. Ultimately,
the matter was settled between the employees and the company, and it was stated that
"this was definitely through union action." Letter from Harry H. Hovey, Jr., Associate
Director, Div. of Air Resources, New York State Dept. of Environmental -conservation,
to James C. Oldham, Nov. 10, 1971. See also note 157 supra.
166. In Rhode Island, two incidents of disposing plating rinses into state waters were
reported by anonymous employees to the applicable environmental agency. Letter from
Raymond J. Joubert, Senior Sanitary Engineer, Div. of Water Supply &: Pollution Control, Rhode Island Dept. of Health, to James C. Oldham, July 11, 1972. In Missouri, an
incident was reported where union members approached the air conservation commission during contract negotiations and requested that certain actions be taken against
their company. Once the contract was negotiated, no further complaints were filed.
Letter from H.D. Shell, Acting Executive Secretary, Missouri Air Conservation Commn.,
to James C. Oldham, Nov. 9, 1971. And in Virginia, employees of a railway company
complained to the state air pollution control board about choking fumes emanating
from diesel engines being operated in the railroad yards. Letter from Hamilton Crock.ford, Information Officer, Virginia State Air Pollution Control Bd., to James C. Oldham,
Nov. 4-, 1971.
167. In Arkansas, it was reported that "misdemeanor charges have been brought
against individual employees of a corporate employer for open burning in violation of
the Air Code." Letter from James M. McHaney, Attorney, Arkansas Dept. of Pollution
Control&: Ecology, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 9, 1971. See also note 67 supra.
168. Daniel Letter, supra note 163.
169. An incident was reported in New Jersey in which a union's picket line prevented proper disposal of odor-causing wastes at an industrial operation. Letter from
Herbert Wortreich, Chief Enforcement Officer, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, New
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reported that employees had failed to use already installed pollution
control equipment.170
D.

The Present State of Union Concern

Did Walter Reuther's call to arms on environmental concerns in
February 1970171 do any good? Certainly it was a catalyst for some
action, such as the UAW's energetic collection of data, the flurry of
resolutions by international unions, and a handful of negotiated contract provisions. In retrospect, 1970 appears to have been labor's
ecology year; less attention has been focused on environmental concerns since then. Resolutions have been fewer, and no outpouring of
contract negotiation efforts has occurred. Nothing of consequence
was done with the data collected by the UAW. Admittedly this is no
surprise--out-plant environmental concerns are relatively far down
the priority list for the typical union, at least when it comes to realworld negotiations and attendant trade-offs. Exacerbating the situation has been the depressed but inflationary economy and more than
customary concern about job security.
Perhaps it is time again to sound the alarm. One thing is clear
from the UAW questionnaires: The matter is not solely academic.
Untended out-plant environmental pollution by corporate employers
is widespread, it frequently demands complicity of the workers, and
it very often directly affects the lives of individual employees. With
the economy again on an upward incline, and given the continuance
of wage guidelines that restrain labor's traditional negotiating room,
extraordinary attention might be directed to nonwage demands; perhaps 1973 can be another ecology year for labor.
What is the range of action which organized labor has at its disposal? Resolutions are easy, and legislative action also can be pursued, as the UAW has shown.172 Safety and health questions can
generally be isolated and given a more central role in negotiations
Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, to James C. Oldham, July 11, 1972. A labor
disagreement that involved a craft union stopped progress on the installation of pollution abatement devices in Louisiana. Letter from John E. Trygg, Technical Secretary,
Louisiana Air Control Commn., to James C. Oldham, July 24, 1972. See also note 114
supra.
170. Letter from William D. Christen, Hearing Commissioner, Indiana State Board of
Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 22, 1971; Letter from Raymond G. Buergin, Air
Quality Engineer, Air Quality & Occupational Health Section, Kansas State Dept. of
Health, to James C. Oldham, Nov. 5, 1971; Letter from Carl G. Beard, II, Director,
West Virginia Air Pollution Control Commn., to James C. Oldham, Nov. 5, 1971.
171. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
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and in daily plant operations, especially with the momentum provided by OSHA. But there are two further possibilities that could
be of major significance-if the law supports or protects them. One
is to bring out-plant pollution questions to the bargaining table. The
other is for unions to encourage their members to balk at performing
work that directly results in pollution and to seek contract language
to protect any such workers from discipline or discharge. Whether
or to what extent these courses of action are permitted by the TaftHartley Act is the inquiry to which the remainder of this Article is
devoted.

IV.
A.

.APPLICATION OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY

Acr

The Duty To Bargain on Environmental Matters

The Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts created no express division
of subject matter into mandatory and nonmandatory categories for
purposes of the duty to bargain.173 The Supreme Court accepted the
NLRB's use of this distinction in the Borg-Warner case174-a step
173. A preliminary question should be acknowledged. It is fair to ask whether it
is philosophically wise, even if legal, to extend collective bargaining to encompass out-

plant pollution. It may be argued that collective bargaining is cluttered enough without
the imposition of this additional area and that the NLRB is without the resources to
accommodate more unfair labor practice cases. Moreover, the varied interests of local
and international unions will detract from the uniform development of national environmental standards.
In response, it is not suggested that environmental problems of unionized employers
would be relegated solely to the bargaining table. Were that the case, surely a patchwork pattern would result. However, from an "arsenal of weapons" standpoint, it is
not harmful to add the bargaining process to those recourses available to individuals
who suffer environmental degradation-especially when workers often suffer the most.
Clearly, this conclusion obtains for the company town and the captive community,
and it may be appropriate for the urban industrial setting as well.
For the individual workers, no risk of a crazy-quilt pattern attends the possibility
that they might resist the performance of environmentally injurious work. It is true
that thorny discharge or grievance cases may occur, but policy implications would be
minimal. Relevant by analogy are conflicts between work requirements and employees'
religious beliefs that have been dealt with in grievance and arbitration procedures. See,
e.g., A.O. Smith Corp., 72-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 1[ 8134 (1972) (Volz, Arbitrator);
International Shoe Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2813 (1946) (Klannon, Arbitrator); Goodyear Tire
&: Rubber Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2722 (1945) (McCoy, Arbitrator). There admittedly would
be widespread plant shutdowns if all employees who perform work contributing to
pollution simultaneously refuse to do their jobs. Raebum W. MacDonald, Chief Engineer for the Maine Environmental Improvement Commission, has said that "should
employees refuse to work in factories that have not yet met their pollution control
obligations protracted layoffs would result in connection with the type of industry
existing in Maine." Letter from Raeburn W. MacDonald to James C. Oldham, Nov. 30,
1971. But realistically this will not happen, and some environmental progress might
result from bringing the operations of employers that are presently violating applicable
pollution standards into compliance. Perhaps similar progress can occur where operations of employers are not patently illegal but are unconscionable.
174. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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that was viewed as unfortunate by many observers.175 Subsequent to
Borg-Warner, the Supreme Court has continued to refine the contours of the duty to bargain in terms of the mandatory-permissive
distinction. The cases are relatively well known, but a review may be
helpful, particularly in light of the comments from the Court in the
recent Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision.176

I. Supreme Court Vicissitudes
In Borg-Warner, the central issue was whether the employer
could lawfully insist that its collective bargaining contract with some
of its employees include a "ballot" clause calling for a prestrike secret
vote of those employees concerning the employer's last offer.177 In a
five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the conclusion of the NLRB
that the employer's insistence on this clause was an unfair labor
practice.178 Writing for the majority, Justice Burton determined
that the duty to bargain under the Taft-Hartley Act was limited to
those subjects falling within the phrase " 'wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment' "; 179 other subjects could be
discussed voluntarily at the bargaining table but could not be insisted upon.1 80 Justice Burton concluded that the ballot clause related "only to the procedure to be followed by the employees among
themselves before their representative [might] call a strike or refuse
a final offer." 181 In his view, it settled no term or condition of employment; the clause merely called for an advisory vote of the
employees. In dissent, Justice Harlan persuasively reviewed the
175. Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA.
L. REv. 1057, 1074-86 (1958); St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's
Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 269, 280 (1973); Comment,
Requirement Under Taft-Hartley Act To Bargain in Good Faith, 44 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 220
(1960); Note, The Impact of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bargaining, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 1225 (1959); Comment, Bargaining on Nonmandatory Topics Constitutes Refusal To Bargain, 11 STAN. L. REv. 188 (1958).
176. Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
177. 356 U.S. at 343. Also under consideration was a "recognition" clause whereby the
employer sought to extend recognition to an uncertified local union, rather than to
the international certified by the Board. Since such a clause would have directly
contravened the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court, with no dissents, found that the employer's insistence on such a clause was an unfair labor practice. 356 U.S. at 350, 362.
178. 356 U.S. at 349-50.
179. 356 U.S. at 349, quoting Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970)). Although the company had met the requirements of good faith as to the mandatory subjects of bargaining, the Court concluded that insisting upon permissive
subjects "is, in substance, a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within the
scope of mandatory bargaining." 356 U.S. at 349.
180. 356 U.S. at 349.
181. 356 U.S. at 350.
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legislative history of both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts to support his conclusion that the decision of the majority sanctioned "an
intrusion by the Board into the substantive aspects of the bargaining
process which goes beyond anything contemplated by the National
Labor Relations Act or suggested in this Court's prior decisions
under it.''182 Justice Harlan was unable to agree with the majority
regarding the classification of the ballot clause. Noting that the
phrase "other terms and conditions of employment" had "been accorded by the Board and courts an expansive rather than a grudging
interpretation,"183 Justice Harlan could see no distinction between
the ballot clause and other developments affecting "the employeremployee relationship in much the same way" such as the timing of
strikes or voting by employees to determine their preference before
the union's decision to strike. 184
In 1964, the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart in the Fibreboard case185 enhanced the "grudging interpretation" of the statutory phrase. There the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren, affirmed the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit186 that contracting out work previously
performed by members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject
for mandatory bargaining. The Chief Justice, in an opinion joined
by four other members of the Court,187 noted that the peaceful
resolution of industrial disputes would be furthered by the Board's
holding that contracting out is a mandatory subject of bargaining.188
The Court found substantiation for its conclusion in general industrial practices through which "contracting out in one form or another
has been brought, widely and successfully, within the collective bargaining framework."189 Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas
and Harlan, concurred, largely for the purpose of articulating what
he viewed as the narrow scope of the majority holding.HlO He stated:
182. 356 U.S. at 351-52.
183. 356 U.S. at 353.
184. 356 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan further argued that even if the ballot clause was
a permissive subject, a good faith insistence upon it should not result in an unfair labor
practice: Merely because the one party is not required to negotiate about a subject
should not mean that the other is prohibited from insisting upon it. 356 U.S. at 353-54.
185. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
186. Local 1304, Steelworkers v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
187. Justice Goldberg did not participate in the consideration or decision of the
case.
188. 379 U.S. at 210-11.
189. 379 U.S. at 211.
190. 379 U.S. at 217-18.
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It is important to note that the words of the statute are words
of limitation. The National Labor Relations Act does not say that
the employer and employees are bound to confer on any subject
which interests either of them; the specification of wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment defines a limited category
of issues subject to compulsory bargaining. The limiting purpose of
the statute's language is made clear by the legislative history of the
present act.191

Justice Stewart acknowledged that "[t]here was a time when one
might have taken the view that the National Labor Relations Act
gave the Board and the courts no power to determine the subjects
about which the parties must bargain-a view ex.pressed by Senator
Walsh when he said that the public concern ends at the bargaining
room door,"192 but he reasoned that "too much law has been built
upon a contrary assumption for this view any longer to prevail, and I
question neither the power of the Court to decide this issue nor the
propriety of its doing so."193
Senator Walsh, of course, had been referring to the Wagner Act.
That Act, as is later indicated in more detail,194 picked up the phrase
"other conditions of employment" from pre-existing statutes, all of
which support an expansive reading of the words. If Justice Stewart
was obliquely admitting this fact in Fibreboard, he must have justified his narrow reading of the phrase by reliance on the legislative
background of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act.
Justice Stewart noted the rejection in conference of the House of
Representatives' approach of enumerating specific subjects which
must be bargained about; however, he concluded that even though
less limiting language was ultimately agreed upon, the final version
adopted "the same basic approach in seeking to define a limited class
of bargainable issues."195 But, the language enacted in section 8(d)196
of the Taft-Hartley Act was virtually identical to the language previously utilized in the Wagner Act and other statutes; how these
words came in 1947 to acquire a meaning exactly opposite of that
which had prevailed before is difficult to understand. As Justice
Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Borg-Warner,197 the rejection
191. 379 U.S. at 220.
192. 379 U.S. at 219 n.2. For the text of Senator Walsh's statement, see text accompanying note 253 infra.
193. 379 U.S. at 219 n.2.
194. See text accompanying notes 229-40 infra,
195. 379 U.S. at 221.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
197. 356 U.S. at 355-56.
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in conference of the "laundry list" approach of the House bill logically supports a broad reading of the language which Congress finally
adopted. 108 Justice Stewart's treatment of legislative history in the
Fibreboard case is, at best, cavalier.
Having concluded that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Act supported a narrow reading of the phrase "other conditions of
employment," Justice Stewart then enumerated illustrative subjects
which he visualized as within this limited concept. Easily included
are such things as hours of work, quantity of work, periods of relief,
safety practices, and aspects of job security.199 However, not all decisions that affect job security are encompassed. Some such decisions,
such as the volume and type of advertising expenditures or product
design, are not embraced because their impact on job security is too
remote. 200 Others, such as investment in labor-saving machinery or
liquidation of assets, are excluded because they constitute the prerogative of management. According to Justice Stewart: "Nothing the
Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control."201 To extend the duty to bargain in this fashion would, according to Justice Stewart, "mark a
sharp departure from the traditional principles of a free enterprise
eonomy"-"a path which Congress certainly did not choose when it
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act."202
This final conclusion by Justice Stewart is highly debatable.
Moreover, Justice Stewart was writing for only three of the eight
Justices sitting for the Fibreboard case; the majority opinion by
Chief Justice Warren did not speak of a narrow interpretation of
"other conditions of employment." In fact, the potential reach of
198. See also notes 245-52 infra and accompanying text.
199. 379 U.S. at 222.
200. 379 U.S. at 223. The trouble with these examples is that they are relative.
There surely can be instances in which product design or advertising volume will
affect employees sufficiently to merit bargaining. As noted by Chamberlain and Kuhn:
Changes in the bargaining unit and shifts in market control and competition may
lead unions to insist upon broadening the scope of bargaining. For example, it
may be impractical for a single small firm to undertake an extensive advertising
program to expand sales, but numerous small companies, bargaining collectively
with the union, may respond to union pressures for a promotional campaign to
which all contribute and from which all benefit. This has, in fact, happened in
the New York City Women's Clothing Industry. Workers in the individual firms
would be likely to feel that company's advertising plans are of no direct interest
to them because they seem so meager in size and effect, but pitched on an industry
basis they may be of importance because of their greater impact on sales, output,
and employment.
N. CHA..\!BERLAIN &: J. KUHN, CoLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING 91 (2d ed. 1965).
201. 379 U.S. at 223.
202. 379 U.S. at 226.
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the majority's declaration that the words "plainly cover termination
of employment"203 undoubtedly triggered many of Justice Stewart's
remarks.
Significant, too, is the language of Judge, now Chief Justice,
Warren Burger, in the lower court opinion which the Supreme
Court affirmed in Fibreboard. Writing for the District of Columbia
Circuit, Judge Burger observed that the statutory definition in the
Taft-Hartley Act of subjects about which parties were required to
bargain was framed in "the broadest terms possible"; in his judgment:
The use of this language was a reflection of the congressional awareness that the act covered a wide variety of industrial and commercial
activity and a recognition that collective bargaining must be kept
flexible without precise delineation of what subjects were covered so
that the Act could be administered to meet changing conditions.20'

As is apparent, Judge Burger's interpretation of the phrase "wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment" stands in contrast to
that developed by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion.
Until recently, the NLRB has relied upon the majority opinion
in Fibreboard in giving broad content to the duty to bargain. Not
only were other subcontracting cases encompassed, but so were additional bargaining subjects once thought to be reserved to management.205 In 1971, however, the Board acquiesced in General Motors
Corp. 206 Responding to a charge of a Fibreboard-type breach of the
duty to bargain, three members of the Board accepted the Stewart
view that Fibreboard is to be limited to its facts. Thus, the transfer
of certain business operations was held to be a sale rather than a
subcontract, thereby necessitating bargaining over the effects of the
sale on employees but not over the basic managerial decision.207
203. 379 U.S. at 210.
204. 322 F.2d at 414.
205. McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958 (1970), enforced in part, 463 F.2d
907 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Metromedia, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 202 (1970); Skaggs Drug Centers,
Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 737 (1969); Wittock Supply Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 201 (1968); General
Motors Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 827, modified, 171 N.L.R.B. 666 (1968); Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced in part, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966). Northwestern Publishing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1963), enforced,
343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965); Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforcement
denied, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644, enforcement
denied on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966);
Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
206. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), petition for review denied sub
nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Summit Tooling Co., 195
N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972).
207. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 3-8, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539-40. The Board relied on
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Given the courts of appeals' disagreement with the Board over the
scope of Fibreboard,2° 8 and in view of the changed composition of
the Board, acquiescence was not surprising. Nevertheless, dissenting
Members Fanning and Bmwn argued:
With all respect, we submit that the concurrence in Fibreboard and
the dicta with respect to managerial decisions are not the law of the
case. The fact is that the Supreme Court has not addressed itself
directly to the issue here involved, and Fibreboard, while it may be
considered limited in scope, remains the only Supreme Court pronouncement in this area. 209

The courts of appeals have been even less generous, as only the Fifth
and District of Columbia Circuits have upheld the Board's early interpretation and application of Fibreboard. 210 The remaining five
circuits that have considered the question have tended to limit Fibreboard to its particular facts. 211
Given the majority opinion in Fibreboard, it might have been
expected that the Supreme Court would set the circuits aright by
confirming the interpretation of Fibreboard employed by the Fifth
and District of Columbia Circuits and by the Board until the General Motors case. However, the Court's recent decision in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass case212 casts a strong shadow over Chief Justice
Justice Stewart's language about decisions that "lie at the very core of entrepreneurial
control." 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 5, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539. But the Board considered
two other factors: the need for secrecy and swiftness in these decisions, and the importance of operational and financial considerations with which employees and their
unions are not likely to be familiar. It remains to be seen to what extent the Board
will elaborate these criteria.
208. See N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 4 n.7, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539 n.7. See also text accompanying notes 266-80 infra.
209. 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, at 10-11, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1541.
210. See UAW v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 857 (1967);
NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935
(1966); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965).
211. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prod., 416 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Thompson
Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Co., 380
F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating &: Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191
(3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. IOU (1966). See generally Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty To Bargain, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 803, 810-12 (1971). It should be noted that what is being
discussed is bargaining over decisions to subcontract or to automate or the like; the
Board has long held that bargaining over the effects of such a decision-so-called "impact bargaining"-is required. See, e.g., Town &: Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022
(1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963); Brown-Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1379
(1959), enforced, 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961); Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494
(1959), enforced, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Brown Truck &: Trailer Mfg. Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 999 (1953). Accord, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960).
212. Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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Warren's and Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger's interpretation of
section 8(d).
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court was asked to decide whether
bargaining over benefits for retired employees was mandatory under
the Taft-Hartley Act. The Court per Justice Brennan concluded
that such bargaining was not required for three independent reasons: (1) retirees are not within the definition of employees utilized
in section 2(3) of the Act,213 (2) retired employees could not be
legally encompassed within the bargaining unit under the statutory
language, and (3) retiree benefits do not so vitally affect active employees as to constitute a mandatory topic of bargaining subject to
the restrictions on midterm contract modifications set out in section
8(d) of the Act.
None of these reasons necessarily involved any philosophical
damage to the collective bargaining process. As to the first two, Justice Brennan acknowledged the relevance of industrial practice, citing the majority opinion in Fibreboard, 214 but he stated that
industrial experience could not change the law regarding which
employees could be included in the bargaining unit under the
Taft-Hartley language.215 As to the third reason, both the court of appeals216 and the Supreme Court217 acknowledged that future retirement benefits of active workers are a mandatory topic for bargaining.
Thus, the failure to embrace the benefits of already retired workers
did not represent a narrowing of the mandatory subject area.
However, in determining whether the benefits of retired employees so vitally affected the active employees as to present a mandatory subject of bargaining under the doctrine of the Oliver case,218
the Supreme Court for the first time approvingly cited Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard. 219 Justice Brennan stated
213. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) (1970).
214. 404 U.S. at 175-76, citing 379 U.S. at 211.
215. 404 U.S. at 176.
216. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936, 941 (6th Cir. 1970).
217. 404 U.S. at 180: "To be sure, the future retirement benefits of active workers
are part and parcel of their overall compensation and hence a well-established statutory subject of bargaining."
218. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). A collective bargaining agreement, establishing a minimum rental to be paid by carriers to truck owners who drove
their own vehicles, was held to cover a mandatory subject even though the Court did
not determine if the truck owners were themselves "employees.'' This was believed
necessary because the rental term was "but a direct frontal attack upon a problem
thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the
collective bargaining contract.'' 358 U.S. at 294.
219. Justice Brennan's initial reference to Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was
in support of the statement that subjects for mandatory bargaining are not immutable
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that section 8(d) of the Act "does establish a limitation against which
proposed topics must be measured."220 Using language from BorgWarner, Justice Brennan indicated that the limitation generally
includes only issues which "settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees."221 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that, as in Oliver, third-party interests can be relevant to the
duty to bargain. In each case, the test is whether the third-party
matter "vitally affects" the terms and conditions of employment of
bargaining unit employees.222 On the facts before it, the Court concluded that the Board had misapplied this test; Justice Brennan
stated that the Board's view that retiree benefits vitally affected
conditions of employment of active employees "simply neglected to
give the adverb its ordinary meaning."223 This holding, apart from
the language used to support it and quibbling over the lack of deference to the agency charged with enforcing the Act,224 is not especially objectionable.
However, in two other respects the opinion may portend a shift to
the Stewart position. First, the Court slighted the impact of industrial
experience on the mandatory bargaining issue. Acknowledging the
Board's reliance on the widespread industrial practice of bargaining
over retiree benefits, Justice Brennan summarily dismissed the practice: "[W]e find nowhere a particle of evidence cited showing that
the explanation for this lies in the concern of active workers for their
own future retirement benefits." 225 Pointedly omitted from this observation was any reference to Fibreboard, even though Chief Justice
Warren's opinion placed heavy reliance on industrial practice as a
logical factor determining whether or not a subject fell within the
mandatory category.226 Second, in a potentially important footnote,
the Court seemed to go out of its way to observe that, in determining whether an issue was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
impact on employee interests may not be the sole test: "Other considerations, such as the effect on the employer's freedom to conduct
-a proposition for which the majority opinion would have stood equally well. 404
U.S. at 178.
220. 404 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).
221. 404 U.S. at 178.
222. 404 U.S. at 179.
22!1. 404 U.S. at 182.
224. For instance, notwiths~ding the Court's conclusions, the expertise of the
Board in classifying bargaining subjects as mandatory or nonmandatory was acknowledged by Justice Brennan. 404 U.S. at 182.
225. 404 U.S. at 182,
226. !179 U.S. at 211-12,
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his business, may be equally important."227 As previously indicated,
such an argument had been a crucial element of Justice Stewart's
position in Fibreboard. 228
Justice Brennan's reliance on Justice Stewart's Fibreboard opinion, his acceptance of the limited nature of section S(d), and his
disregard of Chief Justice Warren's view of the importance of industrial practice collectively constitute a troublesome harbinger for
the future of collective bargaining. This development is particularly
disturbing given the legislative history of the phrase "other conditions of employment" and the healthy approach to this phrase
adopted by the majority in Fibreboard and Judge Burger in the
lower court. The duty to bargain existed before the Taft-Hartley
Act, as did the key statutory phrase. And, as indicated by both Justice
Harlan's dissent in Borg-Warner and the discussion to follow, the
legislative history tends to refute Justice Stewart's conclusions rather
than support them.

2. Legislative History of "Other Conditions of Employment"
The first appearance of the phrase "conditions of employment"
in federal statutes affecting labor occurred in the labor exemption to
the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.229 However, in labor legislation
the phrase more often utilized before 1914 and for nearly two decades to follow was "working conditions."230 In 1932, the NorrisLaGuardia Act231 was enacted-a statute drafted with a broad brush
in order to eradicate widespread judicial abuses in issuing labor
injunctions. As defined by the Act, a "labor dispute" included
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
227. 404 U.S. at 179 n.19. The Court indicated that it was not presented with the
occasion "to consider what, if any, those considerations may be." It should be noted
that whether or not there are pertinent considerations other than the impact on
employee interests, there is no basis in the legislative history for the assertion that
an employer's freedom to conduct his business is "equally important." See text accompanying notes 229-58 infra.
228. 379 U.S. at 223. See text accompanying notes 201-02 supra.
229. Section 20 of the Act provided in part that "no restraining order or injunction
shall be granted • • . involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment ••••" 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
230. See, e.g., the law creating the Labor Department in 1913, 29 U.S.C. § 551
(1970); the Women's Bureau Act of 1920, 29 U.S.C. § 13 (1970); the Railway Labor Act
of 1926, 45 U.S.C. § 15l(a) (1970).
231. 29 u.s.c. §§ 101-15 (1970).
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conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.232

A year later, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA). 233 When President Roosevelt recommended this legislation to Congress on May 17, 1933, section 7(a) of the administration
bill spoke of compliance by employers with "maximum hours of
labor, minimum rates of pay, and other working conditions, approved or prescribed by the President."234 The House of Representatives passed a bill containing the "working conditions" language; 235
however, during Senate consideration of the House bill, Senator
'Walsh of Massachusetts sponsored an amendment striking "other
working conditions" from section 7 (a) and inserting in its stead
"other conditions of employment."236 Although there was no debate
on the Walsh amendment, Senator '\,Valsh's intent is clear because he
inserted his views into the Congressional Record. He stated:
On page 8 the expression "working conditions" is used four times.
"Working conditions" might be construed as limited to physical
conditions within a factory. "Conditions of employment" is a much
broader phrase and might include the problem of night labor by
women and children and other employment restrictions as well as
physical conditions of the factory. 237

The Senate agreed to the Walsh Amendment and the House concurred in the Conference Committee's recommendation. Thus, section 7(a) of the NIRA referred to compliance by employers with
"maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President."238
The NIRA was passed by Congress to empower the President to
cut unemployment and increase labor's earning strength. The powers
given to the President were extensive, prompting the Democratic
Chairman of the House Committee on Rules, Mr. Pou, to state
232. Norris-LaGuarclia Act § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970) (emphasis added). See
also section 2 of the Act, where the freedom to negotiate "the terms and conditions
of his employment" was declared to be one of the rights that the worker should have
and which the Norris-LaGuarclia Act was enacted to protect. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
233. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
234. H.R. 5755, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1933) (emphasis added), in H.R. REP.
No. 159, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1933).
235. See 77 Cor-m. R.Ec. 4373 (1933).
236. 77 CoNG. R.Ec. 3550 (1933). See also 77 CONG. R.Ec. 4220 (1933) (remarks of Representative Kelly).
237. 77 CONG. R.Ec. 4799 (1933).
238. Ch. 90, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 199.
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during floor debate that "the President of the United States is made
a dictator over industry for the time being, but it is a benign dictatorship; it is a dictatorship dedicated to the welfare of the American people."239 Viewed in this context, an expansive application of
section 7(a) of the statute, as amended by Senator Walsh, was a
congressional objective.
This objective was swiftly carried out. Within four months after
passage of the NIRA, the National Recovery Administration promulgated codes of fair competition that contained a wide variety of prohibitions based on the enabling language of "other conditions of
employment." These prohibitions included age limits for hazardous
occupations, restraints on child labor, provisions for worker safety
and health, limitations on reclassification of workers, and even provisions on company stores and houses.240
Against this background, the Wagner Act in 1935 created machinery making it an unfair labor practice for employers to refuse
to bargain on "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment."241 Relatively early in the legislative
process, the predecessor of section 9(a) 242 spoke of collective bargaining "in respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
basic conditions of employment . . . ." 243 Significantly, the limiting word "basic" was dropped from the bill before introduction.
Furthermore, during all of the hearings and floor discussion on the
Wagner Act, there was no question or challenge to the use of the
phrase "other conditions of employment."
The sponsors made no express statement of the intended interpretation of the bill. Years later, however, during the debate on
the Taft-Hartley amendments, Senator Wagner offered a retrospective interpretation. He stated:

By substituting the narrower term "working conditions" for the
present broader term "conditions of employment," the bill would
239. 77 CONG. R:Ec. 4188 (1933).
240. NATIONAL R:EcOVERY .ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL R:EcoVERY Acr 9 (1935).
241. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, §§ 8(a)(5), 9(a), 49
Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1970).
242. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
243. S. 2934 (1934) (emphasis added). This version of the Senate bill, while not
reflected in the Congressional Record, is found in the collected papers of Senator
Wagner (see note 254 infra). The original bill introduced by Senator Wagner on February 28, 1934, S. 2926, did not include the word "basic." S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 5(2) (1934), in 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HlsTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr. 1935, at I, 3 (1949).
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narrow the scope of collective bargaining to exclude many subjects,
such as, perhaps pension plans, insurance funds, which properly belong in the employer-employee relationship and in regard to which
the employer should not have the power of industrial absolutism. 244
During the early 1940's there was considerable debate about what
constituted "management rights" under the Wagner Act. In 1945,
the President's National Labor-Management Conference, after a
long series of meetings, was unable to agree on a system which would
categorize those items properly encompassed by collective bargaining
and those items that should be excluded.245 An additional attempt
to enumerate the collective bargaining subjects to be covered by
the statute was rejected during the legislative process leading to
the Taft-Hartley Act. The House bill had deleted all reference in
section 9(a) to "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,"
substituting instead a definition of collective bargaining in section
2(11) that restricted the area of compulsory bargaining to specified
subjects, such as wages, hours, seniority provisions, or safety conditions.246 The minority report on the House bill noted that "[t]his
section attempts to limit narrowly the subject matters appropriate
for collective bargaining."247
The Senate left section 9(a) as it was in the Wagner Act, referring
to collective bargaining "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment."248 Instead of
244. 93 CoNG. R.Ec, 3323 (1947).
245. U.S. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 77, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 5-30, 1945, at 7, 56-62
(1946).
246. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The text of section 2(11) of the bill was:
Such terms shall not be construed as requiring that either party reach an agreement with the other, accept any proposal or counterproposal either in whole or
in part, submit counterproposals, discuss modifications of an agreement during its
term except pursuant to the express provisions thereof, or discuss any subject
matter other than the following: (i) wage rates, hours of employment, and work
requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating to discharge, suspension, layoff, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer, and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of employment;
(iv) vacation and leaves of absence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing subjects.
It is noteworthy, also, that an attempt to add pension plans, group insurance benefits,
and hospitalization benefits to the list failed. 93 CoNG. R.Ec. 3712 (1947). This illustrates
the importance of flexible statutory langnage, Group insurance and hospitalization
benefits have been bargained about for years; they are matters of vital concern to
employees and are both part of the effective wages of employees and the employees'
"conditions of employment." See, e.g., W.W. Cross&: Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st
Cir. 1949) (group insurance); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pensions).
247. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947).
248. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1947).
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fashioning a limiting definition of collective bargaining, the Senate
bill added section 8(d). That section picked up the language from
section 9(a) and states, among other things, that collective bargaining
"is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representatives of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith in respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment ... .''249 In the Conference Committee,
the Senate bill was accepted, and the flexible approach toward
bargaining subjects was maintained.250 As evaluated by Judge Major
of the Seventh Circuit in the Inland Steel Co. case: 251
We do not believe that it was contemplated that the language of
Sec. 9(a) was to remain static. Congress in the original as well as in
the amended Act used general language, evidently designed to meet
the increasing problems arising from the employer-employee relationship. As was said in Weems vs. United States . .. : "Legislation,
both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore,
be necessarily, confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth."252
To some, the vital principle of the Wagner Act was a laissezfaire bargaining philosophy. This view of the duty to bargain is
captured by the widely quoted remarks of Senator Walsh:
When employees have chosen their organization, when they have
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort
them to the door of the employer and say, "Here they are, the legal
representatives of your employees." What happens behind those
doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire
into it. 253
Senator Wagner undoubtedly concurred in his colleague's appraisal of the intended effect of the statute, but his aspirations for
249. Id. § S(d).
250. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947).
251. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949).
252. 170 F.2d at 254, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). At
issue in Inland Steel was whether an employer could make unilateral changes in
pension and welfare policies of unit employees. It was held that unilateral changes
were not permitted, since the policies constituted a mandatory subject for bargaining.
The court rejected the company's argument that since the pension plan did not take
effect until retirement, the plan did not affect the employees during the term of their
employment.
253. 79 CONG. R.Ec. 7660 (1935). These remarks were referred to by Justice Harlan
in his dissent in Borg-Wagner, 356 U.S. at 354.
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the legislation ran deeper. Wagner's objective was more than to escort the parties to the bargaining table; he wanted to change their
status into something which approached a bargaining partnership.
This hope is reflected in his papers and speeches.254 For example, in
1926, Wagner stated: "In place of the old relation of master and
servant the new day demands a partnership between corporate
industry and organized labor."255 Wagner also prophesied the increasing importance of organized labor in the United States, concluding that "necessarily the whole present relationship of organized
labor to industry must change."256 In 1937, Senator Wagner summarized his feelings in this way:
I believe that Labor and Industry can and should be left entirely to
solve their own problems, upon a basis of partnership, and that the
function of the federal government is to protect only the basic industrial liberties upon which such a partnership must be founded. 257
254. The Lauinger Library of Georgetown Universty is the receptacle of the col•
lected papers of Senator Wagner (1877-1953). The papers were given to Georgetown
University in 1952 after sitting in disarray in the basement of the Old Senate Office
Building since June 28, 1949, when Senator Wagner resigned from the Senate due to
ill health. From 1952 until the early 1960's, the papers were stored in the basement of
the Riggs Library of Georgetown University, disturbed only by an occasional scholar.
It has been only since the beginning of 1972 that any effort has been made to catalogue the papers, and these efforts remain far from complete.
In 1968, J. Joseph Huthmacher, a professor of history at Georgetown University,
published an "unofficial" biography entitled: SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RlsE
OF URBAN LIBERALISM. The primary source of the book was the collected papers, a
source which Professor Huthmacher stated in his preface was poor because "[Wagner]
left behind little in the way of personal reflection." Id. at vii. Since the completion of
this book, the papers have been generally undisturbed by researchers.
An examination of the Wagner papers by two of the author's labor seminar
students confirmed Professor Huthmacher's appraisal of the documents as a research
source. There were few position papers or draft bills on the development of the initial
Wagner Act, although there was some very general correspondence pertaining to certain sections of the Act with key people of the day (such as Secretary of Labor Perkins,
National Recovery Administration Administrator Johnson and General Counsel Donald
Richberg, union leaders, and civil rights leaders); none of these letters contains specific
formulations of basic sections of the Act. Strikingly, there is no correspondence relevant
to the Act between the Senator and President Roosevelt or Mayor LaGuardia, two of
Wagner's closest political allies. Professor Huthmacher suggests in his preface that
the reason for this is "that in the age of telephone and rapid transportation, politicians simply do not communicate very much with each other on paper-to history's
loss." Id. at x. There are also very few handwritten notes of the Senator on any
subject in the papers and none that pertains to the Act.
Nevertheless, the papers do yield a "feel" for the labor attitudes of the era and for
the philosophical objectives of Senator Wagner as he strove to enfranchise the labor
movement. Possibly other attributes of the papers will surface as the cataloguing is
completed and the documents become amenable to more systematic scrutiny.
255. Address by Senator Wagner, New Responsibilities Of Organized Labor, New
York State Fedn. of Labor Convention, Rochester, N.Y., Aug. 28, 1926.
256. Id.
257. Address by Senator Wagner, Yale Law School, April 16, 1937.
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Surely one of the industrial liberties underlying such a partnership is the freedom to insist upon bargaining over a broad range of
conditions of employment, according to the relative impact of those
conditions on the parties and their degree of interest in dealing with
them. To prevent this from happening is clearly out of keeping with
the spirit of Senator Wagner's legislation and its subsequent amendments.25s
3. The Response of the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals
The NLRB has not pursued the "hands off" policy articulated
by Senators Wagner and Walsh. But neither was the Board skimpy
in its pre-1971 approach to the subjects over which there must be
bargaining.259 The general attitude of the Board was to construe the
duty to bargain broadly and to expand the bargaining territory to
encompass new concerns of significance to the workers. As Justice
Harlan observed:
The most cursory view of decisions of the Board and the circuit
courts under the National Labor Relations Act reveals the unsettled
and evolving character of collective bargaining agreements. Provisions which two decades ago might have been thought to be the
exclusive concern of labor or management are today commonplace
in such agreements. The bargaining process should be left fluid, free
from intervention of the Board leading to premature crystallization
of labor agreements into any one pattern of contract provisions, so
that these agreements can be adapted through collective bargaining
to the changing needs of our society and to the changing concepts
of the responsibilities of labor and management.260

The NLRB decision in the Fibreboard case261 illustrates Justice Harlan's point. Theretofore, subcontracting had been viewed as the
exclusive preserve of management. The Board further held in Adams
Dairy, Inc. 262 that a dairy's decision to change its delivery system in
order to sell its trucks and replace its drivers with independent contractors should have been bargained with the union. In Winn258. In fact, Wagner stated in 1937 that it was wrong to expect the government to
do the job of bargaining: "[I]t is a mistake to treat industry and labor as the immature
children of a parental state." Address on CBS Radio, June 4, 1937.
259. It may not be irrelevant to observe that since the enactment of the Wagner
Act, the Board has operated under a Democratic administration for 25 of 38 years.
260. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 358-59 (1958) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
261. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
262. 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforcement denied, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963),
vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644, enforcement denied on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
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Dixie Stores, Inc. 263 the Board concluded that bargaining should be
held concerning an employer's decision to close its cheese processing
plant in favor of an independently operated packaging process, and,
in Ozark Trailers, lnc.,264 a decision to close a facility was held to be
bargainable due to the attendant loss of jobs and the importance of
job security to the Warren opinion in Fibreboard. 265
Nevertheless, as previously indicated, the Board has yielded in
recent cases to the views of the courts of appeals.266 The tension
between the Board and the courts of appeals over Fibreboard had
become pronounced. The estrangement extended not only to major
"entrepreneurial" issues, but also to minor disputes about what are
"conditions of employment." Illustrative of the latter disputes is a
series of cases dealing with food prices at employers' cafeteria or
vending machine facilities. In Westinghouse Electric Corp.,261 the
trial examiner ruled that the company had violated sections 8(a)(l)
and 8(a)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act268 by refusing to bargain with
the union about changes in cafeteria food prices.269 On review,
the Board concluded that bargaining over every food price change
was impracticable, but bargaining was required in response to a
"specific union request for bargaining about changes made or to be
made."270 Before the Fourth Circuit, a three-judge panel upheld
the Board's order by a vote of two to one.271 However, on review en
bane, the three-judge panel's decision was reversed, and enforcement
of the Board's order was denied. 272
The incident which precipitated the dispute in Westinghouse
Electric was an increase by the caterer of five cents in the price of
hot food entrees and an increase of one cent in the price of carry-out
coffee.278 In the view of the full Fourth Circuit, this decision did not
substantially affect conditions of employment and, therefore, was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The court stated that the
NLRB was
263. 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced in part, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966).
264. 161 N.LR.B. 561 (1966).
265. See !179 U.S. at 210-11.
266. See text accompanying notes 206-11 supra.
267. 156 N.LR.B. 1080, enforced, !169 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966), enforcement denied
on rehearing en bane, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967).
268. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l), (5) (1970).
269. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1083-93.
270. 156 N.LR.B. at 1081. Members Jenkins and Zagoria dissented.
271. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 891 (1966).
272. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (1967).
273. 387 F.2d at 545.
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apparently unwilling to acknowledge that in determining whether
a given matter should be deemed a mandatory bargaining subject,
the courts, as well as the Board itself, have recognized a legal distinction between those subjects which have a material or significant
impact on wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, and
those which are only indirectly, incidentally, or remotely related to
those subjects.2 74
This distinction was pivotal in the court's view, because "practically
every managerial decision has some impact on wages, hours, or other
conditions of employment . . . .''275 In reaching its conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the Board's view that Congress had used the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in its "broadest
sense.'' Instead, the court relied on Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Fibreboard to the effect that the phrase is restricted to a
limited category of issues subject to compulsory bargaining.276
In light of the legislative history of the phrase "other conditions
of employment," continued reliance on Justice Stewart's Fibreboard
analysis is unfortunate and, in many cases, unnecessary. For instance,
it would not offend the legislative history of the statutory phrase to
engraft upon it a materiality or substantiality test. Simply in order
to have a manageable bargaining process, mandatory bargaining
should be limited to those subjects that are of real significance to
the workers. From this point of view, the result reached in Westinghouse Electric may be acceptable.
If a materiality standard is to be applied, however, it is important
that the test be qualitative, not quantitative. This point was noted
by Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit in his dissenting opinion in
McCall Corp.277-another cafeteria price decision in which the
Board's bargaining order was not enforced. Judge Sobeloff thought
that the availability or nonavailability of reasonably priced food on
an employee's working premises was "an important 'physical dimension' of any employee's working environment" and a mandatory
bargaining subject.278 "The monetary amount in a given case is
irrelevant; the test of 'materiality' ... is a qualitative, not quantitative, test."279 His suspicion that McCall or Westinghouse Electric
might have been decided differently if there had been sharp food
price increases rather than modest ones seems instinctively sound.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

387 F.2d at 547.
387 F.2d at 548.
387 F.2d at 545-46, citing 379 U.S. at 220-24.
McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970).
432 F.2d at 189.
432 F.2d at 189.
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And surely Judge Sobeloff is correct in suggesting that the nature of
the bargaining issue should control, not the monetary amount involved. 280

4. The Industrial Experience
In evaluating a "qualitative materiality" standard, it is useful to
consider industrial bargaining experience. In the large industrial
unions, basic wage and fringe benefit packages may be negotiated
at the national level and national attention may focus on these issues.
At the local level, however, bargaining proceeds on a remarkably diverse collection of topics, many of which may seem utterly trivial
to outsiders even though they can significantly affect the quality of
life for the industrial worker. Examples may be drawn from the
local bargaining results achieved by the UAW at various GM plants
in the 1970 negotiations. The local bargaining demands and settlements reached between the UAW. and GM during this period included the following:2s1
Demand: Parking Jots be cleaned once per week.
Settlement: Agreed, on a scheduled basis.282
Demand: Plastic trash barrels be used.
Settlement: Agreed to experiment with plastic trash can liners.283
Demand: Booster batteries and cables and wrecker service be
provided for employees during winter.
Settlement: Agreed to provide battery boosters and cables.284
Demand: Transportation be provided to and from main cafeteria for lunch for employees assigned to work outside.
Settlement: Rejected. 285
Demand: Ice cream machine be provided in tool rooms.
Settlement: Agreed.286
Demand: Waterless hand soap be supplied for garage mechanics
and oilers.
Settlement: Agreed. 287
280. The NLRB did not acquiesce in the Fourth Circuit's views, but continued
to apply the principles enunciated in its own opinions in Westinghouse Electric and
McCall Corp. See, e.g., Package Mach. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 77 L.R.R.M. 1456
(1971), enforcement denied, 457 F.2d 936 (1st Cir. 1972).
281. These excerpts were obtained from the materials referred to in note II5 supra.
The demands were categorized as pertaining to "working conditions" or as "miscella•
neous."
282. Cadillac Motors Plant.
283. Id.
284. Chevrolet Mfg. Plant, Flint.
285. Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw.
286. A.C. Plant, Flint.
287. Chevrolet Metal Castings Plant, Saginaw.
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Demand:
Settlement:
Demand:
Settlement:
Demand:
Settlement:
Demand:
Settlement:
Demand:
Settlement:

[Vol. 71:935

Weekly cafeteria menus be posted by all time clocks
and bulletin boards.
Management will request cafeteria to comply.288
Picnic tables be placed throughout the plant.
Fifteen picnic tables purchased.289
All vending machine items be time- and date-stamped.
Sandwiches will be date-stamped.2 00
Chewing tobacco be made available in vending
machines.
Agreed.291
Electric hand dryers be installed at all wash-up locations and toilets.
Rejected.292

Almost all of the above examples might be considered nonmandatory subjects for bargaining if a quantitative substantiality test is
used along the lines suggested by the en bane opinion in Westinghouse Electric. For instance, posting cafeteria menus on a weekly
basis is surely no more significant than a slight increase in cafeteria
prices. Yet, management listened to all of the above demands-and
more-because all of them were of real significance to the quality
of the working environment of the employees and affected their attitudes toward their jobs. Admittedly, some of the demands which
might have proved costly, such as electric hand dryers in washrooms,
were rejected by management. Since they were probably regarded as
luxuries by the employees, no major issue was made of them, but at
least bargaining took place.
It may be said that these examples merely reflect voluntary
bargaining in which any enlightened management will engage for
employee relations purposes. But this observation begs the question.
The point is that industrial practice-an important element of
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Fibreboard-supports these demands as mandatory bargaining subjects, as do the legislative history
of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley amendments, and the interpretation of that history as reflected in the NLRB decisions in
Westinghouse and McCall.
Local bargaining may soon encompass some aspects of the outplant environment. Already there have been instances of bargaining
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Chevrolet Plant, Norwood.
Chevrolet Truck Plant.
Chevrolet Mfg. Plant, Warren.
Fisher Body Plant, Mansfield.
General Motors Assembly Div. Plant, Wilmington.
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over the impact of fallout from the employer's plant on employee's
cars in outside parking lots. 293 Bargaining may develop with regard
to the impact of employer pollution on nearby recreational facilities
and similar matters.294 If so, this bargaining, as well as the local examples described above, can and should be accommodated by the
Taft-Hartley Act.
5. Summary Reflections on Fibreboard

As a bargaining relationship becomes more stable and longstanding, the spectrum of subject matter dealt with at the bargaining table
tends to broaden.295 Occasionally these experiences approach the
partnership concept contemplated by Senator Wagner. 296 In other
situations, even though there is no partnership, management nevertheless engages in bargaining on subjects which might not, in many
courts, be regarded as mandatory. Bargaining occurs because it is
politically expedient in terms of public and employee relations.
This is particularly true at the local level, as has been documented
by the experience between GM and the UAW.
In the company town or captive community, an employer is relatively more powerful than in the urban industrial setting and may
resist the partnership concept since it would mean relinquishing a
significant bargaining advantage without clear legal or economic
compulsion to do so. Thus, in geographic settings where employees'
lives are most affected by their employers, voluntary bargaining on a
cooperative basis over whatever subjects are of real concern to the
workers will rarely occur. This is exactly why employers operating
remote lumber camps are obliged under the Taft-Hartley Act to
bargain over matters that have not been construed as mandatory in
less remote communities; 297 and the analogy between the urban industrial setting in today's economy and the captive community suggests that distinctions heretofore applied may not remain appropriate.
293. See note 119 supra.
294. Cf. the picnic table demand in text accompanying note 289 supra.
295. See C. RANDLE, CoLLEcnVE BARGAINING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 132 (1951).
296. For instance, in the ladies' garment industty, collective bargaining contracts
"specify the conditions under which •an employer may reorganize his business, or enter
into another partnership, or send material to other firms for fabrication • • • ." Id.
at 131. As early as 1926, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and Hart, Shaffner, and
Marx reportedly worked together to arrange for "a more minute subdivision of labor
than formerly, the substitution of machine work for many hand operations, a reduction in the number of styles and increased efficiency in routing material through the
plant.'' Id.
297. See NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953); Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
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The proper question is one of the relative qualitative impact on
the workers. Whenever geography, technology, or other factors
yield new circumstances that significantly affect the workers, bargaining should follow. 298 This may require an adjustment of the traditional prerogatives of management and labor, but as a UAW representative noted: "The whole history of bargaining is one of workers
taking away management rights .... They would not have made
any progress if they hadn't."299
The majority opinion's interpretation in Fibreboard of "other
conditions of employment" is sound. To the extent that the majority
opinion has been overshadowed by the Stewart concurring opinion,
the majority views should be resuscitated. It is hoped that the
Pittsburgh Plate Glass opinion will not do permanent damage to the
limber approach to the duty to bargain employed in Fibreboard by
Judge Burger and Chief Justice Warren.
Collective bargaining must be maintained as a malleable vehicle
that can adapt to changing conditions. One such changing condition
is the impact of out-plant environmental pollution on the workers.
In company towns and in captive communities, where bargaining
over a broad range of issues is mandatory, bargaining on out-plant
pollution should also be mandatory. In urban industrial settings,
where the impact of an employer's out-plant pollution on employees
is great,300 the statutory language and legislative history of the TaftHartley Act dictate the same result.
B. Individual Refusals To Perform Environmentally Injurious
Work as Concerted, Protected Activity
Gilbert Pugliese's environmental encounter with his employer
has already been summarized.301 Pugliese refused to continue to perform what had previously been part of his job-punching a button
which released thousands of gallons of oil into the Cuyahoga River.
Pugliese settled his case out of court and was reinstated. But
had he not succeeded, would he have had recourse under the TaftHartley Act? A strong case under existing authorities can be made
for the proposition that any discipline or discharge of Pugliese by
298. For a discussion of changes occasioned by technology, see D. BOK &: J. DUNLOP,
LABOR AND THE .AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970), particularly ch. 12, entitled: Frontiers of
Substantive Bargaining. Layoffs due to environmental requirements are as attributable
to technology as layoffs due to automation.
299. Detroit Free Press, Jan. 25, 1970, § A, at 6, col. I.
300. See notes 45.53 supra and accompanying text.
301. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
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Jones and Laughlin would have constituted a violation of section
8(a)(l) of the Act. 302 However, the results in a particular case may
differ depending on whether a union is involved. If there is no
union, recourse to the NLRB and successful prosecution of a section
8(a)(l) charge are entirely feasible. If there is a union, under present
law employees may have to tum exclusively to the union for help.
This might result in the successful processing of grievances, to the
point of arbitration if necessary, but if the union is unsympathetic
and can devise a nonarbitrary reason for declining to press the grievance, the employees could be left without a remedy. While this result
is by no means certain under existing law, it is a sufficient possibility
to prompt a suggestion for ameliorative legislation.303
However, it is useful to explore first the scope of concerted activities protected by section 7 of the Act304 in those cases uncomplicated
by the presence of or resistance by a union. The effect of a union
on the scope and protection of those rights can then be more
meaningfully considered.

I. Concerted, Protected Activity

Jill Severn was employed by the Washington State Service Employees Council and the Service Employees Union (SEU) Local No.
6, in May 1969 as an organizer of nursing home and hospital employees in the Seattle area.306 She was competent at her job, and at
the same time she was personally active in social causes not directly
related to her employment. As president of an organization known
as Radical Women, she participated in a picket line sponsored by
another labor organization on strike against a photo-finisher in
Seattle.306 This picketing activity, which occurred early one morning
prior to her normal working hours, was covered by the local press.
President Hare of Local 6 of the SEU, after reading the news story,
told Severn that this type of activity reflected badly upon the union
and she should either choose to work for the union or for Radical
Women, but not for both. Severn did not make this election, but no
302. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1970).
303. See text accompanying notes 386-400 infra.
304. Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970): "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ••••"
305. Washington State Serv. Employees State Council No. 18, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141,
at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. 1467, 1467 (1971).
306. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1467.
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discipline was imposed.807 Later, Severn participated in a demonstration at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport under the auspices of the
Central Contractors' Association, an organization active in promoting job opportunities for blacks. Many of the demonstrators, including Severn, were arrested for criminal trespass, and on November
7, 1969, Severn's arrest was reported prominently in the morning
newspaper. 308 President Hare told Severn that he was much disturbed, contending that "her participation in the outside organization would make her ineffective as an organizer because the employers
whose employees she was organizing would point to her as someone
who would likely be sent to jail."809 Severn responded that the employees she was organizing were about fifty per cent black, so that her
outside activity in support of minority employment would not be
harmful. Hare and Severn were unable to resolve their differences,
and Severn was discharged. a1o
The NLRB, adopting the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the trial examiner, ordered reinstatement of Jill Severn
on the grounds that her discharge constituted an interference with
protected, concerted activities under the Taft-Hartley Act.811 Citing
the Phelps Dodge decision of the Supreme Court,812 the trial examiner concluded that the necessary element of "concert" under the
Act was present, even though Severn was the only employee of Local
No. 6 at the demonstration: The employees acting in concert need
not all work for the same employer.313 In addition, citing the
Second Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss
Chocolates Co.,314 the trial examiner concluded that Severn was
protected even though the demonstration at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport was not aimed at the hiring practices of her own employer.815
Thus, according to the NLRB, an individual's exercise of conscience can be protected under the Taft-Hartley Act when these acts
are supported by other employees, whether or not of the same em307. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1467.
308. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 3, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1467.
309. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
310. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
311. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 1-2, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
312. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468, citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)
313. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 4-5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
314. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468, citing 130 F.2d 503 (1942).
315. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1468-69. The trial examiner also
noted that there was no substantial evidence that Severn's activity "was truly inimical
to Respondents' business activities as a labor organization." 188 N.L.R.B. No. 141, at 5,
76 L.R.R.M. at 1468, citing NLRB v. Local 1229, !BEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
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ployer, assuming that no substantial interference with the business
interests of the employer taking disciplinary action transpires.
Furthermore, the exercise of conscience need not be related to the
employment practices of the employee's own company.
When the circumstances of the worker's own employment are at
issue, protection under the Act is even more secure. For instance,
in KPRS Broadcasting Corp.,816 a secretary named Carole Wise was
held by the Board to have been protected under section 8(a)(l) of
the Act when she spoke up at a shareholder meeting in defense of
another employee, disputing claims by the corporate owners that
the employee was a "militant." This action, in the view of the
Board, allied Ms. Wise ·with the other employee's efforts to secure
improved working conditions, for which retaliation by the company
was not permitted.317
Even though, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, "concerted activities
for the purpose of mutual aid or protection are not limited to union
activities," 318 there must be some element of concert. Often, as in
the case of Gilbert Pugliese, an exercise of conscience may be initiated by the individual action of an employee, although it may be
accompanied or quickly followed by sympathetic action by other
employees. These initial individual actions are not necessarily unprotected; protection will depend on the factual circumstances. Individual complaining does not constitute protected activity.319 However, when individual complaining coalesces with some expression
inclined to produce group or representative action, the activity becomes protected.320
The thinness of the dividing line between the two types of cases
is illustrated by decisions holding that a single employee's encouragement of individual fellow workers to present grievances is unprotected,321 but a single employee attempting to induce his coworkers
316. 181 N.L.R.B. 535 (1970).
317. 181 N.L.R.B. at 536. Consider, too, the first NLRB decision in Tanner, which
did not focus on the impact of the union, but which held that protests by a small
group of employees in the unit to induce their employer to hire more blacks were protected under section 8(a)(l). Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402, vacated and
remanded, NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967). See also
note 353 infra.
318. Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (1953).
319. Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967); Mushroom Transp.
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir. 1951); Southwest Latex Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. 358 (1969); Gulf Container Corp., 161
N.L.R.B. 734 (1966).
320. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 935 (1970).
321. NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971); Mushroom Transp.
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to join in a petition regarding a common grievance is protected.322
Protection is also accorded if the individual is presenting grievances
on behalf of others.323
In the Ninth Circuit's Signal Oil decision,324 an employee's remark, expressing sympathy with a threatened strike, was held to be
concerted since, even though aimed at only one nonunion listener,
it was related to group action. The employer had argued that in
order to be protected, comments had to be made pursuant to a
"plan," "joint scheme," or "pre-existing group understanding," with
the specific design of urging those to whom it was addressed to
engage in "group action." This argument was rejected by the
court.a21>
The various attitudes of the courts of appeals toward what constitutes "concerted" activity were surveyed recently by the Third
Circuit in NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.326 A nonunion employee's
attempt to secure holiday pay, which he believed to be due him
under the collective bargaining agreement, was held unprotected.
The "constructive" concerted activity theory, utilized by one court
to sanction any individual action to enforce a collective agreement,327
was rejected.328 The court relied in part upon language from the
Seventh Circuit that "'it is necessary to demonstrate [at least] that
the activity was for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group
action to correct a grievance or a complaint.' " 329 Seven years earlier,
in the Mushroom Transportation case,330 the Third Circuit had
extended this concept to include not only group action but also "talk
looking toward group action." 331
Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749
(4th Cir. 1949); Union Carbide Corp., 171 NLRB 1651 (1968).
322. Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953).
323. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1969); Signal
Oil &: Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum
Elec. Co-op, 285 F .2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).
324. Signal Oil&: Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338 (1968).
325. 390 F.2d at 342. The employer relied on Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Texas Natural Gasoline Corp., 253 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1958); Continental Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255 (1965); General Elec. Corp., 155
N.L.R.B. 208 (1965). Instead, the court, 390 F.2d at 342, relied upon NLRB v. J.G.
Boswell Co., 136 F.2d 585, 595 (9th Cir. 1943), where it was held that "[a] discharge of
a non-union employee because of a ••• belief that he was sympathetic to, or active in,
a union, violates sections [8(a)(l) and (3)] •••• The fact that the alleged union
activity extends 'outside his own employment' is immaterial."
326. 440 F.2d 881 (1971).
327. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
328. 440 F.2d at 884-85.
329. 440 F.2d at 884, quoting Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (1967).
330. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (1964).
331. 330 F.2d at 685. The Third Circuit in Northern Metal indicated that Mush-
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These comments by the Seventh and Third Circuits highlight
the fact that the group objective need not pertain to the entire
collective bargaining unit; a group effort to vindicate an individual
employee's grievance may suffice. Thus, leaving aside the implications of the presence of a union, Gilbert Pugliese might qualify
for reinstatement under section 8(a)(l) of the Act in view of the
sympathetic reaction of some of his fellow workers who made a group
effort to see his individual grievance satisfied. Moreover, what Pugliese was asked to do as a part of his job was not merely unconscionable by his own measure; it was unlawful under the Refuse Act of
1899.832

2. Refusal To Engage in Unlawful or Unconscionable
Activities as Concerted~ Protected Activity
It is hardly a radical notion that employees should be protected
from discipline or discharge for refusing to perform unlawful acts.
This proposition has been applied by the Board in a variety of
situations.
The Board has ruled that an employer violated the Act by attempting to induce an employee to give false testimony to a Board
agent. 333 Similarly, the Board has held that an employee's refusal
to sign a false statement, regarding overtime payment found to be
due her after a Labor Department investigation, is protected, concerted activity.334 And in another situation, the Board found that
an employer had violated the Act by requiring employees to sign
a petition exonerating the company of any wrongdoing. 335
Related decisions hold that it is protected, concerted activity
for employees to take steps to see that statutes are complied with
by reporting alleged violations to appropriate authorities. Reporting
possible violations goes beyond mere "griping" or complaining about
working conditions, which may be unprotected. Thus, in Gibbs Die
Casting Aluminum Corp.,336 an employer was found to have vioroom Transportation represented the extent of its willingness to stretch the concerted,
protected activity concept of section 7. 440 F.2d at 884.
332. Ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)).
333. Dubois Fence &: Garden Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1003 (1966). This same result had
been reached in Oregon Teamster Security Plan Office, 119 N.L.R.B. 207 (1957), with
the Teamsters as the employer asking the employee to give false testimony or to avoid
testifying at all. In National Springs Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 148 (1966), the Board held it
a violation for the employer to threaten reprisal against the author of an affidavit to
the Board.
334. Gem Knits, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 449 (1969).
335. Fennel's Auto&: Body Works, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 35 (1968).
336. 174 N.L.R.B. 75 (1969).
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lated section 8(a)(l) by laying off three employees who had complained to local health department officials about excessive methylene chloride fumes in the plant. It was held that the employees were
engaged in protected, concerted activity even though the employee
making the actual complaint did not inform the department that
she was acting on behalf of other employees or advise any coworkers
that she had filed a complaint.837
In Illinois Ruan Transport Co.,838 the Board held that an employee could not be discharged for taking his truck to an ICC
inspection station for a safety check. This case, together with other
decisions on which the Board relied,339 establishes the proposition
that an employee may not be denied the right to speak with public
authorities regarding conduct of his employer that violates public
regulations, and any discharge or discipline based on an employee's
effort to present such a grievance would constitute an interference
with concerted activity, protected under section 7. This position
has judicial support.340
More often, however, the courts have examined the problem of
unlawful acts from the perspective of employees who engage in
unlawful behavior, rather than from the point of view of those who
refuse to do so. The courts have been consistent in concluding that
illegal activities by employees are not protected by the Taft-Hartley
Act. An early, firm statement on this point was made by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,341 and there are
numerous subsequent authorities to the same effect.342 In these decisions, the unprotected, illegal employee activity has involved violence or other demonstrative antisocial conduct.
337. 174 N.L.R.B. at 78-79. See also Kansas Refined Helium Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 1037
(1969), where an employee's attempt to have the trial examiner's recommended order
posted on the bulletin board was precluded from being the basis for disciplinary action.
338. 165 N.L.R.B. 227 (1967), enforcement denied, 404 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1969). The
court of appeals denied enforcement because the employer had other, valid reasons for
the discharge. Although the court found it unnecessary to reach the point, it was
assumed, arguendo, that such a visit to the ICC would by itself be a protected, concerted activity.
339. 165 N.L.R.B. at 231-32, citing Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1265
(1966); Socony Mobil Oil, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1965), enforced in part, 357 F.2d
662 (2d Cir. 1966).
340. In Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court upheld
the Board's finding that an employer had illegally fired an employee for writing a
letter to the state health department concerning unsanitary conditions in the plant
restroom.
341. 306 U.S. 240, 254-55 (1939).
342. See, e.g., Trailmobile Div., Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.
1969); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1967); Titan Metal
Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B.196 (1962).
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If these physical elements are absent, but the employee behavior
remains unlawful, protection under the Act will still be denied.
For instance, in American News Co.,343 the Magazine Mailers' and
Deliverers' Union of North Jersey bargained for and won a wage
increase from the American News Company but struck when the
increase was suspended because of wartime wage restraints. The
Board concluded that "a strike prosecuted in order to compel an
employer to violate the [Stabilization] Act of October 2, 1942, is
not within the concerted activities protected by section 7."344
Based on logic, policy, and the foregoing authorities, the conclusion in American News can be fairly adapted to Gilbert Pugliese's
situation. Thus, refusing an employer's order to violate the Refuse
Act of 1899 is within the concerted activities protected by section 7.
Had the dumping of oil by Jones and Laughlin into the Cuyahoga River not been unlawful, would Pugliese's refusal nevertheless
have been protected? The issue becomes one of differing mores and
a question of whose conscience is entitled to prevail.345 The principal
issue in this context is the precise duty of loyalty, if any, owed by
an employee to his employer.346 When the Supreme Court dealt with
this issue in the Jefferson Standard case,347 it disapproved of concerted activities by television technicians who sponsored and distributed "second-class city" handbills designed to impugn the technical quality of their employer's product. The Court noted that the
employees' attack related to no labor practice of the company, made
no reference to wages, hours, or working conditions, but instead attacked policies "of finance and public relations for which management, not technicians, must be responsible."348 In the Court's judgment, "nothing could be further from the purpose of the Act than
to require an employer to finance such activities."349
343. 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
344. 55 N.L.R.B. at 1312.
345. This dilemma recurs throughout society in a wide array of situations. A recent
illustration taken from the military is the problem in Viet Nam concerning the personal responsibility of soldiers carrying out superior orders which, while not clearly a
violation of military law, are to the individual soldier morally indefensible. Consider,
too, the defense extended by the courts to conscientious objectors who otherwise
would be forced against their consciences to participate in immoral conduct. See, e.g.,
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Granted, the Constitution is operative in
these cases, but the analogy to forcing employees to do acts which are by their personal moral codes unconscionable is clear. See also note 353 infra.
346. See generally Blumberg, supra note 54. See also Blades, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM.
L. R.Ev. 1404 (1967).
347. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
348. 346 U.S. at 476.
349. 346 U.S. at 476. Even under these circumstances, Justice Frankfurter, joined by
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However, in the Jefferson Standard case, the employees' acts
verged on misrepresentations to the public. The employees were left
unprotected because of the caustic and aggressive appeal to the
public, which made no reference to a labor dispute and resulted
in undue business damage to their employer.850 Operating on what
the Court perceived as fair play, the behavior was left unprotected.
It is quite another matter for an employee to refuse to perform work
he views as unconscionable. There may be no interference with the
employer's legitimate business interests in this situation. Surely
there is none if the employee can be assigned to other work and the
dispute thereby ended. Even if the dispute reaches the point where
the employer is requested to remedy the unconscionable conditions,
the employee should be protected so long as no substantial business
of the employer is disrupted. This test was applied to Jill Severn's
case, and it is a reasonable minimum standard.851
3. The Effect of a Uriion on the Scope and

Protection of Section 7 Rights
The broad mandate of section 7, giving employees the right to
engage in or refrain from organization, collective bargaining, or
other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, has been
the central source of individual rights created by the Taft-Hartley
Act. However, in particular situations these section 7 rights are
tempered by the majority-rule principle of section 9(a),852 which
states that the selected employee representative is the exclusive collective representative for all employees in an organized bargaining
unit. Tension between these two sections arises when a minority of
union members or nonunion employees in the organized unit engages
in concerted activities without union approval. To what extent does
the vesting of exclusive bargaining power in the union limit
minority employee rights? Or, putting the question another way, are
individual members of an organized bargaining unit, such as Gilbert
Justices Douglas and Black, filed a strong dissent, concluding that the majority had
misconstrued "legislation designed to put labor on a fair footing with management."
346 U.S. at 480.
350. 346 U.S. at 476.
351. See text following note 315 supra. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 7010),
added by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86
Stat. 103: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
352. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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Pugliese, required to channel their concerted activity exclusively
through their bargaining representative, with no concurrent or subsequent recourse if the bargaining representative proves unhelpful?
In NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.,353 the Ninth Circuit
denied protection to activity which was admittedly concerted, because the picketing employees had failed to discuss their grievance
with the union before initiating action designed to increase the
hiring of blacks by their employer. A review of the choices open to
the Tanner court and the few pertinent cases subsequently decided
suggests that the principle enunciated in Tanner may be given wide
application.
When a union is operating in a collective bargaining unit, section 9(a) advances industrial stability by assuring the employer that
his only bargaining adversary will be the authorized representative
and that he need not deal with factions whose demands might conflict with those of the majority. This concept was central to the Supreme Court's decision in the Allis-Chalmers case354 in which fines
by a union against its members who had violated the union's constitution and bylaws by crossing picket lines during a strike were upheld. Relying on fair representation cases,355 the Court spoke of the
importance of majority rule and the concomitant loss of some individual rights in the bargaining process that employees in the unit
must suffer.856
The Court in Allis-Chalmers invoked the majority-rule principle
to dispose of a problem between individual employees and their
union. Usually, however, the problem of majority rule and minority
protests has arisen in the context of bargaining demands. Probably
353. The Tanner case originally came before the .Board in 1964, which held that
the employer had violated section 8(a)(l) by discharging two employees who had engaged in the protected, concerted activity of protesting their employer's alleged racially
discriminatory hiring practices. 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964). The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the Board's finding that the concerted activities of the employees were protected under
section 7 of the Act. However, the court remanded the case for the Board to consider
whether any such activities should be channeled through the established collective
bargaining representative pursuant to the requirements of section 9(a). 349 F.2d I
(1965). On remand, the Board reaffirmed its original finding, reasoning that section
9(a) was irrelevant since the employees were not "acting in derogation of their
established bargaining agent" by seeking to end "morally unconscionable" behavior.
166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967). The Ninth Circuit finally held that by failing in their
"obligation" to speak first with the union representative, the employees were deprived
by section 9(a) of the protection otherwise provided for concerted activity. 419 F.2d 216
(1969).
354. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
355. 388 U.S. at 180, citing Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1959).
356. 388 U.S. at 180-82,
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the most well-known decision of this type is NLRB v. Draper
Corp.,357 decided nearly thirty years ago by the Fourth Circuit. A
group of employees struck to protest alleged delaying tactics by their
employer in contract negotiations with the certified union. The
union did not call, authorize, or sanction the strike, which the court
characterized as "wildcat" and refused to protect under section 7.
The court stated that "employees must act through the voice of the
majority or the bargaining agent chosen by the majority" in order
to promote effective bargaining.358 Clearly, the court feared that
extending protection to minority action would lead to a breakdown
of the collective bargaining process, and, no matter what its goals, a
protected but unauthorized strike would erode the representative
status of the certified union. This viewpoint prevailed in a number
of subsequent decisions.359
Despite the general disapproval of minority strikes, the Fifth
Circuit introduced a more flexible approach in 1964 in NLRB v.
R.C. Can Co.360 The court held that minority action could be protected when taken in support of union objectives. The court recognized the importance of bargaining with an exclusive agent, but laid
greater stress on the competing interest of allowing union members
to "speak effectively in behalf of their own organization and the aims
and objectives which it collectively seeks to assert in their behalf."361
The court fashioned the following test: If the minority's action was
"in criticism of, or opposition to, the policies and actions" previously
adopted by the majority, such "diverse, dis·sident action is not protected.... If, on the other hand, it seeks to generate support £or
an acceptance of the demands put forth by the union, it is protected . . . ." 862
In the Tanner case, the Ninth Circuit had its choice, but rejected
R. C. Can in favor of Draper, which it viewed as "more in accord
with the concept of orderly bargaining premised upon democratic
union processes."363 The court in Tanner limited somewhat the
plenary sweep of Draper by reserving as premature the question
of what action the minority group might take if the majority (the
357. 145 F.2d 199 (1944).
358. 145 F.2d at 203.
359. NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); Plasti-Line, Inc.
v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575
(7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951).
360. 328 F.2d at 974.
361. 328 F.2d at 979.
362. 328 F.2d at 979.
363. 419 F.2d at 221.
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union) refused to press for the requested objective.364 If this were
to happen, the focus would shift to the duty of fair representation
and the principles enunciated in Vaca v. Sipes.365 In Vaca, the Supreme Court articulated and applied the test that "[a] breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's
conduct toward a member of a collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." 366
The treatment of the concerted minority action question in
Tanner has recently been reinforced by the decision of the Fifth
Circuit in NLRB v. Shop-Rite Foods, Inc. 367 The case involved a
minority walk-out without consultation with union officials, who
later disapproved of the strike. The Fifth Circuit, which had previously constructed the R.C. Can approach, now dismissed it as "of
doubtful viability" since it had not been referred to in subsequent
Fifth Circuit cases and because it had been rejected in Tanner.868
The court was concerned about the breadth of the R.C. Can test:
If union objectives are characterized in general terms-such as wages,
job security, conditions of employment and the like-one can assume
that in a great majority of instances minority action will be consistent with one or more of those objectives. If R.C. Can is not applied
with great care it would allow minority action in a broad range of
situations and permit unrestrained undercutting of collective bargaining.369

The court in Shop-Rite did not completely discard the R.C. Can
test, but limited it to minority action toward a "specific, previously
considered and articulated objective."370 Realistically, this narrower
proposition substantially eviscerates R.C. Can.371
364. 419 F.2d at 221. The court later noted:
We think it arguable that in cases where employees, not acting through the
union, initiate in a peaceful and non-disruptive manner an activity which would
otherwise be protected under section 7, but is not by reason of section 9(a), the
employer has a duty to tell them that the matter must be taken up through the
union, and, if the employer does not do so, he has waived his right to object on
that ground, so that section 7 becomes fully operative. We do not decide this
question; we think it is for the Board to decide in the first instance.
419 F.2d at 222.
365. 386 U.S. I'll (1967).
366. 386 U.S. at 190.
367. 430 F.2d 786 (1970).
368. 430 F.2d at 790-91.
369. 430 F.2d at 790.
370. 430 F.2d at 790.
371. The court in Shop-Rite did offer a final disclaimer: "We do not hold that there
cannot be circumstances in which an employee or minority group of employees, may
engage, without reference of the matter to union processes, an action which is protected under section 7 ••••" 430 F.2d at 791.
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In a case now working its way through appeal, it appears that
the NLRB has accepted the Tanner-Shop-Rite rationale. The Emporium372 involves the discharge of two employees for picketing their
employer's store because of alleged racial discrimination against employees. Although it was the "official" union position that employer
discrimination existed, the union's approach was to process the
charges through traditional grievance and arbitration channels. The
employees were seeking more rapid results, and they embarked on
a public education and boycott campaign. The trial examiner's report, adopted by the Board, found:
It would be absurd to say that because they [the pickets] and the
Union had a common ultimate objective, these four employees were
somehow implementing or strengthening the Union in its position.
They were acting outside the agreement and contrary to the Union's
advice and urging. 378

The Tanner-Shop-Rite doctrine has important implications for
employees such as Pugliese who resist the polluting activities of their
employer in circumstances where a certified bargaining representative is present. If the objective of the resistance is to effectuate a
change in conditions of employment which would pertain to the
entire bargaining unit, these employees must tum to their union
for help. If the union is amenable, a contract provision could be
sought to give employees the desired protection.874 If the union
declines to pursue this objective, there would likely be no recourse
under Vaca v. Sipes since the union's refusal would almost certainly
be free from arbitrariness, bad faith, and discrimination. Thus, assuming that the protection sought does not constitute a "specific,
previously considered and articulated objective" of the union, the
employee may be left without recourse, unless the employer has
waived his right in the manner discussed in Tanner. 875
Faced with this dilemma, an employee in Pugliese's position
could take a stand resulting in discharge or discipline and then
request the union to process a grievance upon his behalf seeking
reinstatement. Since almost all union contracts have a "just cause"
provision limiting discharges, a grievance of this type would generally be appropriate.876 There is considerably less likelihood that
372.
Cir.).
373.
374.
375.
376.

192 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971), appeal pending, No. 71-1656 (D.C.
192 N.L.R.B. No. 19, at -, 77 LR.R.M. at 1670.
See text accompanying notes 414-19 infra.
See note 364 supra.
Even so, the economic burden on any worker in this situation highlights the
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the union would refuse to process this grievance in good faith on
nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory grounds; in fact, this might well
be a type of grievance the union would be actively interested in
supporting.
Two further distinctions must be recognized. First, it may be that
an employee such as Pugliese will be chiefly interested in ending his
personal involvement in continued pollution by his employer; his
objective is to be relieved of the task of pressing the "pollution button," even though he realizes that others in the unit will continue to
be required to do it.377 Second, it is possible that the objective
sought, whether personal to a single employee or a broader goal
with ramifications for the entire bargaining unit, concerns a matter
outside the scope of what has traditionally been mandatory bargaining subject matter.
The Ninth Circuit in Tanner dealt with both of these points
by concluding, in both opinions, that picketing by employees in
support of a policy of nondiscriminatory hiring did "relate to terms
and conditions of employment."378 Instead of referring to nondiscriminatory hiring as a mandatory subject for bargaining, the
court simply called it a "proper subject" of collective bargaining.879
The court may have been choosing its words very carefully since the
Board and the courts have been ambiguous about whether "conditions of employment" must be involved for activities to be protected
by section 7 to the same extent as in determining mandatory subjects
for bargaining. This ambiguity stems from section 7 cases in which
no organized bargaining units exist and the duty to bargain is not
pertinent. For example, Jill Severn's activity on behalf of Radical
Women and minority hiring in the construction trades was protected under section 7. Yet her activity could not have been characterized as involving "conditions of employment" in a bargaining
sense. Applying the tests of Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Borg-Warner,
nothing vitally affecting her fellow employees was at issue and no
aspect of the employer-employee relationship was settled.
Surely the scope of section 7 is not reduced by the existence of
a union, notwithstanding the implications of Allis-Chalmers. Emimportance of seeking, in contract negotiations, provisions of the type discussed at
text accompanying note 420 infra.
'!,77. This was in fact Pugliese's situation during his first round with the company.
He was content for a considerable period of time not to be personally required to
dump the oil, although others in the unit continued to perform this task. See text
following note 56 supra.
378. 349 F.2d at 4; 419 F.2d at 218.
379. 419 F.2d at 218.
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ployees·do become subject to majority rule when a union is certified;
but if employees have majority support in the unit, they should be
able to engage in activity for mutual aid or protection to the same
extent as if no union were present since they theoretically will be
able to direct union policy in pursuit of their objectives (except for
matters waived by a collective bargaining agreement). When there
is no union, often there is no inquiry of any kind as to whether the
activity relates to "terms and conditions of employment." No inquiry was made as to Jill Severn, indeed, it could not have been
since the Board noted in Severn's case that activity for mutual aid
or protection need not even relate to one's own employer.
The Ninth Circuit's finding of unprotected activity was based,
on the language of section 9(a) of the statute. That section designates
certified unions as "exclusive representatives ... in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment," with the proviso that individual employees or groups of
employees have the right to present individual grievances to their
employers without the intervention of the union as long as the
union has the opportunity to be present.380 The court in Tanner
observed: "There appears to be a difference between collective bargaining and presenting grievances, else why did the Congress limit
the provision in section 9(a) to grievances?"881 One effect of this
difference, in the court's opinion, was to restrain employees from
bargaining indirectly through the grievance procedure over subject
matter which should be left to the negotiation and administration
of the collective bargaining contract. "Thus, the desire of employees
for non-discriminatory hiring, while a proper subject for collective
bargaining, may not be a proper basis for a grievance."882 However,
this proposition should operate in the other direction as well. To
paraphrase the court's language: Employer discipline over a refusal
to do work which yields unconscionable pollution, while possibly not
a proper subject for collective bargaining, may still be a proper basis
for a grievance.
In fact, the Tanner court was conscious of this distinction. In
its second opinion, the court noted that the desire of the employees
for nondiscriminatory hiring related to a condition of employment
"affecting the entire bargaining unit"-a condition which was not
"personal" to the two employees who were picketing. 383 The court
380.
381.
382.
383.

29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
349 F.2d at 5.
349 F.2d at 5.
419 F.2d at 21~.
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also explained some of its previous decisions upholding individual
employee action notwithstanding the presence of a union on the
basis that the activity involved the presentation of grievances under
section 9(a).884 In one of these earlier decisions, the court had expressly rejected an employer's argument that under section 7 activities for "other mutual aid or protection" must be related to "the purpose of collective bargaining."880
The conclusion that emerges from the language of sections 7 and
9(a), as they have been construed by the Board and courts, is that
activity for mutual aid and protection by a minority of employees
which is not aimed at all employees in the unit-which is not bargaining-oriented but "personal"-remains protected, notwithstanding the presence of a union and the application of the Tanner and
Shop-Rite decisions. Othenvise, employees should be advised that
the presence of a union means not only the loss of individuality
which attends majority rule, but also a diminution of the substantive
scope of their protection under section 7.

4. Statutory Protection for Individual Refusals To
Contribute to Unlawful Employer Activities
The case law clearly establishes that unlawful employee conduct
is unprotected.886 Conversely, it follows that a concerted refusal to
obey an employer's order to violate the law is protected. But, where
there is a union, any such refusal by employees may have to be sent
under Tanner and Shop-Rite through union channels from which a
satisfactory resolution may never emerge. This problem would be circumvented by statutory protection which would provide that a
refusal by an employee to perform work that directly contributes to
a violation of the law would not be deemed a strike and would be
protected under section 7.
There is direct precedent for such an approach in section 502 of
the Taft-Hartley Act.887 That section provides, in part, that work
stoppages by employees "in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment" shall not be
deemed a strike under the Taft-Hartley Act. Illustrative of the application of this section is the decision of the Third Circuit in Phil384. 419 F.2d at 219 n.l, discussing Salt River Valley Water Users Assn. v. NLRB,
206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1966).
385. NLRB v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966).
386. See text accompanying notes 341-44 supra.
387. 29 u.s.c. § 143 (1970).
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adelphia Marine Trade Association v. NLRB. 888 In that case, a group
of longshoremen refused to unload one ship by a method that they
thought was abnormally dangerous. The Trade Association did not
contest the NLRB's finding of abnormally dangerous conditions, but
argued that its subsequent lockout of all longshoremen "was justified
because its purpose was to compel the union to abandon a 'quickie
strike,' and to compel the submission of the dispute to arbitration. "389 The court stated: "The short answer to this is because the
union's activity was found to come within the ambit of section 502,
it was not a strike in violation of the contract, but, on the contrary,
was protected activity."890
In order for protection designed along the lines of section 502
to be meaningful, however, the subjective good faith belief of the
employees as to the existence of abnormally dangerous or unlawful
conditions should be sufficient to invoke the statute. It is this issue
-whether an objective or subjective test is to be applied-that has
dominated the litigation under section 502. In NLRB v. Knight
Morley Corp.,891 a subjective test was applied: all that need be shown
is that the workers could reasonably consider the working conditions
to be abnormally dangerous. 392 In later decisions, however, the
NLRB and the Eighth Circuit have concluded that an objective test
for abnormally dangerous working conditions is appropriate. 898
Furthermore, as the Board has recently stated,
Absent the emergence of new factors or circumstances which change
the character of the danger, work which is recognized and accepted
by employees as inherently dangerous does not become "abnormally
dangerous" merely because employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thin or their forebearance ceases.394

Even under the Board's approach, employees should be protected
388. 330 F.2d 492, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833 (1964).
389. 330 F.2d at 495.
390. 330 F.2d at 495.
391. 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
392. 251 F.2d at 759. The condition in question was an unusually unpleasant com•
bination of dust, grit, heat, and humidity inside _the plant, due in large part to
malfunctions in the blower providing the Yentilation required by Michigan's statute.
251 F.2d at 756.
393. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964);
Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473 (1963). In Fruin-Calnan, the construction
of section 502 by the Sixth Circuit in Knight Morley was expressly rejected. 330 F.2d
at 892. In the Curtis Mathes case, decided before Knight Morley, an opposite result
was reached on virtually identical facts.
394. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.LR.B. No. 51, at 20, 80 L.R.R.M. 1780, 1782
(1972), citing NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964).
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from extraordinary danger that exists above and beyond the normal
hazards of their work. Yet, such protection will have little significance
unless activated by the good faith belief of the employees as to the
nature of the extraordinary danger. These points were recognized
recently by the Third Circuit in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers. 8911 In conjunction with a dispute between the union and
the employer over a reduced air flow in a mine shaft, it was discovered
that certain foremen had been making false entries on the log book
recording the air flow. 896 When these foremen were reinstated, the
employees, led by the union, walked off the job. The employer sought
to deal with the situation under those sections of the contract providing for final and binding arbitration of "any local trouble of any
kind" at the mine. 397 Acknowledging the strong federal policy in favor
of arbitration, the court nevertheless reached the following conclusions:
Considerations of economic peace that favor arbitration of ordinary disputes have little weight here. Men are not wont to submit
matters of life or death to arbitration and no enlightened society encourages, much less requires, them to do so. If employees believe that
correctible circumstances are unnecessarily adding to the normal
dangers of their hazardous employment, there is no sound reason for
requiring them to subordinate their judgment to that of an arbitrator,
however impartial he may be.sos
The suit in Gateway Coal was not brought under section 502, but the
court supported its conclusion by referring to section 502 and by
citing its earlier decision in Philadelphia Marine Trade Association
and the Sixth Circuit's Knight Morley decision. 399 Nevertheless, the
opinion, although salutary in outcome, may not persuade the Supreme Court, which has taken the case on certiorari.400
A revival of the subjective test utilized in Knight Morley could
ameliorate the problem of the Tanner doctrine. If a minority of
employees protest what they in good faith believe to be abnormally
dangerous working conditions, their activity cannot be deemed a
395. 466 F.2d 1157 (1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S., Feb. 26, 1973).
396. 466 F.2d at 1158.
397. 466 F.2d at 1159.
398. 466 F.2d at 1160.
399. 466 F.2d at 1160. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 885 (1964), was not cited. However, the dissenting judge observed that,
as he read the statute, section 502 "requires a third party, a court, to determine the
reasonableness of the union's belief in the abnormally dangerous condition." 466 F.2d
at 1162.
400. 41 U.S.L.W. 3462 (Feb. 26, 1973).
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strike and would be protected even if the employees did not elect to
go to the union first. Applying a subjective standard to section 502
or granting statutory protection for an employee's refusal to obey an
employer's order to contribute to unlawful activity is not contrary to
the Tanner rationale. Tanner rests on the necessity of preserving the
exclusivity of the union's role as the bargaining representative-a
role undercut by activities of a minority of employees seeking to
secure additional benefits or to apply pressure on the employer. The
union, however, has no power to countenance violations of the law
by its employees. Nothing the union could negotiate or arbitrate with
the employer would solve this problem, short of agreement to accept
the employee's refusal to perform the illegal act. Also, as Gateway
Coal recognizes, "no enlightened society" should encourage, much
less require, employees to arbitrate a matter of life or death. The
same should be true of violations of the law. Forced negotiation or
arbitration of these problems is materially different from requiring
employees to subordinate their economic demands to those articulated by the chosen collective bargaining representative.
Perhaps section 502 suits will be exempted by the courts from the
Tanner-Shop-Rite doctrine. But, absent this development, statutory
protection of an employee's refusal to contribute to a violation of the
law, either by amendment to section 502 or by independent legislation, would be helpful. Any such legislation would probably circumvent Tanner and Shop-Rite by inference, although express
language to this effect could easily be incorporated.

V.

ILLUSTRATIVE AND RECOMMENDED CONTRACT PROVISIONS

The extent to which out-plant environmental matters can be
brought to the bargaining table will vary according to the type of
contract language sought. Some of the attempts which have been made
by labor have been previously discussed. Those provisions, and other
ideas, need now to be considered against the legal backdrop of legislative history and case authority giving content to the duty to bargain.

A.

The 1AM Environmental Shutdown Provision

Under the established holdings of the NLRB, the provision
negotiated by the 1AM concerning environmental shutdowns401
clearly covers a mandatory subject of bargaining. It is unnecessary
to apply Fibreboard in analyzing this provision since the object of
401. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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the provision is not the decision to shut down, but the impact of the
shutdown on the workers. Although the shutdown or layoff would be
caused by economic problems precipitated by governmental requirements, this should be treated the same as shutdowns for other
economic reasons. Bargaining is required over the impact of partial
plant closings and complete plant shutdowns.402

B.

The United Farm Workers Economic Poisons Provision

As earlier indicated,403 the United Farm Workers' contract has a
provision that combines general ecological recitations with provisions
concerning the use of pesticides that directly affect the worker's
health as well as the welfare of the public. There should be no
question that this provision represents a mandatory bargaining subject, even under the views of the courts of appeals. Justice Stewart in
Fibreboard acknowledged that safety issues concerning the lives of the
workers during their working experience were encompassed by the
duty to bargain.404

C.

The Steelworkers and Glass Bottle Blowers General Policy
Provisions

It is not realistic to consider the provisions concerning general
environmental policy negotiated by the Steelworkers or Glass Bottle
Blowers405 as involving a strike issue; whether either is construed as
a mandatory bargaining issue is academic. It is likely, nevertheless,
that management would cooperate in fashioning such a provision, and
the presence of this type of provision in a collective bargaining agreement would be a first step that might in succeeding contracts lead to
more substantive arrangements. Moreover, it is possible that the
contract provision would generate meaningful grievance and arbitration cases.
D.

The Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers Comprehensive
Proposal

Some parts of the proposal of the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill
Workers400 should be regarded as mandatory subjects of bargaining
402. See General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971),
petition for review denied sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
note 211 supra.
403. See text accompanying notes 143-45 supra.
404. 379 U.S. at 222.
405. See text accompanying notes 142 & 152 supra.
406. See text accompanying notes 132-41 supra.
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under existing law, such as the environmental layoff protection.
Other parts, such as the contract provision for disclosure of financial
records to support an employer's claim of high pollution abatement
costs (other than as a part of required bargaining over threatened
layoffs or suspensions), would be met with claims of managerial prerogatives. It can be argued that all such information is relevant to
job security as information to be used by a union to avert layoffs. But
this is what Justice Stewart's opinion in Fibreboard was all about
-the fact that an issue affects job security is not enough in all cases.407
The same problem occurs with regard to the provision of the
Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers' proposal earmarking a
percentage of investment and profits for environmental research.408
This type of provision not only raises a management prerogative
question, but also requires an allocation by management of capital
funds-exactly the sort of thing that Justice Stewart was talking about
in Fibreboard409 and that was picked up subsequently in the Darlington case.410 Yet, this is an example of a provision where Justice
Stewart's narrow interpretation is harmful. If employees wish to press
for these demands and if their lives are significantly affected, 411 the
law and times should adjust. Employer prerogatives are not written
in stone, and this provision would settle an aspect of the employeremployee relationship.412 It is a condition of employment on which
407. 379 U.S. at 222-23.
408. Compare the one-half cent per hour industry contribution for environmental
research won by the United Rubber Workers in 1970. Pearlstine, Labor's Pollution
Campaign Goes Up in Smoke, Wall St. J., April 19, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
409. 379 U.S. at 223.
410. Textile Union Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1963), involved
the decision by a board of directors to close down a plant rather than recognize the
newly elected union. Faced with the question whether this action constituted violations
of sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3), Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, asserted:
Whatever may be the limits of § 8(a)(l), some employer decisions are so peculiarly
matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations
of § 8(a)(l), whether or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they
also violated § 8(a)(3). Thus it is not questioned in this case that an employer
has the right to terminate his business, whatever the impact of such action on
concerted activities, if the decision to close is motivated by other than discriminatory reasons.
380 U.S. at 269.
411. Whether or not employees are vitally affected, to use Justice Brennan's Pitts•
burgh Plate Glass term, is an inquiry in all cases as a practical matter. The substantial•
ity of the impact of the subject on the employees necessarily is a factor in evaluating
the subject as a potential strike issue.
412. As previously discussed, the Court in Borg-Warner apparently used this test
as a means for determining what would or would not be a mandatory subject of
bargaining. The ballot clause being proposed by the company was excluded because
"[i]t settles no terms or condition of employment-it merely calls for an advisory vote
of the employees. It is not a partial 'no-strike' clause. A 'no-strike' clause prohibits
the employees from striking during the life of the contract. It regulates the relations
between the employer and the employees." 356 U.S. at 350.
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bargaining should be required to the extent pressed by either party
at the bargaining table.
The Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers' approach has one
strategic advantage. By intermingling clearly mandatory provisions
with arguably nonmandatory ones, the burden is shifted to the employer to winnow out the nonmandatory features. This may prove a
delicate process, both from a legal and political standpoint. Management might choose to resolve such a problem by bargaining on the
entire proposal until a resolution is reached, instead of picking the
proposal apart on jurisdictional grounds. 413
E.

Suggested Provisions for Individual Employee Protection

Three general types of provisions can be negotiated to protect
the individual employee.414 One would provide that no discipline or
discharge of employees could be imposed for reporting an employer's
pollution violation. This provision should clearly be mandatory
under the Taft-Hartley Act. It is akin to the "just cause" provisions
that have been around for years. There should not be particularly
strong employer opposition to this type of provision.
Another possible provision would prohibit discipline or discharge
for a refusal to perform work that directly contributes to unlawful
pollution. This provision should also be mandatory under existing
law. Employees can refuse to perform unlawful acts.415 Conversely,
employees are not protected if they are engaged in unlawful behavior
or seek unlawful goals.416 This provision can also be construed as an
aspect of familiar "just cause" contractual language. Here, as in all
of the contract provisions discussed, the grievance and arbitration
process could play a significant role.
Finally, a third section could provide that no employee could be
disciplined or discharged for refusing to perform work that directly
contributes to improper pollution. Once again, this could be a part
of the "just cause" provision, and the term "just cause" might be
defined in the contract to exclude this type of behavior. The employees' interest in being able to refuse this type of work is clearly a condition of employment-not only would it be a "bone of contention"417 between the employer and the employees, but also it would
41!1, As later indicated, this strategic feature also attends the conglomerate proposal
suggested at text accompanying note 420 infra.
414. These provisions are hypothetical; to the author's knowledge they have not
been negotiated in practice.
415. See text accompanying notes !1!1!1-40 supra.
416. See text accompanying notes !141-44 supra,
417. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 676 (1949).

1024

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:935

be related to job security. Moreover, this type of provision directly
involves the employer-employee relationship, and, in the language of
Borg-Warner,418 echoed in Pittsburgh Plate Glass,419 it would settle
an aspect of the employer-employee relationship. Admittedly, this is
a subject to be negotiated and would call for a rule of reason. If the
essence of an employee's job unavoidably involves environmentally
harmful acts that the employee views as unconscionable (though not
unlawful), and if no transfer is feasible, the employee might be lawfully fired. But in any case, construction of the contract provision
would be required, and useful advantage might be taken of the
grievance and arbitration procedures. Moreover, in the process the
employer may be sensitized to environmental considerations not
previously considered-a salutary by-product of including this type
of provision in the bargaining mainstream.
F. A Suggested Conglomerate Provision
The following provision is suggested as a model for handling
environmental problems through collective bargaining.420
(a) An employee shall in no way be penalized for refusing to perform
a job or task, if his refusal is based on a good faith claim that the job
or task will contribute to an unlawful or unduly hazardous pollution
condition. Upon any such refusal, the employee shall be given suitable
work elsewhere in the plant, if such work is available. If no suitable
work is available, the employee shall be sent home, and the time lost
by the employee shall not be paid for by the company.
(b) If the plant is closed partially or completely by any government
agency for an alleged violation of a pollution control standard, all
employees affected by the closing shall receive full compensation at
their regular rate of pay for any time lost for a period of _ _ days
or until such time as the employees secure suitable employment else418. 356 U.S. at 350.
419. 404 U.S. at 178.
420. Although hypothetical, the various parts of this conglomerate provision have
been adapted from a number of sources, such as Leonard Woodcock's environmental
blackmail legislative proposal (see text accompanying notes 79-85 supra), the Pulp,
Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers' outline for an environmental protection committee
(see text accompanying notes 135-36 supra), and various contract provisions designed
to deal with health and safety problems. The health and safety provision after which
paragraph "(a)" in the text is fashioned was negotiated by the UAW in Philadelphia
in a contract between Local No. 1069 and the Vertol Division of Boeing Aircraft
Company. That provision included the following language:
An employee shall not be discharged for refusing to work on a job if his refusal is
based on a claim that said job is not safe or might unduly damage health ••••
Pending such determination, the employee will be given suitable work elsewhere
in the plant, if such work is available. If no suitable work is available, he will
be sent home. The time lost by the employee shall not be paid for by the com-

pany.
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where, whichever is shorter. The company shall provide assistance in
relocating employees and, wherever possible, shall retain the employees on the payroll by transferring them to other company operations. Employees shall not be paid for any time lost after having been
offered suitable alternative employment, if such employees decline to
accept such employment.
(c) There shall be established a joint union-management committee,
consisting of three union and three company representatives to be
known as the Environmental Committee. The committee shall establish minimum pollution standards which shall be within ten per cent
of then existing federal standards. The committee shall hold meetings
at least once each month, for the purpose of jointly inspecting, investigating, and reviewing pollution conditions, and for the purpose
of making joint recommendations to eliminate unhealthy or undesirable conditions. A written record shall be kept of all matters handled by the committee. In the event of a tie vote, the issue may be
submitted to the decision of a representative from [a local environmental protection group]. Time spent on work of the committee
shall be paid time.
(I) Any committee representative may arrange for an inspection
of facilities or a review or analysis of information by appropriate
officials of government or independent agencies, provided that any
such inspections shall be made in the presence of union and company representatives and that all reports, advice, recommendations,
opinions, or findings, whether verbal or documentary, shall provide
equal opportunity for comment and be equally available to the
union and company.
(2) The committee shall serve as a Community Dispute Settlement
Center, applying the techniques of mediation, fact-finding, and if
feasible, arbitration to complaints from the community. The committee shall have authority to advertise its existence by means of
local media outlets, such advertising to be conducted not less than
once each month.
(d) There shall be established an Environmental Fund for purposes
of pollution control and environmental protection, to be administered
and disbursed by the committee, and to be funded by either the union
or the company at their discretion, or by the terms set forth in this
contract. A treasurer, appointed by the committee, shall submit a
financial report once every three months. The fund shall be audited
by a certified public accountant once each calendar year, and the
audit shall be prominently displayed in the plant and offices of the
company.
(e) Upon determination by the committee that, for a consecutive
period of not less than three days, normal and continuing production
operations have caused pollution levels to exist in excess of committee
standards in either customary work areas or in areas of companyprovided leisure or convenience facilities such as lunch areas or park-
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ing lots, the company agrees to contribute$-- to the Environmental
Fund, and an additional $_ _ for each successive day in which the
standards are exceeded. In making such determinations, the committee shall have access to the company's monitoring equipment or shall
be authorized to secure and operate its own monitoring equipment.

(f) The union agrees that all production operations necessary for
the continuing operation or installation of antipollution devices or
procedures will be permitted throughout the period of any and all
strikes. The category of jobs covered by this provision will be designated by the committee. The designations to apply throughout a
given strike will be those established at a time six months prior to
strike action.
(g) The union agrees to enforce a fine of not less than $_ _ to be
paid to the Environmental Fund by any employee found by the
committee to have violated, without authorization, company pollution regulations or regulations and procedures established by the
committee, including reasonable standards limiting personal actions
such as discarding personal refuse.
(h) The company and the union agree that there shall be no reprisal
against anyone who volunteers information concerning company or
employee actions related to pollution to any third party.

As indicated by the preceding discussion, some parts of this
conglomerate provision clearly fall within the mandatory bargaining
range, while others cannot be so clearly categorized. This contract
proposal, like that of the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers
discussed above, has a tactical advantage. Just as riders on congressional bills often succeed as compromise means of securing passage
of the basic legislation, some of the "riders" in the conglomerate
provision might· be successfully bargained over in the process of
hammering out a final provision to deal with environmental problems.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In the aggregate, organized labor's involvement in environmental
problems has not been momentous. The reasons for this limited
activity are varied, including the persistent fear, at the local level in
particular, of job losses; the need to apply limited union resources
to priorities that seem more immediate to the worker in the work
place; the existence of other organizations and agencies designed to
spend all of their energies on environmental problems; and presumed
limitations on the legal possibilities within labor's jurisdiction.
However, recent developments have weakened some of these
excuses, and others appear insubstantial upon close analysis. The job
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scare is usually exaggerated; it may be nonexistent at the national
level, and legislative or contractual protection can be achieved and
should be sought for workers at the local level. The emergence of
OSHA should boost considerably the health and safety protections
for the workers in the plant, thereby facilitating a diversion of some
resources to health and safety conditions outside the plant. Certainly
it is now recognized that the environmental protection agencies cannot do the entire job, and for political reasons many of them will
operate in circumscribed ways.
Some of the legal alternatives open to organized labor under the
Taft-Hartley Act are clear. Contract provisions to protect against job
losses in cases of environmentally required shutdowns can be sought.
Provisions can be negotiated to protect workers against reprisal when
they report unlawful polluting activities of their employer to an
environmental protection agency. Contract protection can also be
negotiated to provide that a refusal by a worker to perform work
which contributes to unlawful pollution by his employer shall not
constitute just cause for discipline or discharge.
Other Taft-Hartley Act alternatives are not as clear but deserve to
be tested. At the bargaining table, a general provision dealing with
community environmental problems such as the one achieved by the
Steelworkers in a Canadian agreement421 should be sought. Because
of the provision's generality, management may not raise the BorgWarner issue to test whether the provision must be bargained about.
Even if this issue is raised, there is the chance that the provision will
be classified as mandatory, particularly if it arises in the setting of the
company town or the captive community. At the same time, environmental language can be inserted in provisions that have long been
accepted as mandatory bargaining issues. The United Farm Workers
Organizing Committee provision on pesticides is illustrative, even
though that organization operates outside the jurisdiction of the
Taft-Hartley Act. 422 Any number of variations in contractual language can and should be experimented with. As noted by Chamberlain and Kuhn:
I£ any conclusions can be reached as to the "appropriate" subject

matter of collective bargaining, then, it is that one cannot label
certain matters as bargainable and exclude others as beyond the
union's interest. Such labels do not often stick. With changing economic, social, and political relationships, issues which were once of no
concern to the workers, presumably because they were beyond their
421. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
422. Taft-Hartley Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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control, or those not immediately affecting their welfare become of
direct interest, with the possibility of control discovered or created.
One may question whether the impact of the union on any given
sphere of business operation is desirable or undesirable, just as one
may wonder whether the influence of a trade association is beneficial
or not, but this is a question to which the answer cannot be readily
found simply by dividing all business matters into the classifications
of those which are bargainable and those which are not bargainable. 423
If there is no union, employees who are disciplined or discharged
because of refusals to perform work which is environmentally injurious should file section S(a)(I) charges, alleging interference with
protected, concerted activities. If there is a union, and if there is no
"just cause" provision of the type previously mentioned, these employees should file the same charge, arguing that the Tanner case is
inapplicable. Alternatively, if there is a "just cause" provisioneither a generic one or one particularized to environmental concerns
-these employees should file a grievance and seek the active backing
of their unions. If the unions will not cooperate, employees should
call in the press, seek the support of fellow employees, contact the
federal and state environmental protection agencies, and perhaps
call in an OSHA inspector.424
For those few unions that have the resources and have demonstrated a willingness to press for legislation on environmental problems, there are several possibilities. The UAW's campaign to secure
legislative protection for workers laid off, discharged, or otherwise
adversely affected by environmental shutdowns should be supported.
Also, new statutory protection, analogous to section 502 of the Act,
could be sought so that a refusal to perform unlawful activities will
not be deemed a strike. This protection would be especially meaningful in those states where employees may be individually liable
for performing acts which contribute to unlawful pollution.425 Such
employees are in a thoroughly untenable position when the regular
performance of their jobs could lead to individual criminal sanctions.
Finally, unions can be influential through empirical activities.
Fact gathering of the type engaged in by the OCAW as a prelude to
OSHA, and by the UAW on occupational health and safety and
423. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, supra note 200, at 106-07.
424. An unfair labor practice charge based on an alleged breach of the duty of fair
representation could be filed as well, but success under the Yaca case would be unlikely
unless the union has been completely irresponsible. See text accompanying notes 365-66
supra.
425. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
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environmental matters, can yield powerful data with which to confront employers, environmental protection agencies, or the press.
But the collective data should not be allowed to gather dust; it must
be analyzed, utilized, and periodically updated.
It is worth reiterating that the various suggestions put forth in
this Article are intended to supplement, and not to substitute for,
independent energies directed at environmental problems. Moreover,
there are a great many employers who are responding voluntarily to
eliminate adverse environmental consequences of their commercial
and industrial operations. But in those lamentably numerous instances where substantial pollution remains, it is time to realize that
the workers are genuinely, often predominantly, affected by their
employers' pollution outside the plant as well as inside, and that
there is a high degree of interconnection between the internal and
external environments. A handful of unions and employers have
recognized these facts, and others will as well as time passes and environmental conditions worsen. It is hoped that the unions will
recognize one thing more-that attention by organized labor to community environmental problems represents, in the long run, an
exercise in enlightened self-interest.

APPENDIX

A

February 23, 1970
To All UAW Local Union Presidents and Chairmen of Bargaining
Committees in the United States and Canada

Greetings:
As you know the UAW Executive Board has suggested for consideration by the delegates to the forthcoming Constitutional Convention in April that the problem of pollution become a matter for
collective bargaining in 1970 negotiations. Moreover, the UAW has
already been hard at work developing and promoting protective
legislation on this problem. It will be one of the priority objectives
of the UAW, both at the bargaining table and in the legislative
branches of government in the United States and Canada, to seek
to protect UAW members and the millions of other workers against
environmental, occupational safety and health hazards which each
year become increasingly a danger to life and limb.
In order to better prepare ourselves for 1970 negotiations on this
subject and to promote strong protective legislation, we will need
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information which, within the Union, can be supplied only by you
and your fellow Local Union officers.
There are three basic types of in-plant pollution: noise pollution,
particulate matter or dust pollution, and pollution from toxic fumes
or gases.
There are about 6,000 potentially dangerous chemical substances
used in modem industry today which can adversely affect the health
of workers. There are only the weakest forms of protective standards
concerning 450 of these chemicals. It is extremely important that we
know what kinds of toxic materials are being used today in plants
under UAW contract. Your Local Union Safety Committee or the
stewards and committeemen should be helpful to you in obtaining
the information required for response to questions #2 through #39.
Industry is one of the worst polluters of the air, the water and the
land. The harmful effects upon the environment, upon the public
welfare and the health of the nation is [sic] already receiving wide
publicity. The health of thousands of our members is day by day
adversely affected by the industrial pollution inside the plants. Industry has not taken sufficient protective action to eliminate pollution
and its harmful effects. This is why it is necessary for the Union to
make this a matter of collective bargaining and for this purpose it is·
essential that we have maximum information concerning industrial
pollution in each of the plants under UAW contract. Your Local
Union Conservation-Recreation Committee should be involved in
compiling the requested data for response to questions #40-#54.
Your stewards and committeemen could be most helpful as well in
collecting information for you.
By helping us assemble this inventory about the environmental,
occupational safety and health problems in your plant, you will be
making an important contribution to the UAW effort to improve
working conditions and to formulate strong federal legislation which
will protect workers everywhere on their jobs and where they live.
The need for collecting this information is urgent. Please return
the questionnaire, properly filled out, to Solidarity House, attention
of the President's Office, promptly.
Fraternally,
Walter P. Reuther, President
Olga M. Madar, Director
Department of Conservation and
Resource Development

April 1973]

Organized Labor and the Environment

1031

U.A.W.
ENVIRONMENTAL, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE
Local No. _______ Address: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
No. of bargaining units _ _ _ _ _ __
•Names of Companies-Type of production and number of members

I. Are the companies that you hold contracts with covered by the
Walsh Healey Act? (The Walsh Healey Act covers all companies
which do work for the Government in excess of $10,000 per year.
Please indicate if you know or believe your plant is in that
category.)
2. The standards for chemicals, sound and particulate matter are
known as Threshhold [sic] Limit Values. Are these values posted
for your members to see?
3. Do the companies measure them with monitoring equipment to
see that they are not exceeded?
4. How often? Daily _ _ Weekly _ _ Monthly _ _ Yearly _ _
Never _ _
5. Do the companies allow the Union to see the results of their
tests?
6. Does the Union ask that monitoring be done on a regular basis?
7. Does your Local Union do monitoring?
7. [sic] Are special medical tests given to UAW workers on a regular
basis?
8. How often?
9. Are these tests required by your contract?
10. Are the results given to the individual?
1I. Are the results given to the Local Union?
12. What kind of medical tests are performed? (For example: urine
for lead, etc.)
13. What type of safety or health programs does the company have?·
14. What suggestions do you have for improvements?
15. Do they have Doctors on duty?
16. How many?
17. All shifts?
18. Do they have nurses on duty?
19. Howmany?
20. All shifts?
21. To the best of your knowledge, list the harmful substances used
by your members in the manufacturing process.
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22. What substances seem to be giving your members the most
trouble in the workplace? (For example: gases, particulate matter, noise, chemicals, etc.)
23. What needs to be done?
24. Should the employer provide more information about the nature
of these dangers to health or safety?
25. How often are your plants visited by a safety inspector-state
or federal?
26. Does your local ever spot check the safety or health engineering
equipment used by members?
27. What is the result?
28. If an inspector has visited your plant, has he discussed his findings with the union?
29. If not, why not?
30. Have you been able to get copies of his reports?
31. Please state your views on the problems your local union has
faced regarding safety.
32. Have there been accidents in the plants where the employees
were unable to protect themselves from harm?
33. Also list diseases developed by your members and other facts
bearing on the question of health damage.
34. How has management responded to union requests for better
safety or health conditions?
35. Does your plant employ personnel solely for safety or health
protection purposes?
36. Do you have a joint union-management safety committee in
your plant?
37. If yes, list names and addresses of local union members who
serve on this committee.
38. List names and addresses of any members who serve as safety
people for your local union. (If same as above, indicate "same".)
39. Are they recognized by the company?
40. Do your members know if their plant is contributing to pollution of the surrounding air, water and land?
41. Please describe how this occurs and about how much pollution
results. (Waste products flushed into rivers, gases or dust released
into the air.)
42. Do any of your members know of examples where their lives
have been directly affected by pollution caused by your plant?
(Recreation facilities such as water or land destroyed, impaired
or othenvise diminished in value for others.)
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43. Please list examples.
44. Does your plant have devices that purify wastes before they are
discharged into the air or water?
45. Are they maintained in working order?
46. Has your plant been "Cited" for air or water pollution violations
by any Governmental enforcement agency?
47. Describe violation or violations.
48. Are your members assigned job tasks by plant management and/
or supervision which results in air or water pollution?
49. If so, specify:
50. Are emissions from your company's smokestacks present in plant
parking lots where your members park their cars during their
work hours?
51. If emissions are present, are there ill effects to your members'
cars?
52. List examples:
53. Does your local union have a Conservation-Recreation Committee?
54. If yes, please list names and addresses of Committee members.
NOTE:

PLEASE RETURN TO UAW, SOLIDARITY HOUSE,
ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
Name of Local Union Officer returning Questionnaire
Local Union office held:
APPENDIX B

Ecological and Environmental Resolutions Considered at the Ninth
Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO, Bal Harbour, Florida,
November 18-24, 1971.
I.

RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY OCAw
Environmental Protection

RESOLUTION NO. 72-By Delegates A. F. Grospiron, B. J.
Schafer, Eldwood D. Swisher, Anthony C. Sabatine, Angelo Augustina; Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union.
WHEREAS, It is not necessary in this statement to reiterate the
many ways by which modern man is polluting his environment. These
have been well publicized and discussed in recent years. It is clear to
all that pollution is making life less pleasant, is causing sickness, and
indeed is threatening the very survival of the human race, and
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WHEREAS, On many occasions labor unions have contributed
significantly to the current efforts to stop pollution. Union members
are well informed on the subject because they work in the industrial
plants which contribute to pollution. They are the first to be exposed
to the toxic and noxious fumes, vapors, liquids and solids which
escape from the factories into the general environment, and
WHEREAS, On some occasions organized labor faces a conflict
of interest between environmental clean-up on the one hand and
economic security and prosperity on the other hand. This conflict is
particularly poignant when employers assert that certain facilities
must be closed, causing unemployment, when anti-pollution measures are deemed to be too expensive, and
WHEREAS, We believe that these conflicts can be resolved and
must be resolved. The position of organized labor must be that environmental protection must have the highest priority, that pollution
must be stopped at all costs, and
WHEREAS, In most cases existing industrial facilities can be so
modified and improved as to eliminate polluting emissions. In most
cases the owners can accomplish this through the expenditure of reasonable amounts of money. In most cases this will mean more, not
less, employment because labor is required in the building, installation and day-to-day operation and maintenance of pollution control
devices, and
WHEREAS, In some few cases it may be economically unsound
to continue operations of obsolete, economically marginal facilities.
There is no doubt that pollution control laws and regulations will
force the shutdown of some places of employment. Of course the
number of plants which actually must be closed will be far fewer than
the number threatened by owners and managers who seek to escape
compliance with environmental protection orders, and
WHEREAS, Whenever the closing of a facility does prove necessary, the workers displaced must be given economic protection and
assistance. This must be considered one of the necessary costs of ending pollution, to be absorbed by the economy, private and public, as
all other costs are absorbed; therefore, be it
RESOLVED: By the AFL-CIO Convention that it does support
a full and effective elimination of environmental pollution at whatever cost is necessary, and be it further
RESOLVED:
1. That whenever environmental protection measures force the
partial or full closure of a facility with resultant job losses, displaced
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workers shall be protected in their economic well-being. Such protection can take the form of early retirement with adequate pension,
extended severance pay, transfer to jobs in other facilities of the company involved, job retraining and job placement, and others. The
costs should be borne by the employer where feasible. Whenever an
employer demonstrates conclusively that it is not feasible for him to
bear the costs, government must assume the responsibility.
2. That employers be inhibited from using the threat of unemployment as a method, avoiding compliance with pollution control
standards by the passage of legislation providing that any employer
making such a threat be subject to injunction forbidding the layoff
of any worker until the necessity of such layoff or layoffs has been
proven, with burden of proof on the employer and with public hearings and opportunity for cross-examination of employer witnesses
provided.
3. That emissions standards be established without delay, based
in principle on zero pollution; that such standards be uniform for all
50 States, Puerto Rico, and Canada; and that the standards be given
the force of law.
4. That all federal, state and local government jurisdictions provide penalties of sufficient severity and that these penalties be enforced for violations of emission standards by individuals and
corporations.
5. That victims of pollution, public and private, be entitled to
sue polluters for triple damages plus replacement in kind.
6. That all waste waters be freed of such metallic toxicants as
mercury, copper and chrome, and that all burdens of salts, organics
and biologically active impurities be reduced to a level no higher
than that of the receiving waters; that thermal pollution be regulated
and that such other safeguards be established so that the waters receiving wastes be unaltered ecologically.
7. That the industrial practice of dispersing waste gases by such
devices as overly tall stacks, be discouraged and that emphasis be
placed upon process and apparatus improvements.
8. That the practice of injecting fluid wastes into subterranean
disposal wells be immediately disallowed and that all such practices
now authorized by state permits be revoked.
9. That city and county control boards be restricted in granting
variances from lawful control orders.
IO. That statewide zoning be applied to the location of factories,
plants and industries.
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11. That all states mandate class actions to replace the commonlaw principle of nuisance and to permit suits against polluters by
persons otherwise unable to demonstrate direct injury.
12. That states provide penalties equivalent to a minimum of
ten years' taxes against industries which "run away" from a state to
avoid compliance with pollution standards and that such a penalty
be a lien against the treasurer of the offending firm; that the United
States Departments of Labor and of Health, Education and Welfare
immediately establish guidelines by which it may reasonably be determined when an industry "runs away" rather than comply with
environmental standards.
13. That no tax concessions of any manner be granted to any
plant required to install devices, change processes or alter raw materials for the purpose of complying with an order to abate pollution
and comply with control standards.
14. That any business activity using municipal facilities for the
treatment of wastes or disposal, including sewerage and sewage treatment, be assessed weighted and equitable charges.
15. That no plant or business shall permit noise, light or radiation, in addition to gases, solid wastes and fluids, to escape into surrounding neighborhood.
16. That the affiliates, staff and officers of the AFL-CIO encourage constructive legislation for environmental control, support and
aid politicians concerned with environmental protection, and exert
their families' influence in the market place by purchasing and using
products, materials, packaging and devices which are proven not to
contribute to pollution or to the degradation of our environment,
and to assist and encourage all organizations involved in the fight to
maintain a viable ecology.
Referred to Committee on Resolutions.
II.

RESOLUTIONS

p ASSED

Resolution No. 124: The Environment
The challenge of pollution is far from met, although there has
been some improvement over the past two years.
In the administration of federal anti-pollution legislation, we
urge that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration be
transferred from the Department of Commerce to the Environmental
Protection Agency. The administration of the Refuse [Act?] should
also be transferred from the Corps of Army Engineers to the Environmental Protection Agency, with responsibilities extended to cover

April 1973]

Organized Labor and the Environment

1037

intra-state as well as inter-state navigable waters, underground waters,
lakes, esturaries [sic], the contiguous coastal areas, and appurtenant
land.
Changes in industrial processes, to abate air and water pollution,
may cost jobs in one area and gain them in another sector. Workers,
however, are badly in need of protection against environmental blackmail by management and possible misrepresentations of job loss resulting from the cost of complying with a government abatement
order and where companies threaten to leave and relocate in another
state or locality, whose laws and enforcement programs are softer on
polluters.
Therefore, the federal air and water pollution acts should be
amended to provide national emission standards on all existing stationary sources of both air and water pollution. The amendment
should provide that any employer, alleging that an abatement order
will cause layoffs, dismissals, or cessation of operations, must prove its
case before an administrative hearing called by the federal agency
involved. Any company, in those circumstances, which fails to demonstrate such relationship, would be subject to civil penalties. Any
worker or workers' representative, using the protections and rights
of the act, must be protected from management sanctions by nondiscrimination provisions in the federal air and water pollution control acts.
If an actual job-loss is demonstrated, federal manpower training
and other special programs should assist the workers.
Because of air pollution and the tremendous drain on energy
fuels by internal combustion engines for automotive vehicles, we
once again urge that the National Air Pollution Control AdministJ;ation give top priority on developing alternative sources of power
for such vehicles, particularly in the field of steam power.
Although the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments streamlined the
enforcement process, the federal, regional and state enforcement
efforts have not been adequate. There should be a concerted crackdown on all violators of emission standards.
The AFL-CIO supports amendments to the federal Water Pollution Control Act which would:
Cover all navigable waters, underground waters, lakes, coastal
areas, contiguous coast areas, soil wash from all sources, feed lots,
sanitary landfills, and associated land problems affecting water quality.
Empower the federal government to establish national emission
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standards. All industrial concerns releasing effluents into water would
be required to measure and report the kinds and quality of such
effluents to the federal government.
Provide for issuance of immediate abatement orders enforced by
federal court orders. Civil and criminal penalties for violators should
be stiffened. The 1899 Refuse Act should be made an important enforcement tool.
At least $3 billion each year for the next five years, should be
appropriated by Congress for federal grants to assist municipalities
in construction or modification of sewage treatment plants.
Such a program could create more than 250,000 new jobs, many
in areas of high unemployment, with a multiplier effect, adding as
many as 300,000 additional new jobs. To assist needy communities,
the present 66 percent federal matching ceiling should be increased
to 80 percent.
Each state plan should require river basin planning as the foundation of its abatement program as a condition of receiving federal
approval and financial assistance.
The nation is in need of a national land-use policy as an important and logical next step to improve and enhance the quality of our
environment, and at the same time, provide for sound use and development, consistent with the economic and social needs of the American people.
Such a national land use policy should include the following: a
federal grant-in-aid program to assist state and local governments in
establishing or improving their land-use programs and managements,
and adopting broad land-use laws and programs; a federal program
to improve land-use planning and operations on federally mmed
lands; developing data on major land-use and planning trends;
strengthening federal, state and local soil conservation programs.
We continue to support the family farm ownership, the break-up
of huge land monopolies, and strict enforcement of the excess acreage
provisions of federal reclamation laws.
We urge an expansion of the federal role and increased emphasis
in solid wastes technology, in particular those dealing with separation, recycling and re-use of solid wastes. A broad and systematic program should give full consideration to human values, including the .
jobs of workers in the private sector as well as those employed in the
disposal field.
Resolution No. 125: Energy
The AFL-CIO.has time and again, over the past decade, called
for a comprehensive natural resources and energy policy, integrated
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with a full-employment economic policy which would protect and
preserve the environment, protect the interests of the consuming
public, and eliminate duplication of functions and waste among the
scattered federal resources departments and agencies.
A long-range national energy policy is needed that will influence
the percent of America's future energy requirements supplied by oil,
natural gas, coal and uranium. Such a policy should develop a rational
pattern of research, development and conservation of energy resources, resolution of problems of costs, supply, monopolization, pollution, and the necessary restructuring of the federal agencies engaged in these fields.
Just as the President is now advised by a statutory Council of
Environmental Advisers, a similarly constituted Council on National
Energy Policy should be created by Congress. The council's functions
should include a close consultative relationship with the Environmental Protection Agency, annual reports to Congress on the state
of the nation's energy posture, projections of energy resources and
needs, and recommend research and development programs to help
solve present and future problems of competition, new and improved
technologies, consumer protection and foreign supply.
·we urge the establishment by Congress of long-range programs
to develop our enormous oil shale resource, and utilizing domestic
coal reserves by converting them into supplies of low-pollution natural gas.
The creation of TVA-type development agencies are needed in
order to most effectively achieve the national objectives of abundant
low-cost supply of such new energy fuels, guard against monopoly,
provide a federal cost yardstick to protect consumers, conserve the
resources and prevent environmental damage.
·we have long urged high priority to development of a feasible
breeder reactor technology. We support congressional authorization
of a demonstration breeder reactor to be constructed and operated
by the Atomic Energy Commission, with the most meticulous protection against the terrible hazards of plutonium, one of the most
dangerous materials. This should be done with full participation by
the nation's scientific community, and protection against breeder
reactors close to population centers.
While we endorse the recent strengthening by the Atomic Energy
Commission of its standards, governing release of airborne radioactive
materials to the general environment, we insist that such reductions
be made to apply to all radiation workers as well.
We cannot emphasize too strongly the need for more resources
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to be placed into the effort to achieve sustained energy from the
fusion of the heavy hydrogen atom. The difficult problems that still
lie ahead must be more rapidly resolved. Fusion power would make
it possible to achieve an almost limitless supply of energy from the
oceans.
The continuation of major and minor power brownouts and
blackouts, in the past six years, underlies the need for legislation of
the kind that the AFL-CIO has urged since 1959. Such a program
would create a low-cost, reliable bulk power supply system for the
United States, open to participation by all electric systems. The federal government should regulate the creation and operation of regional power supply systems. I£ such agencies £ail to carry out the aims
of the program, the federal government should build and operate
them.
Once again, we urge Congress to investigate the increasing control
over major energy sources by giant integrated corporations, the accompanying decline in competition, and the failure of the Federal
Power Commission and the Department of the Interior to provide
adequate protection of the public against energy monopolies.

